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Abstract
The design of reliable embedded control systems inherits the difficulties involved in designing
both control systems and distributed (concurrent) computing systems. Design bugs in these
systems may arise from the unforeseen interactions among the computing, communication
and control subsystems. Motivated by the difficulties of finding this type of design bugs, this
thesis develops mathematical frameworks, based on formal methods, to facilitate the design
and analysis of such embedded systems. An expressive specification language of linear
temporal logic (LTL) is used to specify the desired system properties. The practicality
of the proposed frameworks is demonstrated through autonomous vehicle case studies and
autonomous urban driving problems.
Our approach incorporates methodology from computer science and control, includ-
ing model checking, theorem proving, synthesis of digital designs, reachability analysis,
Lyapunov-type methods and receding horizon control. This thesis consists of two comple-
mentary parts, namely, verification and design. First, we introduce Periodically Controlled
Hybrid Automata (PCHA), a subclass of hybrid automata that abstractly captures a com-
mon design pattern in embedded control systems. New sufficient conditions that exploit
the structure of PCHAs in order to simplify their invariant verification are presented.
Although the aforementioned technique simplifies invariant verification of PCHAs, find-
ing a proper invariant remains a challenging problem. To complement the verification
efforts, in the second part of the thesis, we present a methodology for automatic synthesis
of embedded control software that provides a formal guarantee of system correctness, with
respect to its desired properties expressed in linear temporal logic. The correctness of the
system is guaranteed even in the presence of an adversary (typically arising from changes
in the environments), disturbances and modeling errors. A receding horizon framework
is proposed to alleviate the associated computational complexity of LTL synthesis. The
effectiveness of this framework is demonstrated through the autonomous driving problems.
vContents
Acknowledgements iii
Abstract iv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Thesis Overview and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Background 11
2.1 Alice: An Autonomous Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Linear Temporal Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 System Verification 19
3.1 Formal Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.1 Computer-Science Oriented Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.2 Control Oriented Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Hybrid System Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.1 Hybrid Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.2 Other Modeling Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4 Applications of Formal Methods to Alice 27
4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2 Canonical Software Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3 Verification of Gcdrive Finite State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.4 Composing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
vi
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.A PROMELA Models for the Gcdrive Finite State Machine Example . . . . . . 43
5 Periodically Control Hybrid Automata 51
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3 Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.3.1 Definition of Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automata . . . . . . . . . 54
5.3.2 Invariant Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.3.3 Sum of Squares Formulation for Checking the Invariant Conditions . 62
5.3.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.4 Case Study: Alice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4.1 Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4.2 Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.4.3 Complete System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5 Analysis of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5.1 Family of Invariants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.5.2 Invariance Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.5.3 Segment Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.5.4 Safety and Waypoint Progress: Identifying Safe Planner Paths . . . . 78
5.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.A Vehicle∥Controller as a PCHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.B Invariant Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.C Proofs for Segment Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.D Proofs for Safety and Waypoint Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
6 Automatic Synthesis of Embedded Control Software 99
6.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2.1 Synthesis of a Digital Design: A Two-Player Game Approach . . . . . 101
6.2.2 Synthesis of a Continuous Controller: An Optimization-Based Approach103
6.3 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.4 Hierarchical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
vii
6.5 Computing Finite State Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.5.1 Finite Time Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.5.2 Preliminaries on Polyhedral Convexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
6.5.3 Verifying the Reachability Relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.5.4 State Space Discretization and Correctness of the System . . . . . . . 115
6.5.5 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7 Receding Horizon Framework for Temporal Logic Specifications 120
7.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.2 Preliminaries on Receding Horizon Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.3 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.4 Receding Horizon Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.5 Implementation of the Receding Horizon Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.6 Case Study: Autonomous Urban Driving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8 Conclusions and Future Work 145
8.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Bibliography 150
1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Modern engineering systems often comprise a network of sensors and actuators, equipped
with computing and communication capabilities. These systems may also need to read-
ily react to changing environments and operational situations. Such “embedded systems”
appear in diverse areas including aerospace, automotive, civil infrastructure, energy, health-
care, manufacturing and transportation. Design bugs in these systems can be fairly subtle
and may arise from the unforeseen interactions among the computing, the communication
and the control subsystems. Finding this type of design bug is challenging, but is neverthe-
less important to ensure reliability of the systems. In most cases, traditional techniques for
analyzing systems based on testing and simulation are not adequate to ensure the absence
of these bugs.
Consider, for example, the autonomous vehicle Alice built at Caltech for the 2007
DARPA Urban Challenge [1]. The DARPA Urban Challenge required all the competing
vehicles to navigate, in a fully autonomous manner, through a partially known urban-like
environment populated with static and dynamic obstacles, including live traffic. These ve-
hicles also had to perform different tasks such as street and off-road driving, parking and
visiting certain areas while obeying traffic rules. These tasks were specified by a sequence
of checkpoints that the vehicle had to cross. For the vehicles to successfully complete the
race, they need to be capable of negotiating an intersection, handling changes in the envi-
ronment or operating condition (e.g., newly discovered obstacles) and reactively replanning
in response to those changes (e.g., making a U-turn and finding a new route when the newly
discovered obstacles fully block the road).
2Figure 1.1: Alice, Team Caltech’s entry in the 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge.
Alice (Figure 1.1) is a modified Ford E350 van, equipped with mechanical actuators
(brake, throttle, steering and transmission), sensors (LADARs, RADARs and cameras) and
an Applanix INS (for state estimation). The embedded computing system of Alice consists
of approximately 25 programs and 200 execution threads to be executed concurrently in
the 25 processors onboard. This system can be divided into the sensing and the control
subsystems. The sensing subsystem provides a representation of the environment around
the vehicle. The control subsystem determines and executes desired motion of the vehicle
to satisfy the mission goals, which include crossing GPS waypoints, avoiding obstacles,
following traffic rules, etc.
The National Qualifying Event (NQE) of the DARPA Urban Challenge was split into
three test areas to assess the vehicle’s capabilities in different aspects of urban driving. Each
of the competing autonomous vehicles had two chances to perform each test. Test Area A
(Figure 1.2) involved making left turns while merging into traffic. There were 10–12 human-
operated traffic vehicles involved in this test. These traffic vehicles circled around the outer
loop of the figure eight road network (Figure 1.2(b)). The autonomous vehicle started in the
middle, single lane road and merged into traffic, which had the right of way, after coming
to a complete stop at the bottom T-intersection. It then continually circled around the
right loop of the figure eight in the counter-clockwise direction for 30 minutes. Test Area B
(Figure 1.3) was designed to test basic navigation, which includes route planning, staying
in lanes, parking and obstacle avoidance. There was no additional traffic involved in this
3(a) (b)
Figure 1.2: (a) Test Area A. (b) Road network for Test Area A.
(a) (b)
Figure 1.3: (a) Test Area B. (b) Road network for Test Area B.
test. Test Area C (Figure 1.4) was designed to test intersection precedence with 3–4 human-
operated traffic vehicles at intersections. In this test area, the autonomous vehicle also had
to demonstrate the replanning and U-turn capabilities by finding an alternate route when
it encountered a surprise roadblock.
Alice performed reasonably well in Test Area B and Test Area C [18, 121, 30]. It suc-
cessfully completed the course of Test Area B with only minor errors. It also demonstrated
correct intersection and U-turn operations throughout the run of Test Area C even though
it could not finish the run within the time limit. In both executions at Test Area A, how-
ever, its behavior was unsafe and almost led to a collision. Alice was stuck at the corner of
a sharp turn dangerously stuttering in the middle of an intersection.
It was later diagnosed that this behavior was caused by bad interactions between the re-
active obstacle avoidance subsystem (ROA) and the relatively slowly reacting path planner .
4Figure 1.4: Road network for Test Area C.
The planner incrementally generates a sequence of waypoints based on the road map, obsta-
cles and the mission goals. The ROA is designed to rapidly decelerate the vehicle when it
gets too close to (possibly dynamic) obstacles or when the deviation from the planned path
gets too large. Finally, to protect the vehicle steering system, Alice’s low-level controller
limits the rate of steering at low speeds. Thus, accelerating from a low speed, if the planner
produces a path with a sharp left turn, the controller is unable to execute the turn closely.
Alice deviates from the path; the ROA activates and slows it down. This cycle continues,
leading to stuttering. In order to avoid this type of unsafe behavior, the planner needs to
be aware of the constraints imposed by the controller.
The above example illustrates how design of reliable embedded control systems inher-
its the difficulties involved in designing both control systems and distributed (concurrent)
computing systems. The described design bug manifests as undesirable behavior only un-
der a very specific set of conditions and only when the controller, the ROA and the vehicle
interact in a very specific manner. Therefore, such a bug had never been discovered in thou-
sands of hours of extensive simulations and over three hundred miles of field testing. Formal
methods provide tools and techniques for uncovering such subtle design bugs and mathe-
matically prove correctness of designs. More recently, formal techniques have also been used
to automatically generate controllers that are provably correct by construction [64, 33].
Motivated by the failure of Alice, in this thesis, we develop frameworks, based on for-
mal methods, to facilitate design and analysis of such system and other embedded control
systems with similar features such as autonomous automotive systems, robots and auto-
matic pilot avionics. This work primarily focuses on the embedded control component that
regulates the underlying physical process, which we refer to as the plant. An expressive
5and powerful specification language of linear temporal logic (LTL) is used throughout the
thesis to specify the desired properties. The practicality of the proposed frameworks is
demonstrated through Alice and the autonomous urban driving problem.
1.2 Related Works
Formal methods have been extensively studied in both computer science and control. These
approaches rely on applying mathematically-based techniques in proving system correctness.
Computer-science oriented approaches are mainly directed towards discrete systems. A large
class of properties including deadlocks, livelocks, correctness of system invariants, safety,
non-progress execution cycles have been considered. ω-regular languages and temporal
logics are widely used to precisely describe such properties [8]. One of the main challenges
in this domain lies in dealing with concurrency and proving system correctness for any
interleaving of concurrent processes. Model checking and theorem proving are commonly
used techniques to enable such proofs. Model checking is attractive because it is fully
automatic. However, it is limited to systems with a finite number of states. It also faces a
combinatorial blow up of the state space, commonly known as the state explosion problem.
Theorem proving, on the other hand, is not limited to finite state systems but it requires
a skilled human interaction. Recently, the development of a polynomial-time algorithm to
construct finite state automata from their temporal logic specifications enables automatic
synthesis of digital designs that satisfy a large class of properties including safety, guarantee
and response even in the presence of an adversary (typically arising from changes in the
environments) [98].
Control systems, on the other hand, are generally described by a set of differential equa-
tions and hence contain an infinite number of states. Reachability analysis and Lyapunov-
type approaches are commonly used to verify stability and safety properties of such con-
tinuous systems. Optimization-based approaches, receding horizon control (also known as
model predictive control) and the abundance of computational resources enable automatic
synthesis of continuous controllers that ensure safety and stability even in the presence of
disturbances and modeling errors [91, 42, 14].
As previously discussed, embedded control systems usually contain both continuous
(physical) and discrete (computational) components. Hybrid system formulation has been
6developed to handle such systems. Control of hybrid systems has been studied extensively
but properties of interest are typically limited to stability and safety [27, 47]. For systems
to perform complex tasks, a wider class of properties such as guarantee (e.g., eventually
perform task 1 or task 2 or task 3) and response (e.g., if the system fails, then eventually
perform task 1 or perform tasks 1, 2 and 3 infinitely often in any order) need to be consid-
ered. Temporal logics have therefore garnered great interest due to their expressive power.
Methodology from computer science and control has been integrated to incorporate tem-
poral logics in design and verification of hybrid systems. A model checking tool, HyTech,
was developed for automatic verification of hybrid systems [5, 45]. Its successor, PHAVer,
was designed to address many limitations of HyTech such as the overflow problem, which
prohibits the use of HyTech with complex systems [34]. Both HyTech and PHAVer are
symbolic model checkers for linear hybrid automata, a subclass of hybrid automata that are
defined by linear predicates and piecewise constant bounds on the derivatives. Hence, the
applications of HyTech and PHAVer are limited to systems whose continuous dynamics is
defined by linear differential inequalities of the form Ax˙ ∼ b where ∼ ∈ {≤,≥}, A is a constant
matrix and b is a constant vector.
Approaches that incorporate temporal logic in control include an approach based on
mixed integer linear programming [58]. Reference [68] introduced LTLC, an extension of
linear temporal logic for specifying properties of discrete-time linear systems, and described
LTLC model checking that allows a sequence of control inputs to be automatically computed
such that a complex control objective expressed in LTLC is satisfied.
Digital design synthesis and hybrid system theory has been integrated to allow auto-
matic synthesis of provably correct embedded control software for continuous systems. Such
integration is enabled by the development of language equivalence and bisimulation notions,
which allows abstraction of the continuous component of the system to a purely discrete
model while preserving all the desired properties [6]. This subsequently provides a hierar-
chical approach to system design. In particular, a two-layer design is common and widely
used in the area of planning and control [65, 25, 64, 33, 113, 40]. In the first layer, a discrete
planner plans, in the abstracted discrete domain, a set of transitions of the system to ensure
the satisfaction of the desired properties, taking into account all the possible behaviors of
the environment. This abstract plan is then continuously implemented by a continuous con-
troller in the second layer. Simulations/bisimulations provide the proof that the continuous
7execution preserves the desired properties. The planner can be automatically synthesized
using the digital design synthesis tool while the controller can be automatically generated
using, for example, an optimization-based or other control-theoretic approach.
1.3 Thesis Overview and Contributions
The objective of this thesis is to develop a framework for systematic design and analysis of
embedded control systems to provide a formal, mathematical guarantee of the correctness
of such a system with respect to its desired properties. The systems of our particular
interest are those with both the low-level (continuous) dynamics associated with the physical
hardware and the high-level (discrete) logics that govern the overall behavior of the systems.
Design and analysis of these systems thus require integration of reasoning about discrete
and continuous behaviors within a single framework.
The research presented here consists of three key components—specification, design and
verification. Specification refers to a precise description of both the system and its desired
properties. This precise description of the system, however, does not need to capture all
the details of the actual implementation itself. To simplify the analysis of the system, one
may want to capture only the important aspects and abstract the actual implementation
in this description.
Verification is the process of checking the correctness of the system. Here, correctness
is only defined relative to the desired properties. Hence, specifications of both the system
and its desired properties are essential in this process. It is well known that verifying the
correctness of complex systems such as autonomous vehicles can be very difficult due to the
interleaving between their continuous and their discrete components as previously discussed.
Although much work has been done in this domain, verification of such systems remains a
time consuming process and requires some level of expertise.
To complement the verification efforts, there has been a growing interest in automatic
design of embedded control software that provides a formal guarantee of system correctness.
This avenue of research is appealing and promising. Once it is brought to practicality, this
type of automatic design can potentially reduce the time and cost of the system develop-
ment cycle as it helps reduce the number of iterations between redesigning the system and
verifying the new design.
8The planner-controller subsystem of Alice and the autonomous urban driving problem of
the DARPA Urban Challenge are considered as case studies throughout the thesis. Linear
temporal logic is used as the main specification language for describing desired properties.
A detailed description of the planner-controller subsystem of Alice and an overview of LTL
are provided in Chapter 2 as the background for later chapters.
This thesis has two main parts. The first part focuses on the verification aspect while
the second part focuses on the design aspect. Specification is mentioned in both parts as a
key requirement that enables systematic verification and design. The original contributions
of this work cover both theoretical and application aspects as outlined below.
Part I: Verification
Chapters 3–5 focus on the verification aspect of this work. First, Chapter 3 summarizes
related work on system verification. A brief overview of approaches from computer science
and control to system verification is provided. In particular, formal verification based on
model checking and theorem proving is discussed. Reachability analysis and Lyapunov-
type approaches which have been proved successful in verifying safety of control systems
are presented. This chapter ends with verification of hybrid systems, a formalism that has
been utilized to handle both discrete and continuous behaviors. The limitations of existing
approaches are identified.
The main contribution of Chapter 4 is in the applications of existing verification ap-
proaches to Alice. First, it describes the Canonical Software Architecture that has been
implemented to facilitate the coordination of different components in the planner-controller
subsystem of Alice. This description is followed by two verification case studies. The first
case study illustrates the use of model checking to prove the correctness of the finite state
machine implemented in Gcdrive to handle multiple concurrent commands. The second
case study demonstrates the provably correct decomposition of the desired system proper-
ties into components’ properties based on the structure imposed by the Canonical Software
Architecture.
Chapter 5 contains the main theoretical contributions of the verification part of the
thesis. First, we introduce Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automata (PCHA), a class of
hybrid automata for modular specification of embedded control systems. In a PCHA,
control actions that change the control input to the plant occur roughly periodically, while
9other actions that update the state of the controller may occur in the interim, changing
the set-point of the system. Such actions could model, for example, sensor updates and
information received from higher-level planning modules that change the set-point of the
controller. Based on periodicity and subtangential conditions, a new sufficient condition
for verifying invariant properties of PCHAs is presented. In principal, for PCHAs with
polynomial continuous vector fields, it is possible to check these conditions automatically
using, for example, quantifier elimination or sum of squares relaxations. We examine the
feasibility of this automatic approach on a small example. The proposed technique is
also used to manually verify safety and progress properties of a fairly complex planner-
controller subsystem of Alice. Geometric properties of planner-generated paths are derived
that guarantee that such paths can be safely followed by the controller. The material
presented in this chapter has been reported in [118, 119, 120].
Part II: Design
Chapters 6–7 focus on the design aspect of this work. Specifically, we propose an approach
for automatically synthesizing embedded control software that ensures system correctness
with respect to its desired properties regardless of the environment in which the system
operates. The material presented in this part of the thesis has been published in [122, 123,
124].
Chapter 6 summarizes related work on automatic synthesis of embedded control soft-
ware, including background on automatic design of digital and control systems. A common
approach to automatic synthesis of embedded control software that provably satisfies a
given LTL property is to construct a finite transition system that serves as an abstract
model of the physical system (which typically has infinitely many states) and synthesize a
strategy, represented by a finite state automaton, satisfying the desired properties based on
the abstract model. This leads to a hierarchical, two-layer design with a discrete planner
computing a strategy based on the abstract model and a continuous controller comput-
ing a control signal based on the physical model to continuously implement the strategy.
Simulations/bisimulations [6] provide the proof that the continuous execution preserves the
desired properties. To increase the robustness of the system against the effects of direct,
external disturbances and a mismatch between the actual system and its model, we extend
the hierarchical approach to account for exogenous disturbances. Specifically, the contribu-
10
tion of this part of the thesis is to consider a discrete-time linear time-invariant state space
model with exogenous disturbances and provide an approach to automatically compute a
finite state abstraction for such a model.
The main practical limitation of the hierarchical approach is the well-known state ex-
plosion problem inherent in LTL synthesis. To alleviate this problem, Chapter 7 proposes
a receding horizon framework that effectively reduces the synthesis problem into a set of
smaller problems while preserving the desired system-level temporal properties. An im-
plementation of the proposed framework leads to a hierarchical, modular design with a
goal generator, a trajectory planner and a continuous controller. The goal generator es-
sentially reduces the trajectory generation problem into a sequence of smaller problems of
short horizon while preserving the desired system-level temporal properties. Subsequently,
in each iteration, the trajectory planner solves the corresponding short-horizon problem
with the currently observed state as the initial state and generates a feasible trajectory to
be implemented by the continuous controller. Based on the simulation property, we show
that the composition of the goal generator, trajectory planner and continuous controller
and the corresponding receding horizon framework guarantee the correctness of the system.
The effectiveness of this framework is demonstrated through an example of an autonomous
vehicle navigating an urban environment.
11
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides background for later chapters. This includes a detailed description
of the planner-controller subsystem of Alice and an overview of linear temporal logic.
2.1 Alice: An Autonomous Vehicle
Alice was equipped with 25 CPUs and utilized a networked control system architecture
to provide high performance and modular design. The embedded control component of
Alice is shown in Figure 2.1. This hierarchical control architecture comprises the following
modules [18, 30, 121]:
Mission Planner computes the route, i.e., a sequence of roads the vehicle has to nav-
igate in order to cross a given sequence of checkpoints. A sequence of checkpoints
was provided by DARPA approximately 5 minutes before the start of each run. Mis-
sion Planner is also capable of recomputing the route when the response from Traffic
Planner indicates that the previously computed route cannot be navigated success-
fully. This type of failure occurs, for example, when the road is blocked.
Traffic Planner makes decisions to guide Alice at a high level. Specifically, based on the
traffic rules and the current environment, it determines how Alice should navigate
the Mission Planner generated route, that is, whether Alice should stay in the travel
lane or perform a passing maneuver, whether it should go or stop and whether it is
allowed to reverse. Traffic Planner also implements an obstacle clearance requirement.
In addition, it is responsible for intersection handling (e.g., keeping track of whether
it is Alice’s turn to go through an intersection). Based on these decisions, it sets up
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actuation commands
actuation commands actuator state
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vehicle state
vehicle & environment states
vehicle & environment states
vehicle & environment states
Figure 2.1: The embedded control component of Alice.
the constraints for the path planning problem.
The logic implemented in Traffic Planner can be described by a two-level finite state
machine (FSM). First, the high-level mode is determined based on the current status
of the vehicle, the current status of Traffic Planner and the current position of the vehi-
cle with respect to the road network. This high-level mode includes road region, zone
region, off-road, intersection, U-turn, failed and paused. Each of the high-level modes
can be further decomposed to completely specify the planning problem described by
the drive state, the allowable maneuvers and the obstacle clearance requirement. The
drive state includes DR (drive), BACKUP (reverse) and STO (stop for an obstacle).
When the drive state is DR or STO, the allowable maneuvers are specified by the fol-
lowing modes: NP (no passing or reversing allowed), P (passing allowed but reversing
not allowed) and PR (both passing and reversing allowed). The obstacle clearance
modes include S (the nominal, or safe, mode), A (an aggressive mode) and B (a very
aggressive, or bare, mode). When the obstacle clearance mode is A or B, both pass-
ing and reversing maneuvers are allowed by default. As an example, the finite state
machine associated with the road region mode consists of 11 states and 25 transitions
as shown in Figure 2.2.
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DR,NP,S STO,NP,S
DR,P,S STO,P,S
no coll.-free path
coll.-free path found
stopped & obs detected
no coll.-free path
coll.-free path found
passing finished or
obs disappeared
DR,PR,S
no coll.-free path & #lanes = 1 
STO,PR,S
no coll.-free path &
#DR,PR,S < M
coll.-free path found
passing finished or obs disappeared
STO,A
BACKUP
no coll.-free path & #lanes > 1 
no coll.-free path &
#DR,PR,S >= M &
#lanes > 1 
backup finished
& #BACKUP >= N
no coll.-free path
& #DR,PR,S >= M
& #lanes = 1 
backup finished
& #BACKUP < N
DR,A
no coll.-free path
coll.-free path found
STO,BDR,B
no coll.-free path
coll.-free path found
no coll.-free path
FAILED
no coll.-free path
         & #lanes>1
PAUSEDOFF-ROAD
no coll.-free path
& #lanes=1
ROAD REGION
no coll.-free path 
coll.-free path for
DR,A found
coll.-free path for
DR,PR,S found
Figure 2.2: Traffic Planner FSM for the road region mode.
Path Planner generates a path that satisfies the constraints determined by Traffic Plan-
ner. Since Alice needs to operate in both structured and unstructured regions, three
types of path planner have been implemented to exploit the structure of the environ-
ment: (1) the rail planner (for structured regions such as roads and intersections),
(2) the off-road rail planner (for unstructured regions such as obstacle fields and sparse
waypoint regions), and (3) the clothoid planner (for parking lots and unstructured re-
gions). All the maneuvers available to the rail planner are pre-computed; thus, the
rail planner may be too constraining. To avoid a situation where Alice gets stuck in a
structured region (e.g., when there is an obstacle between the predefined maneuvers),
the off-road rail planner or the clothoid planner may also be used in a structured
region. This decision is made by Traffic Planner.
Path Follower computes control signals (acceleration and steering angle) that keep Alice
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on the path generated by Path Planner [73]. Although these paths are guaranteed
to be collision-free, since Alice cannot track them perfectly, it may get too close
or even collide with an obstacle if the tracking error is too large. To address this
issue, a reactive obstacle avoidance (ROA) component was implemented. The ROA
component can override the acceleration command to rapidly stop the vehicle if the
deviation from the planned path is too large or the projected position of Alice overlaps
with an obstacle. The projection distance depends on the velocity of Alice. Path
Follower will report failure to Path Planner if the ROA is triggered, in which case
Path Planner will recompute the path.
Gcdrive is the overall driving software for Alice. It receives actuation commands from
Path Follower, determines if they can be executed and, if so, sends the appropriate
commands to the actuators. Gcdrive also performs checking on the health and op-
erational state of the actuators, resets the actuators that fail, and broadcasts the
actuator state. Also included in the role of Gcdrive is the implementation of physical
protections for the hardware to prevent the vehicle from hurting itself. This includes
three functions: (1) limiting the steering rate at low speeds, (2) preventing shifting
from occurring while the vehicle is moving, and (3) transitioning to the paused mode
in which the brakes are depressed and commands to any actuator are rejected when
any of the critical actuators such as steering and brake fail. Furthermore, Gcdrive
implements the emergency stop functionality for Alice and stops the vehicle when an
externally produced emergency stop command is received.
A Canonical Software Architecture (CSA) has been developed to support a hierarchical
decomposition and separation of functionality in this planner-controller subsystem, while
maintaining communication and contingency management. More details on CSA can be
found in Chapter 4.
Note that this planner-controller subsystem, including the complicated finite state ma-
chines implemented in Traffic Planner, was designed and implemented completely by hand
in an ad-hoc manner. Furthermore, it was validated only through simulations and tests.
Hence, there was absolutely no formal guarantee that the system would work as desired.
This thesis develops methods and tools for systematic design and analysis of embedded con-
trol system such as Alice and illustrates their applications to the autonomous urban driving
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problem. Linear temporal logic provides a precise mathematical language for describing
desired system properties.
2.2 Linear Temporal Logic
Temporal logic is a branch of logic that implicitly incorporates temporal aspects and can
be used to reason about a time line [8, 32, 50, 82]. Its use as a specification language was
introduced by Pnueli [100]. Since then, temporal logic has been demonstrated to be an
appropriate specification formalism for reasoning about various kinds of systems, especially
those of concurrent programs. It has been utilized to formally specify and verify behavioral
properties in various applications [23, 101, 37, 72, 48, 15, 112, 35, 54, 19, 55].
In this thesis, we consider a version of temporal logic, namely linear temporal logic
(LTL), which is particularly suitable for describing properties of software systems. Before
describing LTL, we need to define an atomic proposition, which is LTL’s main building
block. An atomic proposition can be defined based on a variable structure of the system as
follows.
Definition 2.2.1. A system consists of a set V of variables. The domain of V , denoted by
dom(V ), is the set of valuations of V . A state of the system is an element v ∈ dom(V ).
Definition 2.2.2. An atomic proposition is a statement on system variables υ that has a
unique truth value (True or False) for a given value of υ. Let v ∈ dom(V ) be a state of
the system and p be an atomic proposition. We write v ⊩ p if p is True at the state v.
Otherwise, we write v ⊮ p.
In this language, an execution of a system is described by an infinite sequence of its
states. Specifically, for a discrete-time system whose state is only evaluated at time t ∈{0,1, . . .}, its execution σ can be written as σ = v0v1v2 . . . where for each t ≥ 0, vt ∈ dom(V )
is the state of the system at time t.
LTL has two kinds of operators: logical connectives and temporal modal operators.
The logic connectives are those used in propositional logic: negation (¬), disjunction ( ∨ ),
conjunction ( ∧ ) and material implication (Ô⇒). The temporal modal operators include
next (#), always (◻), eventually (3) and until ( U ).
An LTL formula is defined inductively as follows:
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(1) any atomic proposition p is an LTL formula; and
(2) given LTL formulas ϕ and ψ, ¬ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ, #ϕ and ϕ U ψ are also LTL formulas.
Other operators can be defined as follows:
• ϕ ∧ ψ ≜ ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ),
• ϕÔ⇒ ψ ≜ ¬ϕ ∨ ψ,
• 3ϕ ≜ True U ϕ, and
• ◻ϕ ≜ ¬3¬ϕ.
A propositional formula is one that does not include temporal operators. Given a set of
LTL formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, their Boolean combination is an LTL formula formed by joining
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn with logical connectives.
Semantics of LTL: An LTL formula is interpreted over an infinite sequence of states.
Given an execution σ = v0v1v2 . . . and an LTL formula ϕ, we say that ϕ holds at
position i ≥ 0 of σ, written vi ⊧ ϕ, if and only if (iff) ϕ holds for the remainder of
the execution σ starting at position i. The semantics of LTL is defined inductively as
follows:
(a) For an atomic proposition p, vi ⊧ p iff vi ⊩ p;
(b) vi ⊧ ¬ϕ iff vi ⊭ ϕ;
(c) vi ⊧ ϕ ∨ ψ iff vi ⊧ ϕ or vi ⊧ ψ;
(d) vi ⊧ #ϕ iff vi+1 ⊧ ϕ; and
(e) vi ⊧ ϕ U ψ iff there exists j ≥ i such that vj ⊧ ψ and ∀k ∈ [i, j), vk ⊧ ϕ.
Based on this definition, #ϕ holds at position i of σ iff ϕ holds at the next state vi+1,◻ϕ holds at position i iff ϕ holds at every position in σ starting at position i, and 3ϕ
holds at position i iff ϕ holds at some position j ≥ i in σ.
Definition 2.2.3. An execution σ = v0v1v2 . . . satisfies ϕ, denoted by σ ⊧ ϕ, if v0 ⊧ ϕ.
Definition 2.2.4. Let Σ be the set of all executions of a system. The system is said to be
correct with respect to its specification ϕ, written Σ ⊧ ϕ, if all its executions satisfy ϕ, that
is, (Σ ⊧ ϕ) iff (∀σ, (σ ∈ Σ) Ô⇒ (σ ⊧ ϕ)).
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Examples of LTL formulas: Given propositional formulas p and q, important and
widely used properties can be defined in terms of their corresponding LTL formulas
as follows.
(a) Safety (invariance): A safety formula is of the form ◻p, which asserts that the
property p remains invariantly true throughout an execution. Typically, a safety
property ensures that nothing bad happens. A classic example of safety property
frequently used in the robot motion planning domain is obstacle avoidance.
(b) Guarantee (reachability): A guarantee formula is of the form 3p, which guar-
antees that the property p becomes true at least once in an execution. Reaching
a goal state is an example of a guarantee property.
(c) Obligation: An obligation formula is a disjunction of safety and guarantee for-
mulas, ◻p ∨ 3q. It can be shown that any safety and progress property can be
expressed using an obligation formula. (By letting q ≡ False, we obtain a safety
formula and by letting p ≡ False, we obtain a guarantee formula.)
(d) Progress (recurrence): A progress formula is of the form ◻3p, which essentially
states that the property p holds infinitely often in an execution. As the name
suggests, a progress property typically ensures that the system makes progress
throughout an execution.
(e) Response: A response formula is of the form ◻(p Ô⇒ 3q), which states that
following any point in an execution where the property p is true, there exists a
point where the property q is true. A response property can be used, for example,
to describe how the system should react to changes in the operating conditions.
(f) Stability (persistence): A stability formula is of the form 3 ◻ p, which asserts
that there is a point in an execution where the property p becomes invariantly true
for the remainder of the execution. This definition corresponds to the definition
of stability in the controls domain since it ensures that eventually, the system
converges to a desired operating point and remains there for the remainder of the
execution.
Example 2.2.1. Consider a robot motion planning problem where the robot is moving in
an environment that is partitioned into six regions as shown in Figure 2.3.
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Desired Properties
• Visit the blue cell infinitely often.
• Eventually go to the red cell when 
a PARK signal is received.
Assumption
• Infinitely often, PARK signal is not 
received.
C0 C1 C2
C3 C4 C5
ϕ = ! ! (¬park) =⇒ (! ! (s ∈ C5) ∧
!(park =⇒ !(s ∈ C0)))
Figure 2.3: The robot environment of Example 2.2.1.
Let s represent the position of the robot and C0, . . . ,C5 represent the polygonal regions
in the robot environment. Suppose the robot receives an externally triggered PARK signal.
Consider the following desired behaviors.
(a) Visit region C5 infinitely often.
(b) Eventually go to region C0 when a PARK signal is received.
Assuming that infinitely often, a PARK signal is not received, the desired properties of the
system can be expressed in LTL as
◻3(¬park) Ô⇒ ( ◻3(s ∈ C5) ∧ ◻(park Ô⇒ 3(s ∈ C0))).
Here, park is a boolean variable that indicates whether a PARK signal is received.
Remark 2.2.1. Properties typically studied in the control and hybrid systems domains are
safety (usually in the form of constraints on the system state) and stability (i.e., convergence
to an equilibrium or a desired state). LTL thus offers extensions to properties that can be
expressed. Not only can it express a more general class of properties, but it also allows more
general safety and stability properties than constraints on the system state or convergence
to an equilibrium since p in ◻p and 3 ◻ p can be any propositional formula.
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Chapter 3
System Verification
System verification is the process of checking that a system meets its requirements. The
requirements specify the allowed behaviors and formalize the desired properties of the sys-
tem. This chapter reviews existing approaches to system verification that provides a formal
guarantee that the system satisfies the desired properties. These approaches rely on a math-
ematical model of the system and analyze the correctness of the model, instead of the actual
implementation itself, with respect to the requirements.
3.1 Formal Methods
Formal methods are mathematically-based techniques that provide a guarantee of system
correctness and enable the developers to construct a system that operates reliably despite
its complexity. This approach relies on constructing a mathematical model of the system
and proving that the model respects the system requirements. There are two key elements
involved in this process—specification and verification.
Formal specification is a precise mathematical representation of a system and its re-
quirements. It helps remove ambiguities from the description of the expected behaviors of
the system. Examples of such mathematical objects typically used in modeling systems
include finite state machines, differential equations, time automata and hybrid automata.
Formal verification relies on a repertoire of proof techniques by which the correctness of
the abstract mathematical model of the system relative to the requirements can be analyzed.
It gives a formal guarantee that the desired properties hold over all possible executions of
the system, provided that the actual execution of the system respects its model.
System correctness may be formally verified by hand in the style of mathematical proofs.
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This approach is usually slow and often error prone. It also requires a high level of math-
ematical sophistication and expertise. As a result, there have been growing interests in
automating or semi-automating such proofs. In this section, we summarize existing ap-
proaches for system verification from computer science and control theory.
3.1.1 Computer-Science Oriented Approaches
In computer science, automated proofs typically fall into two categories: algorithmic ap-
proaches and deductive approaches. The algorithmic approach relies on exhaustively ex-
ploring the state space to check that the desired properties of the system are satisfied.
Model checking is a well-established technique that enables such exploration [24, 8]. The
key requirement of this technique is that the description of the system and its requirements
be formulated in some precise mathematical language. From the description of the system,
all of its possible behaviors can be derived. In addition, all the invalid behaviors can be
obtained from the system requirements. A model checker then checks whether an inter-
section of all the possible behaviors of the system and all the invalid behaviors is empty.
It terminates with a yes/no answer and provides an error trace in case of a negative re-
sult. This technique is very attractive because it is automatic, fast and requires no human
interaction. However, to achieve the decidability, model checking is limited to finite state
systems. It also faces a combinatorial blow up of the state space, commonly known as the
state explosion problem.
Various model checkers have been developed for different specification languages. TLC
[125] is a model checker for specifications written in TLA+, which is a specification language
based on Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [2, 70, 71]. TLA introduces new kinds of tempo-
ral assertions to traditional linear temporal logic to make it practical to describe a system
by a single formula and to make the specifications simpler and easier to understand. SPIN,
on the other hand, is a model checker for specifications written in Process Meta-Language
(PROMELA) [49]. This language was influenced by Dijkstra, Hoare’s CSP language and C.
It emphasizes the modeling of process synchronization and coordination, not computation
and is not meant to be analyzed manually. SPIN can be run in two modes—simulation and
verification. The simulation mode performs random or iterative simulations of the modeled
system’s execution while the verification mode generates a C program that performs a fast
exhaustive verification of the system state space. SPIN is mainly used for checking for dead-
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locks, livelocks, unspecified receptions, unexecutable code, correctness of system invariants
and non-progress execution cycles. It also supports the verification of linear time temporal
constraints. SPIN has been used in many applications, especially in proving correctness
of safety-critical software [44, 41]. Other popular model checkers include Symbolic Model
Verifier (SMV) [84] and its successor NuSMV [22].
The deductive approach relies on using axioms and proof rules to prove the correctness
of a system. The proofs are typically based on inductive invariants: If property ϕ holds at
the initial stage of the system and all legal successors of every ϕ-state are ϕ states, then
ϕ always holds. Theorem proving is a machinery that allows such proofs to be partially
automated. This approach is not limited to finite state systems. However, it demands a
skilled human interaction. An example of a commonly used theorem prover is Prototype
Verication System (PVS) [94, 93, 52].
3.1.2 Control Oriented Approaches
Control systems are described by a set of differential or difference equations, e.g., x˙(t) =
f(x(t), u(t)) or x[t + 1] = f(x[t], u[t]) where x represents the state of the system and u
represents the control input to the plant. These systems have been a subject of research
in the control community for many decades. Parallel to the studies of formal methods
in computer science, control theorists have developed a methodology for verifying that
such a continuous system remains within a certain set, namely, the safe set. The dual of
this safety problem is the reachability problem that concerns proving the existence of a
trajectory that starts from an initial set and reaches another given set. This kind of safety
and reachability analysis is typically based on two main approaches: direct reachability
analysis and Lyapunov-type methods.
The detailed examination of direct reachability analysis can be found in [87] and refer-
ences therein. In summary, these approaches seek to compute either the set of all states
that can be reached along trajectories that start within a given set of initial states (forward
reachability), or the set of all states from which trajectories start such that a given set of
target or final states can be reached (backward reachability). Lyapunov-type methods, on
the other hand, do not require explicit computation of reachable sets. In addition, non-
linearity, uncertainty and constraints can be handled directly. The underlying idea is to
search for a Lyapunov-type function that satisfies certain algebraic conditions. This func-
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tion, together with the corresponding algebraic conditions, provides a certificate that all
trajectories of the system starting from a given initial set remain within the safe set. An
example of such function is a barrier certificate [103, 104, 105]. The existence of a feasible
solution to the dual of this safety analysis problem provides a certificate for the existence
of a trajectory from the initial set to the unsafe set [107]. This dual test can be formulated
using the concept of convex duality and density functions. The roles of a barrier certificate
and a density function in proving safety and reachability can also be interchanged so that
a density function is used to prove safety while a barrier certificate is used to prove reacha-
bility. This approach can be extended to analyze the eventuality property: All trajectories
starting from a given initial set eventually reach a given final set in a finite time. More
details regarding this primal-dual approach can be found in [107].
A barrier certificate and a density function can be automatically constructed using sum
of squares techniques in conjunction with semidefinite programming, provided that the
vector field is polynomial and the sets are semialgebraic (i.e., can be described by poly-
nomial equalities and inequalities) [106]. Such construction relies on using the generalized
S-procedure [116] (a special case of the Positivstellensatz) and sum of squares relaxations
to translate the set containment constraints to a sum of squares optimization problem. The
applicability of this sum of squares technique can be extended to certain non-polynomial
systems by using a recasting procedure [95].
S-Procedure Given functions f0(x) = xTF0x and f1(x) = xTF1x where x ∈ Rn, n ∈ N and
F0 and F1 are n × n symmetric matrices, if there exists α ≥ 0 such that
f0(x) − αf1(x) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ Rn,
then the following equivalent statements hold:
(i) f0(x) ≥ 0 for all x such that f1(x) ≥ 0,
(ii) {x ∈ Rn ∣ f1(x) ≥ 0} ⊆ {x ∈ Rn ∣ f0(x) ≥ 0},
(iii) {x ∈ Rn ∣ f1(x) ≥ 0 and f0(x) < 0} = ∅,
(iv) ∀x ∈ Rn, f1(x) ≥ 0 Ô⇒ f0(x) ≥ 0.
Generalized S-Procedure Given polynomials f0, f1, . . . , fm ∶ Rn → R, if there exist
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positive semidefinite polynomials r1, . . . , rm such that
f0(x) − m∑
i=1 ri(x)fi(x) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ Rn,
then {x ∈ Rn ∣ fi(x) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ⊆ {x ∈ Rn ∣ f0(x) ≥ 0}.
Sum of Squares Relaxations The sum of squares relaxations simply replace all the non-
negativity constraints obtained from the generalized S-procedure with the constraint
that they are sum of squares polynomials, i.e., polynomials that can be represented as
a sum of squares of finitely many polynomials. This sum of squares constraint is more
restrictive but more computationally tractable than the non-negativity constraint.
A constraint-based technique [43] for computing inductive invariants can be thought of
as a variant of the Lyapunov-type methods. Similar to Lyapunov-type methods, it requires
a template for the unknown inductive invariant I. With this template, sufficient conditions
for an invariance of I can be expressed as satisfiability of a ∃∀ formula over reals, where the
existential quantification is over the template variables and the universal quantifier is over
the state variables. The universal quantifier can then be eliminated using a special case
of the generalized S-procedure known as Farkas Lemma. The following variant of Farkas
Lemma is presented in [43] and duplicated here for convenience.
Farkas Lemma Let J and K be finite sets. For each j ∈ J and k ∈ K, let pj and rk be
polynomials of bounded degrees over the state variables. The formula
⋀
j∈J pj > 0 ∧ ⋀k∈K rk ≥ 0
is unsatisfiable over reals if there exist non-negative constants µ, µj , j ∈ J and νk, k ∈K
such that
µ +∑
j∈J µjpj + ∑k∈K νkrk = 0,
and at least one of the µj or µ is strictly positive.
We refer the reader to [43] for a detailed discussion on converting an arbitrary universally
quantified arithmetic formula into an existentially quantified formula using this variant of
Farkas Lemma. The resulting satisfiability checking can then be converted to a bit-vector
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satisfiability problem. A solution, in a bounded range, of this satisfiability problem can be
searched for using the bit-vector decision procedure of a satisfiability modulo theory (SMT)
solver.
3.2 Hybrid System Verification
3.2.1 Hybrid Automata
The hybrid system formalism [3, 4, 38] provides a rich mathematical language for speci-
fying embedded systems where computing and control components interact with physical
processes. In this framework, a hybrid system is characterized by (a) a set of continuous
states, (b) a finite set of locations or discrete states, (c) the set of initial states, (d) an
invariant set associated with each location, (e) a set of vector fields, and (f) a set of discrete
transitions between two locations. A guard set and a reset map can be derived from the set
of discrete transitions between two locations. Reference [38] adds continuous and discrete
input sets to this description.
Reachability analysis, Lyapunov-type methods and the constraint-based approach de-
scribed in Section 3.1.2 can be applied to verify safety properties of systems modeled in this
hybrid automata framework. Forward reachability analysis has been implemented in model
checkers for hybrid systems such as HyTech [45] and PHAVer [34]. Backward reachability
has been applied, for example, in [10] to analyze safety of aircraft autoland systems.
To explicitly capture the concurrency and asynchronous characteristics of distributed
algorithms and distributed systems, a family of system modeling frameworks based on
interacting infinite-state machines was introduced by Lynch et al. [80, 59, 76, 79, 88]. These
frameworks are based on input/output (I/O) automata model and come in many flavors,
e.g., basic asynchronous I/O automata, timed I/O automata and hybrid I/O automata.
Properties of these automata can be proved by hand or with the assistance of theorem
provers. Algorithms and proofs described in this I/O-automata-style modeling framework
can be found in [78]. Of our particular interest is hybrid I/O automata (HIOA), which add
a set of trajectories to describe the evolution of system state over intervals of time.
In the HIOA framework, the discrete behavior of a system is described by a set of discrete
state transitions (actions). The continuous behavior is described by a set of trajectories that
specify the behavior of the variables of an automaton with time. An execution of HIOA is
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described by a finite or infinite alternating sequence of trajectories and actions. A safety
or invariant property I of an HIOA A is typically deduced by finding a stronger inductive
invariant I ′ ⊆ I and checking, through case analysis, that all the actions and trajectories ofA preserve I ′. Specifically, the set I of states is an invariant of an HIOA A if
• (Start condition) any initial state of the system x0 ∈ I,
• (Transition condition) For any action a, if x a→ x′ and x ∈ I, then x′ ∈ I,
• (Trajectory condition) For any trajectory τ , if the first state of τ , τ.fstate ∈ I, then
the last state of τ , τ.lstate ∈ I.
This technique allows the reasoning about the actions and the trajectories to be decoupled.
Theorem prover strategies (PVS programs) that partially automate construction of such
proofs can be found, for example, in [88].
HIOA has been applied, for example, to prove the correctness of a vehicle deceleration
maneuver part of an automated transportation system [77] and to verify the safety of
the automated highway system of the California PATH project and the Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) that is used by aircraft to avoid midair collisions
[28, 74]. More details of HIOA can be found in Chapter 5 where we introduce its subclass
that is suitable for modeling embedded systems with periodic sensing and actuation.
An important aspect of these hybrid and I/O automata frameworks is that they allow
composition of automata to make larger ones. This enables modular specification of hybrid
and distributed systems as each component of the system can be individually specified.
These component specifications can then be composed to describe the whole system.
3.2.2 Other Modeling Frameworks
Computational and Control Language (CCL) is another formalism for expressing systems
with a tight link between the computing and the control components [62]. It was influenced
by the UNITY formalism [20] and was originally developed for expressing cooperative con-
trol systems. The main idea of CCL is to divide an execution of a system into epochs during
which each process is executed exactly once. The order that the processes are executed in
one epoch, however, is arbitrary. This allows us to take into account the small-time in-
terleaving that may occur between processors executing at essentially the same rate. It
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is a stronger assumption of the fairness constraint adopted by I/O automata and other
distributed system modeling frameworks that only assume that each process gets executed
eventually . Analysis of a CCL program is typically based on inductive techniques. Sum-
mary of distinctions between CCL and other modeling frameworks can be found in [63].
CCL has been applied to analyze a simplified version of a capture-the-flag system [62, 26].
3.2.3 Limitations
The algorithmic verification problem for hybrid systems with general dynamics is known
to be computationally hard [46]. Restricted subclasses that are amenable to algorithmic
analysis have been identified, such as the rectangular-initialized hybrid automata [46], o-
minimal hybrid automata [69], and more recently planar [102] and STORMED [117] hybrid
automata. Although these restricted subclasses improve our understanding of the decid-
ability frontier for hybrid systems, the imposed restrictions are artificial, i.e., they are not
representative of structures that arise in real-world systems. For example, initialized hybrid
automata require the continuous state of the system to be reset every time the automaton
enters a new mode. STORMED hybrid automata, on the other hand, require all the vector
fields and reset maps to be monotonic with respect to a certain fixed direction.
On the other hand, deductive verification of hybrid systems is typically very time con-
suming and can be error prone due to the required human interaction. Although some proofs
can be partially automated using theorem provers, significant human interaction remains
necessary, especially for models with non-linear dynamics. More automation is needed in
order to make this approach more practical and attractive.
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Chapter 4
Applications of Formal Methods to
Alice
This chapter illustrates the applications of formal methods presented in Chapter 3 to the
embedded control component of Alice (Figures 2.1). The case studies presented in this
chapter focus on the two low-level modules, namely Path Follower and Gcdrive.
4.1 Overview
As described in Section 2.1, the control subsystem of Alice consists of five software modules:
Mission Planner, Traffic Planner, Path Planner, Path Follower and Gcdrive. These modules
are responsible for reasoning at different levels of abstraction and are executed concurrently
in the onboard processors. A Canonical Software Architecture is used to support this hi-
erarchical decomposition and separation of functionality, while maintaining communication
and contingency management.
The case studies considered in this chapter focus on the two lower-level modules—
Path Follower (or Follower, for short) and Gcdrive. Path Follower receives a planned path
and computes commands to throttle, brake and transmission that enable Alice to track
this path. Gcdrive receives actuation commands from Path Follower and an externally
produced emergency stop (estop) command from DARPA. It then performs checking to
make sure that the commands are reasonable. For example, gear can be changed only when
Alice is stopped. Based on the received commands and actuators’ states, Gcdrive computes
appropriate commands to all the actuators.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the Canonical Software Ar-
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chitecture. Section 4.3 illustrates the use of model checking to prove the correctness of the
finite state machine implemented in Gcdrive to handle concurrent commands from Follower
and DARPA. Section 4.4 describes the use of the Canonical Software Architecture in system-
atically decomposing system-level requirements into a set of component-level requirements.
It is followed by a case study where we mathematically prove that the component-level
requirements of Follower and Gcdrive are sufficient to ensure that certain system-level re-
quirements are satisfied. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Canonical Software Architecture
One of the main issues with distributed systems is synchronization. A Canonical Software
Architecture (CSA)1 has been developed in order to address this issue. This architecture
builds on the state analysis framework developed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
and takes the approach of clearly delineating state estimation and control determination as
described in [31, 108, 9, 51].
In CSA, we can think of the entire system as being broken up into “modules,” each of
which has a separate, dedicated function. There are two types of modules in CSA: estimation
modules and control modules. An estimation module estimates the system state or provides
an abstraction of the system state for the corresponding control module(s). A control
module gets inputs, performs actions based on the inputs, and delivers outputs. This section
only discusses CSA control modules, which are the focus of this thesis. For modularity, each
software module in the control subsystem may be broken down into multiple CSA modules.
An example of the control subsystem in CSA we have implemented on Alice is shown in
Figure 4.1.
The CSA imposes a structure on both the interface between control modules and the
major operations that happen within a control module. As shown in Figure 4.2, inputs to
a CSA control module are restricted to be one of the followings: state information, direc-
tives/instructions (from other modules wishing to control this module) and responses/status
reports (from other modules receiving instructions from this module). The outputs can only
be either status reports from this module or directives/instructions for other control mod-
ules.
1The idea of this architecture came from discussions with Robert D. Rasmussen and Michel D. Ingham
from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
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Figure 4.1: The planner-controller subsystem of Alice in the Canonical Software Architec-
ture. Boxes with double lined borders are subsystems that will be broken up into multiple
CSA modules.
For each directive that a control module is designed to accept, the following must be
(implicitly or explicitly) specified:
(a) Entry (initial) condition: defines what must be true before starting to execute this
directive; could result in rejection if not readily achievable;
(b) Exit (end) condition: defines what must be true to complete the execution of this
directive; could result in rejection if not readily achievable; could result in failure if
deadlines are not met;
(c) Rules: constraints, control objectives, etc. that must be satisfied during the execution
of the directive; otherwise, failure is declared;
(d) Performance criteria: performance or other items to be optimized.
For each directive received, a response that indicates rejection, acceptance, failure or com-
pletion of the directive and the reason for rejection or failure must be reported to the source
of the directive. Rejection or failure of a directive occurs when the entry or exit condition
is not readily achievable, the deadlines are not met, or one of the constraints cannot be
satisfied. It results in dropping the problem directive and all subsequent directives from
that source until an acknowledgement of the failure or rejection is received. This directive-
response mechanism allows CSA to support distributed goal and contingency management,
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Figure 4.2: A generic control module in the Canonical Software Architecture.
an approach where each of the modules is responsible for handling the faults in its own
domain and anything the module is unable to handle is propagated “up the chain” until
the correct level has been reached to resolve the fault or conflict.
To separate communication requirements from the given module’s core function re-
quirements, the CSA decomposes a module into three components: Arbitration, Control
and Tactics. Arbitration is responsible for (1) managing the overall behavior of the control
module by issuing a merged directive, computed from all the received directives, to Con-
trol ; and (2) reporting rejection, acceptance, failure and completion of a received directive
to Control of the issuing control module. Control is responsible for (1) computing the out-
put directives to the controlled module(s) or the commands to the hardware based on the
merged directive, received responses and state information; and (2) reporting failure and
completion of a merged directive to Arbitration. Tactics provides the core functionality of
the control module and is responsible for providing the logic used by Control for computing
output directives.
4.3 Verification of Gcdrive Finite State Machine
Gcdrive consists of five CSA modules: Actuation Interface, Acceleration Module, Steer-
ing Module, Transmission Module and Turn Signal Module. Acceleration Module, Steering
Module, Transmission Module and Turn Signal Module are the interfaces to the correspond-
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Figure 4.3: Finite state machine implemented in Actuation Interface.
ing actuators. The logic in Gcdrive is contained in Actuation Interface and can be described
by a finite state machine. This example illustrates the use of model checking in proving the
correctness of the implementation of this finite state machine.
Gcdrive takes independent commands from Path Follower and DARPA and sends appro-
priate commands to the actuators. Commands from Path Follower include control signals
to throttle, brake and transmission. Commands from DARPA include estop pause, estop
run and estop disable. An estop pause command should cause the vehicle to be brought
quickly and safely to a rolling stop. An estop run command resumes the operation of the
vehicle. An estop disable command is used to stop the vehicle and put it in the disable
mode. A vehicle that is in the disable mode may not restart in response to an estop run
command.
The finite state machine to handle these concurrent commands is shown in Figure 4.3.
To prove the correctness of its implementation in Actuation Interface, we model Follower,
Actuation Interface and DARPA (see Figure 4.4) in the SPIN model checker with the
following global variables.
• state ∈ {DISABLED (D), PAUSED (P), RUNNING (Ru), RESUMING (Re), SHIFT-
ING (S)} is the state of the finite state machine as described in Figure 4.3.
• estop ∈ {DISABLE (0), PAUSE (1), RUN (2)} is the emergency stop command sent
by DARPA.
• acc ∈ [−1,1] and acc cmd ∈ [−1,1] are the acceleration commands sent from Actuation
Interface to Acceleration Module and from Follower to Actuation Interface, respec-
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Figure 4.4: The components involved in the Gcdrive FSM example.
tively.
• gear ∈ {−1,0,1} and gear cmd ∈ {−1,0,1} are the gear commands sent from Actu-
ation Interface to Transmission Module and from Follower to Actuation Interface,
respectively.
• timer ∈ {0,1,2,3,4,5} keeps track of the time after which the latest estop run com-
mand is received.
We make the following assumptions.
(a) Actuation Interface gets executed at least once each time an estop command is sent.
(b) Actuation Interface reads the current estop status at the beginning of each iteration.
It then performs a computation based on this estop status for the rest of the iteration.
(c) All the estop commands are eventually received.
We introduce a global variable enableEstop in the PROMELA model to incorporate as-
sumption (a). Assumption (b) is enforced using atomic sequences. Lastly, assumption (c) is
enforced by letting the variable estop represent the estop command received by Gcdrive as
well. With these assumptions, SPIN can verify the correctness of the system with respect
to the following desired properties.
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(1) If DARPA sends an estop disable command, Gcdrive state will eventually stay at DIS-
ABLED and Acceleration Module will eventually command full brake forever.
◻ ((estop = DISABLE) Ô⇒ 3 ◻ (state = DISABLED ∧ acc = −1)) (4.1)
(2) If DARPA sends an estop pause command while the vehicle is not disabled, eventually
Gcdrive state will be PAUSED.
◻ ((estop = PAUSE ∧ state /= DISABLED) Ô⇒ 3(state = PAUSED)) (4.2)
(3) If DARPA sends an estop run command while the vehicle is not disabled, eventually
Gcdrive state will be RUNNING or RESUMING or DARPA will send an estop disable
or estop pause command.
◻((estop = RUN ∧ state /= DISABLED) Ô⇒
3(state ∈ {RUNNING,RESUMING} ∨ estop /= RUN)) (4.3)
(4) If the current state is RESUMING, eventually the state will be RUNNING or DARPA
will send an estop disable or pause command.
◻ ((state = RESUMING) Ô⇒ 3(state = RUNNING ∨ estop ∈ {DISABLE,PAUSE}))
(4.4)
(5) The vehicle is disabled only after it receives an estop disable command.
((state /= DISABLED) U (estop = DISABLE)) ∨ ◻(state /= DISABLED) (4.5)
(6) Actuation Interface sends a full brake command to the Acceleration Module if the
current state is DISABLED, PAUSED, RESUMING or SHIFTING. In addition, if the
vehicle is disabled, then the gear is shifted to 0.
◻(state ∈ {DISABLED, PAUSED, RESUMING, SHIFTING} Ô⇒ acc = −1) ∧◻(state = DISABLED Ô⇒ gear = 0)
(4.6)
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(7) After receiving an estop pause command, the vehicle may resume the operation 5 sec-
onds after an estop run command is received.
◻ (state = RUN Ô⇒ timer ≥ 5) (4.7)
The PROMELA models of the components involved in this example can be found in Ap-
pendix 4.A. Note that assumptions (a)–(c) are necessary for all the above desired properties
to be satisfied. In fact, assumptions (a) and (b) were not realized until we model checked
the early implementation of Gcdrive. Realizing that these assumptions needed to be en-
forced, we then modified the implementation of Alice by having Gcdrive store all the estop
commands in a queue and process all these commands one by one. If an estop command is
not stored but only sampled at the beginning of each iteration, an estop disable or pause
command may not be handled appropriately. Consider, for example, the case where an
estop pause command is sent while Actuation Interface is in the middle of an iteration and
an estop run command is sent immediately after. In this case, Alice will not stop because
the estop pause command is not processed, leading to an incorrect, unsafe behavior.
4.4 Composing Requirements
As described in Section 4.2, the inputs, outputs and major operations within a CSA control
module have a well-defined structure. To facilitate the design and verification of the sys-
tem, system requirements should be decomposed into the requirements for the Arbitration
component and the requirements for the Control and Tactics components for each of the
modules. The requirements for the Arbitration component specify the relationship between
the received directives and the merged directives while the requirements for the Control
and Tactics components specify the relationship between the merged directives, responses,
state knowledge and the output directives as presented later in this section.
Besides module requirements, communication requirements such as bandwidth, packet
drop, delay, etc also need to be specified. Modules’ requirements and communiation require-
ments can then be composed either manually or with the assistance of tools such as theorem
provers [36, 94] to verify that they are sufficient to ensure that the system requirements are
satisfied.
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We illustrate this requirement composition idea in the following case study where we
prove that the CSA can ensure the state consistency between different software modules.
The example considered here focuses on the two lower-level modules: Follower and Gcdrive
(see Figure 4.1). Specifically, we want to prove that Follower, the module that commands
a gear change, has the right knowledge about the gear Alice is currently in even though it
does not talk to the actuator directly and sensors may fail. Otherwise, it will command full
brake. This example involves six components—the Control of Follower, Actuation Interface,
Transmission Module, Acceleration Module, the actuators and the network—as shown in
Figure 4.4.
In this example, we are only interested in acceleration and transmission commands. The
following variables are involved in this example as shown in Figure 4.5:
• Transf,s: transmission directive sent from Follower;
• Transf,r: transmission directive received by Actuation Interface;
• Transa,s: transmission directive sent from Actuation Interface;
• Transa,r: transmission directive received by Transmission Module;
• Accf,s: acceleration directive sent from Follower;
• Accf,r: acceleration directive received by Actuation Interface;
• Acca,s: acceleration directive sent from Actuation Interface;
• Acca,r: acceleration directive received by Acceleration Module;
• TransRespf,s ∈ {COMPLETED,FAILED}: response sent from Actuation Interface;
• TransRespf,r ∈ {COMPLETED,FAILED}: response received by Follower;
• TransRespa,s ∈ {COMPLETED,FAILED}: response sent from Transmission Module;
• TransRespa,r ∈ {COMPLETED,FAILED}: response received by Actuation Interface.
Each of these variables is represented by a finite sequence, whose nth element represents
its value in the nth iteration, with the following operators:
• Last(s): The last element of sequence s;
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• Len(s): The length of sequence s;
• s[n]: The nth element of sequence s.
Let Trans be the actual gear and Transf be the gear that Follower thinks Alice is in.
Assume that when Len(Transf,s) = 0 (i.e., before any command is sent from Follower),
Transf = Trans, we want to verify the following desired system-level properties:
(1) Follower has the right knowledge about the gear that Alice is currently in, or it com-
mands full brake. Mathematically, this can be written as:
◻((Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(Transf,s) ∧ Last(TransRespf,r) = COMPLETED)Ô⇒ Transf = Trans) ∧ ◻(Transf = Trans ∨ Accf,s = −1).
(4.8)
(2) At infinitely many instants, Follower has the right knowledge about the gear that Alice
is currently in, or a hardware failure (HWF ) occurs:
◻3(Transf = Trans ∨ HWF). (4.9)
We consider the following component-level properties:
A. Transmission Module and transmission actuator:
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• The number of responses cannot be greater than the number of directives. This
can be formalized by the following LTL formula:
◻ (Len(TransRespa,s) ≤ Len(Transa,r)). (4.10)
• For each of the directives that Transmission Module receives, a response will even-
tually be sent. If the gear is successfully changed, the completion of the directive
will be reported. Otherwise, a hardware failure occurs and the failure will be re-
ported. This property can be mathematically represented by the conjunction of
the following three LTL formulas:
◻(n = Len(Transa,r) Ô⇒
3((Trans = Transa,r[n] ∧ TransRespa,s[n] = COMPLETED)∨ (HWF ∧ TransRespa,s[n] = FAILED)));
(4.11)
◻(Last(TransRespa,s) = COMPLETED Ô⇒
Trans = Transa,r[Len(TransRespa,s)]); (4.12)
◻ (Last(TransRespa,s) = FAILED Ô⇒ HWF). (4.13)
B. Actuation Interface: All the transmission directives and responses received are always
sent (to Transmission Module and to Follower, respectively). This property can be
described by the conjunction of the following LTL formulas:
◻(Len(Transa,s) = Len(Transf,r) ∧∀i ∈ {1, . . . , Len(Transf,r)} ∶ Transa,s[i] = Transf,r[i]); (4.14)
◻(Len(TransRespf,s) = Len(TransRespa,r) ∧∀i ∈ {1, . . . , Len(TransRespa,r)} ∶ TransRespf,s[i] = TransRespa,r[i]). (4.15)
C. Network: All messages are eventually delivered. An example of this assumption for
the transmission directive sent from Actuation Interface and received by Transmission
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Module, formalized in LTL, is given by
◻(Len(Transa,r) ≤ Len(Transa,s)) ∧∀i ∈ {1, . . . , Len(Transa,r)} ∶ Transa,r[i] = Transa,s[i]). (4.16)
D. The Control of Follower:
• If the response is not yet received, send a brake command:
◻ (Len(TransRespf,r) /= Len(Transf,s) Ô⇒ Accf,s = −1). (4.17)
• If the last response indicates failure, send a brake command:
◻ (Last(TransRespf,r) = FAILED Ô⇒ Accf,s = −1). (4.18)
• Do not send a new directive until a response for the last directive is received:
◻ (Len(Transf,s) ≤ Len(TransRespf,r) + 1). (4.19)
• Infinitely often, the number of the transmission directives is not greater than the
number of the responses (i.e., once a response is received, Follower processes it
before sending out another directive):
◻3(Len(Transf,s) ≤ Len(TransRespf,r)). (4.20)
• If the last response indicates completion of the directive, Follower updates Transf
to the corresponding directive:
◻(Last(TransRespf,r) = COMPLETED Ô⇒
Transf = Transf,s[Len(TransRespf,r)]). (4.21)
To prove the above component-level requirements are sufficient to ensure system-level
requirements, we use the following lemmas and proposition.
Lemma 4.4.1. Any execution of the program satisfies the following properties:
(1) ◻(Len(TransRespa,r) ≤ Len(Transa,s);
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(2) ◻(Len(TransRespf,r) ≤ Len(Transf,s);
(3) ◻(Len(Transa,s) ≤ Len(TransRespa,r) + 1).
Proof. These properties can be derived from the assumptions about the network, (4.10),
(4.14), (4.15) and (4.19).
Lemma 4.4.2. Any execution of the program satisfies the following properties:
(1) ◻((Len(TransRespa,r) = Len(Transa,s))∨(Len(Transa,s) = Len(TransRespa,r)+1);
(2) ◻((Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(Transf,s))∨(Len(Transf,s) = Len(TransRespf,r)+1).
Proof.
1. Let
A ≡ Len(Transa,s) ≥ Len(TransRespa,r),
B ≡ Len(Transa,s) ≤ Len(TransRespa,r),
C ≡ Len(Transa,s) = Len(TransRespa,r) + 1.
From Lemma 4.4.1, we get that any execution satisfies
◻((A ∧B) ∨ (A ∧C)).
Since
A ∧B ≡ Len(TransRespa,r) = Len(Transa,s)
and
A ∧C ≡ Len(Transa,s) = Len(TransRespa,r) + 1,
this completes the proof.
2. This can be proved using Lemma 4.4.1(2) and property (4.19) and following the same
steps as in the previous proof.
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Lemma 4.4.3. Any execution of the program satisfies
◻(Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(Transf,s) Ô⇒
Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(TransRespf,s) = Len(TransRespa,r) = Len(TransRespa,s)= Len(Transa,r) = Len(Transa,s) = Len(Transf,r) = Len(Transf,s)).
Proof. This can be derived from the assumptions about the network, (4.10), (4.14) and
(4.15).
Lemma 4.4.4. Any execution of the program satisfies
◻((Len(TransRespf,r) ≤ Len(TransRespf,s) ≤ Len(TransRespa,r) ≤ Len(TransRespa,s))∧ (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , Len(TransRespf,r)} ∶ TransRespf,r[i] = TransRespf,s[i] =
TransRespa,r[i]) = TransRespa,s[i])).
Proof. This is clear from (4.15) and the assumptions about the network.
The following proposition can be proved using the truth table.
Proposition 4.4.1. The following propositional formula is a tautology:
((¬A ∨B) ∧ (A ∨C)) Ô⇒ (B ∨C).
We now prove that the system-level requirements hold, provided that all the component-
level requirements are satisfied.
Theorem 4.4.1. Any execution of the program satisfies
◻((Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(Transf,s) ∧ Last(TransRespf,r) = COMPLETED)Ô⇒ Transf = Trans).
Proof. The case where Len(Transf,s) = 0 is trivial so we only consider the case where
Len(Transf,s) > 0. Suppose Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(Transf,s) and Last(TransRespf,r) =
41
COMPLETED). Then, we get
Transf
(4.21)= Transf,s[Len(TransRespf,r)]
Lemma4.4.3= Transf,s[Len(Transa,s)](4.14),network= Transa,s[Len(Transa,s)].
Also, from Lemma 4.4.3 and Lemma 4.4.4, we get
Last(TransRespa,s) = COMPLETED.
Using (4.12), we can then conclude that
Trans = Transa,s[Len(TransRespa,s)]
Lemma4.4.3= Transa,s[Len(Transa,s)]= Transf .
Theorem 4.4.2. Any execution of the program satisfies
◻(Transf = Trans ∨ Accf,s = −1).
Proof. From (4.17),
◻(Len(TransRespf,r) /= Len(Transf,s) Ô⇒ Accf,s = −1).
Or equivalently,
◻(Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(Transf,s) ∨ Accf,s = −1).
Similarly, from (4.18), we get
◻(Last(TransRespf,r) = COMPLETED) ∨ Accf,s = −1).
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Let
A ≡ Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(Transf,s),
B ≡ Last(TransRespf,r) = COMPLETED,
C ≡ Transf = Trans,
D ≡ Accf,s = −1.
The system has the following property
◻((A∧B) Ô⇒ C) ∧ (A∨D) ∧ (B ∨D)) ≡ ◻((¬A∨¬B ∨C)) ∧ (A∨D) ∧ (B ∨D)).
Applying Proposition 4.4.1 twice, we can complete the proof.
Theorem 4.4.3. Any execution of the program satisfies
◻3(Transf = Trans ∨ HWF).
Proof. From Lemma 4.4.2(2),
◻((Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(Transf,s)) ∨ (Len(Transf,s) = Len(TransRespf,r) + 1)).
Consider an arbitrary kth1 cycle. From (4.20) and Lemma 4.4.2, ∃k > k1 such that in the kth
cycle, Len(TransRespf,r) = Len(Transf,s).
Consider this kth cycle. The case where Len(Transf,s) = 0 is trivial. (By assump-
tion, Transf = Trans.) So we only consider the case where Len(Transf,s) > 0. If
Last(TransRespf,r) = COMPLETED, then from Theorem 4.4.1, (4.21) and Lemma 4.4.3,
Transf = Trans = Last(Transf,s).
Otherwise, Last(TransRespf,r) = Last(TransRespa,s) = FAILED, so from (4.13), HWF .
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4.5 Conclusions
This chapter described the Canonical Software Architecture that supports the hierarchical
decomposition and separation of functionality in the control subsystem of Alice, while main-
taining communication and contingency management. Two case studies were presented to
illustrate the applications of formal methods to the complex embedded control system of
Alice. The first case study used an off-the-shelf model checker SPIN to verify the correctness
of the implementation of the finite state machine that handled multiple concurrent com-
mands. SPIN uncovered a crucial assumption to ensure system correctness. The second
example exploited the structure imposed by the Canonical Software Architecture to verify
the desired system-level properties from the components’ properties.
Appendix
4.A PROMELA Models for the Gcdrive Finite State Ma-
chine Example
System Model
Atomic sequences and an auxiliary variable enableEstop are used to ensure that Actuation
Interface gets executed at least once each time an estop command is sent.
mtype = { D, P, Ru, Re, S };
mtype state = P;
byte estop = P;
short acc = -1;
short acc_cmd = 0;
short gear = 1;
short gear_cmd = 0;
bool enableEstop = true;
byte timer = 0;
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active proctype Follower()
{
do
:: acc_cmd = -1
:: acc_cmd = 0
:: acc_cmd = 1
:: gear_cmd = -1
:: gear_cmd = 0
:: gear_cmd = 1
od
}
active proctype sendEstop()
{
do
:: atomic{ enableEstop == true ->
if
:: estop = 0
:: estop = 1
:: estop = 2
fi;
enableEstop = false;
}
od
}
active proctype ActuationInterface()
{
do
:: atomic{ (estop == 0 || state == D) ->
state = D;
acc = -1;
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gear = 0;
enableEstop = true;
}
:: atomic { (estop == 1 && state != D) ->
state = P;
acc = -1;
enableEstop = true;
}
:: atomic{ else ->
if
:: estop == 2 && state == P ->
state = Re;
timer = 0;
:: state == Re && timer == 5 ->
state = Ru;
:: state == Ru && gear_cmd == gear ->
acc = acc_cmd;
:: state == Ru && gear_cmd != gear ->
state = S;
acc = -1;
:: state == S ->
gear = gear_cmd;
state = Ru;
:: else ->
skip;
fi;
enableEstop = true;
}
od
}
active proctype clock()
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{
do
:: atomic{ timer < 5 -> timer = timer + 1 }
od
}
Desired Properties
(1) If DARPA sends an estop disable command, Gcdrive state will eventually stay at DIS-
ABLED and Acceleration Module will eventually command full brake forever (see Equa-
tion (4.1)).
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never {
T0_init :
if
:: (1) -> goto T1_S1
:: (estop == 0) -> goto T0_S3
fi;
T1_S1 :
if
:: (1) -> goto T1_S1
:: (estop == 0) -> goto accept_S3
fi;
accept_S3 :
if
:: (1) -> goto T0_S3
:: (acc != -1) || (state != D) -> goto accept_S3
fi;
T0_S3 :
if
:: (1) -> goto T0_S3
:: (acc != -1) || (state != D) -> goto accept_S3
fi;
}
(2) If DARPA sends an estop pause command while the vehicle is not disabled, eventually
Gcdrive state will be PAUSED (see Equation (4.2)).
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never {
T0_init :
if
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
:: (state != D && state != P && estop == 1) -> goto accept_S2
fi;
accept_S2 :
if
:: (state != P) -> goto accept_S2
fi;
}
(3) If DARPA send an estop run command while the vehicle is not disabled, eventually,
Gcdrive state will be RUNNING or RESUMING or DARPA will send an estop disable
or estop pause command (see Equation (4.3)).
never {
T0_init :
if
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
:: (state != D && state != Re && state != Ru && estop == 2 &&
estop == 2) -> goto accept_S2
fi;
accept_S2 :
if
:: (state != Re && state != Ru && estop == 2) -> goto accept_S2
fi;
}
(4) If the current state is RESUMING, eventually, the state will be RUNNING or DARPA
will send an estop disable or pause command (see Equation (4.4)).
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never {
T0_init :
if
:: (1) -> goto T0_init
:: (estop != 0 && estop != 1 && state != Ru && state == Re) ->
goto accept_S2
fi;
accept_S2 :
if
:: (estop != 0 && estop != 1 && state != Ru) -> goto accept_S2
fi;
}
(5) The vehicle is disabled only after it receives an estop disable command (see Equation
(4.5)).
never {
T0_init :
if
:: (estop != 0) -> goto T0_init
:: (state == D && estop != 0) -> goto accept_all
fi;
accept_all :
skip
}
(6) Actuation Interface sends a full brake command to the Acceleration Module if the
current state is DISABLED, PAUSED, RESUMING or SHIFTING. In addition, if the
vehicle is disabled, then the gear is shifted to 0 (see Equation (4.6)). After receiving an
estop pause command, the vehicle may resume the operation 5 seconds after an estop
run command is received (see Equation (4.7)).
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active proctype invariant()
{
assert( (state == Ru || acc == -1) &&
(state != D || gear == 0) &&
(state != Ru || timer >= 5) )
}
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Chapter 5
Periodically Control Hybrid
Automata
This chapter introduces Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automata (PCHA), a subclass of
hybrid automata suitable for modeling sampled control systems and embedded systems with
periodic sensing and actuation. A sufficient condition for verifying invariance of PCHAs is
presented. This technique is then used to analyze the design flaw that caused the failure
of Alice at the National Qualifying Event of the DARPA Urban Challenge as described in
Section 1.1.
5.1 Overview
While real-world hybrid systems are large and complex, they are also engineered, and hence,
have more structure than general hybrid automata [3]. With the motivation of abstractly
capturing a common design pattern in embedded control systems, such as Alice, and other
motion control systems [89], in this chapter we study a new subclass of hybrid automata.
The two main contributions of this chapter are the following:
First, we define a class of hybrid control systems in which certain control actions oc-
cur roughly periodically. Each control action sets the controlling output that drives the
underlying physical process, which we refer to as the plant. In the interval between two
control actions, the state of the plant evolves continuously with fixed control inputs. Also,
in the same interval, other discrete actions may occur, updating the state of the system.
Such discrete changes may correspond, for example, to sensor inputs and changes of the
waypoint or the set-point of the controller. These changes may in turn influence the compu-
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tation of the next control action. For this class of Periodically Controlled Hybrid Systems,
we present a sufficient condition for verifying invariant properties. The key requirement in
applying this condition is to identify a collection of subset(s) C of the candidate invariant
set I, such that if the control action occurs when the system state is in C, then the subse-
quent control output guarantees that the system remains within I for the next period. The
technique does not require solving the differential equations; instead, it relies on checking
conditions on the periodicity and the subtangential condition at the boundary of I. For
systems with polynomial vector fields, we show how these checks can be automated using
sum of squares decomposition and semidefinite programming [106]. These formulations are
illustrated by analyzing a simple example in which an invariant is automatically determined
using the constraint-based approach presented in [43]. We believe that other techniques for
finding invariants, for example those presented in [99, 111], could also be effectively used
for computing invariants of PCHAs.
Second, we apply the above technique to manually verify the safety and progress prop-
erties of the planner-controller subsystem of Alice. Since the model of Alice involves com-
plex, non-polynomial dynamics, the proposed automatic approach is not directly applicable.
Thus, the analysis is done completely by hand. First, we verify a family of invariants {Ik}k∈N
using the above-mentioned technique. This step is fairly simple, requiring only algebraic
simplification of expressions defining the vector fields and Ik’s. Then, we determine a se-
quence of shrinking Ik’s as the vehicle makes progress along the planned path. From these
shrinking invariants, we are able to deduce safety. That is, the deviation—distance of the
vehicle from the planned path—remains within a certain constant bound. In the process, we
also derive geometric properties of planner paths that guarantee that they can be followed
safely by the vehicle. Informally, these geometric properties require that sharp turns in
the path are only present after relatively long segments. In executing a long segment, the
vehicle converges to small deviation as well as small disorientation with respect to the path.
Thus, the instruction for executing a subsequent sharp turn, does not make the deviation
grow too much.
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we briefly present the key defini-
tions for the hybrid I/O automaton framework. In Section 5.3, we present PCHA and a
sufficient condition for proving invariance. The formulation of this sufficient condition as
a sum of squares optimization problem for automatic verification is also provided. In Sec-
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tions 5.4 and 5.5, we present the formal model and verification of Alice’s Controller-Vehicle
subsystem.
5.2 Preliminaries
We use the Hybrid Input/Output Automata (HIOA) framework of [76, 59] for modelling
hybrid systems and the state model-based notations introduced in [88]. A HIOA is a non-
deterministic state machine whose state may change instantaneously through a transition,
or continuously over an interval of time following a trajectory . In this section, we briefly
present important terminology and notations that are used throughout the chapter. We
refer the reader to [59, 88] and references therein for more details.
A variable structure is used for specifying the states of an HIOA. Let V be a set of
variables. Each variable v ∈ V is associated with a type which defines the set of values v can
take. The set of valuations of V is denoted by dom(V ). For a valuation v ∈ dom(V ) of set of
variables V , its restriction to a subset of variables Z ⊆ V is denoted by v ⌈ Z. A variable may
be discrete or continuous. (See [88] for formal definition of these variable dynamic types.)
Typically, discrete variables model protocol or software state, and continuous variables
model physical quantities such as time, position and velocity.
A trajectory for a set of variables V models continuous evolution of the values of the
variables over an interval of time. Formally, a trajectory τ is a map from a left-closed
interval of R≥0 with left endpoint 0 to dom(V ). The domain of τ is denoted by τ.dom. The
first state of τ , τ.fstate, is τ(0). A trajectory τ is closed if τ.dom = [0, t] for some t ∈ R≥0,
in which case we define the last time of τ , τ.ltime ≜ t, and the last state of τ , τ.lstate ≜ τ(t).
For a trajectory τ for V , its restriction to a subset of variables Z ⊆ V is denoted by τ ↓ Z.
The set of allowed trajectories of all the variables of an HIOA is defined by state models,
as follows. For given set V of variables, a state model S is a triple (FS , InvS , StopS), where
(a) FS is a collection of differential equations (DEs) involving the continuous variables in
V , and
(b) InvS and StopS are predicates on V called invariant condition and stopping condition
of S.
S defines a set of trajectories, denoted by traj(S), for the set V of variables. A trajectory
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τ for V is in the set trajs(S) iff
(a) the discrete variables in V remain constant over τ ;
(b) the restriction of τ on the continuous variables in V satisfies all the DEs in FS ;
(c) at every point in time t ∈ dom(τ), (τ ↓ V )(t) ∈ InvS ; and
(d) if (τ ↓ V )(t) ∈ StopS for some t ∈ dom(τ), then τ is closed and t = τ.ltime.
5.3 Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automata
In this section, we define a subclass of HIOAs that is suitable for modeling sampled control
systems and embedded systems with periodic sensing and actuation. The main result of
this section, Theorem 5.3.1, gives a sufficient condition for proving invariant properties of
this subclass.
5.3.1 Definition of Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automata
A Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automaton (PCHA) is an HIOA with a set of (control)
actions that occur roughly periodically. These control actions alter the actual control sig-
nal (input) that feeds to the plant and may change the continuous and the discrete state
variables of the automaton. The automaton may have other actions that change only the
discrete state of the automaton. These actions can model, for example, sensor inputs and
the change in the set-point of the controller from higher-level inputs. However, these exter-
nal commands do not affect the dynamics of the system immediately; they only change the
internal variables of the controller. Formally, a PCHA is defined as follows.
Definition 5.3.1. Let X ⊆ Rn, for some n ∈ N, and L,Z and U be arbitrary types. A
Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automaton (PCHA) A is a tuple (X,Q,Q0,A,D,S ) where
(a) X = {s, loc, z, u,now ,next} is a set of internal or state variables where s is a continuous
state variable of type X , loc is a discrete state (location or mode) variable of type L,
z is a command variable of type Z, u is a control variable of type U , now is a real
continuous variable and next is a real discrete variable;
(b) Q ⊆ dom(X) is a set of states and Q0 ⊆ Q is a non-empty set of start states;
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(c) A is a set of actions, consisting of a set of update actions and a single control action;
(d) D ⊆ Q ×A ×Q is a set of discrete transitions. A transition (x, a,x′) ∈ D is written in
short as x
a→A x′ or as x a→ x′ when A is clear from the context. An action a ∈ A is said
to enabled at a state x ∈ Q if there exists a state x′ ∈ Q such that x a→ x′; and
(e) S is a collection of state models for X, such that for every S,S ′ ∈S , InvS ∩ InvS′ = ∅
and Q ⊆ ⋃S∈S InvS .
In addition, A must satisfy the property that every update action is enabled1 at every state
and may only change the value of z, while control actions occur roughly periodically starting
from time 0; the time gap between two successive occurrences is within [∆1,∆1+∆2] where
∆1 > 0 and ∆2 ≥ 0.
We denote the components of a PCHA A by XA,QA, etc. For a set X of variables, a
state x is an element of dom(X). We denote the valuation of a variable y ∈ X at state x,
by the usual (.) notation x.y.
The continuous state typically includes the continuous state of the plant and some
internal state of the controller. The discrete state represents the mode of the system. The
command variable is used to store externally produced input commands or sensor updates.
The control variable stores the control input to the plant. Finally, the now and next
variables are used for triggering the control action periodically.
PCHA A has two types of actions: (a) through input action update, A learns about new
externally produced input commands such as set-points, waypoints. When an update(z′)
action occurs, z′ is recorded in the command variable z. (b) The control action changes the
continuous and discrete state variables s and loc and the control variable u. When control
occurs, loc and s are computed as a function of their current values and that of z, and u is
computed as a function of the new values of loc and s. Observe, from this definition, that
the external commands do not affect the dynamics of the system immediately, i.e., they
do not change the location nor the input value of the hybrid system but only the internal
variables of the controller. The modification of the dynamics due to the external commands
are effective at the next control cycle.
For each value of l ∈ L, the continuous state s evolves according to the trajectories
specified by state model smodel(l). That is, s evolves according to the differential equation
1In the terminology of HIOA, an update action is an input action.
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1signature
internal control
3input update(z′ ∶ Z)
5variables
internal s : X := s0
7internal discrete loc : L := l0,
z : Z := z0, u : U := u0
9internal now : R≥0 := 0, next : R := −∆2
11transitions
input update(z′)
13eff z := z′
14internal control
pre now ≥ next
16eff next := now + ∆1;⟨loc, s ⟩:= h(loc, s, z);
18u := g(loc, s)
20trajectories
trajdef smodel(l : L)
22invariant loc = l
evolve d(now) = 1;
24d(s) = fl(s, u)
stop when now = next + ∆2
Figure 5.1: PHCA with parameters ∆1, ∆2, g, h, {fl}l∈L. See, for example, [88] for the
description of the language.
s˙ = fl(s, u). The timing of control behavior is enforced by the precondition of control and
the stopping condition of the state models.
Note that as opposed to a general HIOA, a PCHA does not contain input and output
variables. For the sake of simplicity, we consider the PCHAs of the form shown in Figure 5.1
with only one update action and a unique starting state. However, Theorem 5.3.1 generalizes
to PCHAs with multiple update actions as illustrated later in Section 5.5.
An execution of a PCHA A records the valuations of all its variables and the occurrences
of all actions over a particular run. An execution fragment of A is a finite or infinite sequence
α = τ0a1τ1a2 . . ., such that for all i in the sequence, ai ∈ AA, τ ∈ trajs(S) for some S ∈SA,
and τi.lstate
ai+1→ τi+1.fstate. An execution fragment is an execution if τ0.fstate ∈ Q0. An
execution is closed if it is finite and the last trajectory in it is closed. The first state of an
execution fragment α, α.fstate, is τ0.fstate, and for a closed α, its last state, α.lstate, is the
last state of its last trajectory. The limit time of α, α.ltime, is defined to be ∑i τi.ltime.
The set of executions and reachable states of A are denoted by ExecsA and ReachA. A set
of states I ⊆ QA is said to be an invariant of A iff ReachA ⊆ I.
5.3.2 Invariant Verification
Proving invariant properties of hybrid automata is a central problem in formal verifica-
tion. Invariants are used for overapproximating the reachable states of a given system, and
therefore, can be used for verifying safety properties.
Given a candidate invariant set I ⊆ Q, we are interested in verifying that ReachA ⊆ I.
For continuous dynamical systems, checking the well-known subtangential condition as in
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the Lyapunov-type methods provides a sufficient condition for proving invariance of a set I
that is bounded by a closed surface (see, for example, [13]). Theorem 5.3.1 below provides
an analogous sufficient condition for PCHAs. In general, however, invariant sets I for
PCHAs have to be defined by a collection of functions instead of a single function. For each
mode l ∈ L, we assume that the invariant set Il ⊆ X for the continuous state is defined by
a collection of m boundary functions {Flk}mk=1, where m is some natural number and each
Flk ∶ X → R is a differentiable function.2 Formally,
Il ≜ {s ∈ X ∣ ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, Flk(s) ≥ 0} and I ≜ {x ∈ Q∣ x.s ∈ Ix.loc}.
Note that the overall candidate invariant set I does not restrict the values of the command
or the control variables. In the remainder of this section, we develop a set of sufficient
conditions for checking that I is indeed an invariant of a given PCHA. Lemma 5.3.1 modifies
the standard inductive technique for proving invariance, so that it suffices to check invariance
with respect to control transitions and control-free execution fragments of length not greater
than ∆1+∆2. It states that I is an invariant if it is closed under (a) the discrete transitions
of the control actions, and (b) control-free execution fragments of length at most ∆1 +∆2.
Lemma 5.3.1. Suppose Q0 ⊆ I and the following two conditions hold:
(a) (control steps) For each state x,x′ ∈ Q, if x control→ x′ and x ∈ I then x′ ∈ I.
(b) (control-free fragments) For each closed execution fragment β = τ0 update(z1) τ1 update(z2)
. . . τn starting from a state x ∈ I where each zi ∈ Z, if x.next − x.now = ∆1 and
β.ltime ≤ ∆1 +∆2, then β.lstate ∈ I.
Then ReachA ⊆ I.
Proof. Consider any reachable state x of A and any execution α such that α.lstate = x. We
can write α as β0 control β1 control . . . βk, where each βi is control-free execution fragment
of A, i.e., execution fragments in which only update actions occur. From condition (a), it
follows that for each i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, if βi.lstate ∈ I, then βi+1.fstate ∈ I.
Thus, it suffices to prove that for each i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, if βi.fstate ∈ I, then βi.lstate ∈ I. We
fix an i ∈ {0, . . . , k} and assume that βi.fstate ∈ I. Let βi = τ0 update(z1) τ1 update(z2) . . . τn,
2Identical size m of the collections simplifies our notation; different number of boundary functions for
different values of l can be handled by extending the theorem in an obvious way.
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where for j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, zj ∈ Z and τj is a trajectory of A. If i = 0, then βi.ltime = 0 and
βi.lstate ⌈ {loc, s} = βi.fstate ⌈ {loc, s} since the first control action occurs at time 0 and
update transitions do not affect the value of loc and s. Therefore, βi.lstate ∈ I. Otherwise,
i > 0 and since βi starts immediately after a control action, β.fstate ⌈ next−β.fstate ⌈ now =
∆1. From periodicity of main actions, we know that βi.ltime ≤ ∆1 + ∆2, and hence from
condition (b) it follows that βi.lstate ∈ I.
Invariance of control steps can often be checked through case analysis, which can be
partially automated using a theorem prover [93]. The next key lemma provides a sufficient
condition for proving invariance of control-free fragments. Since control-free fragments do
not change the valuation of the loc variable, for this part, we fix a value l ∈ L. For each
index of the boundary functions j ∈ {1, . . .m}, we define the set ∂Ij to be part of the set Il
where the function Flj vanishes. That is, ∂Ij ≜ {x ∈ X ∣ Flj(x) = 0}. For the sake of brevity,
we call ∂Ij the jth boundary of Il even though strictly speaking, the jth boundary of Il is
only a subset of ∂Ij according to the standard topological definition. Similarly, we say that
the boundary of Il, is ∂Il = ⋃j∈{1,...,m} ∂Ij .
Lemma 5.3.2. Suppose that there exists a collection {Cj}mj=1 of subsets of Il such that the
following conditions hold:
(a) (Subtangential) For each s0 ∈ Il ∖Cj and s ∈ ∂Ij, ∂Flj(s)∂s ⋅ fl(s, g(l, s0)) ≥ 0.
(b) (Bounded distance) ∃ cj > 0 such that ∀ s0 ∈ Cj , s ∈ ∂Ij, ∣∣s − s0∣∣ ≥ cj.
(c) (Bounded speed) ∃ bj > 0 such that ∀ s0 ∈ Cj , s ∈ Il, ∣∣fl(s, g(l, s0))∣∣ ≤ bj,
(d) (Fast sampling) ∆1 +∆2 ≤ minj∈{1,...,m} cjbj .
Then, any control-free execution fragment β, with β.ltime ≤ ∆1 +∆2, starting from a state
in Il where next − now = ∆1, remains within Il.
In Figure 5.2, the control and control-free fragments are shown by bullets and lines,
respectively. A fragment starting in I and leaving I, must cross ∂I1 or ∂I2. Consider the
following four cases.
(1) If u is evaluated outside both C1 and C2 (e.g., τ2, τ4 and τ6), then condition (a)
guarantees that the fragment does not cross ∂Ij where j ∈ {1,2} because when it
reaches ∂Ij , the vector field governing its evolution points inwards with respect to ∂Ij .
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Figure 5.2: A graphical explanation of Lemma 5.3.2 showing an invariant set Il defined by
two boundary functions. The boundary ∂I1 is drawn in solid line whereas the boundary
∂I2 is drawn in dotted line. The corresponding sets C1 and C2 are also shown.
(2) If u is evaluated inside C1 but outside C2 (e.g., τ1 and τ7), then by the previous rea-
soning, condition (a) guarantees that the fragment does not cross ∂I2. In addition,
conditions (b) and (c) guarantee that it takes finite time before the fragment reaches
∂I1 and condition (d) guarantees that this finite time is at least ∆1 +∆2; thus, before
the fragment crosses ∂I1, u is evaluated again.
(3) If u is evaluated outside C1 but inside C2 (e.g., τ3), then by a symmetric argument, the
fragment does not cross ∂I1 or ∂I2.
(4) If u is evaluated inside both C1 and C2 (e.g., τ5), then conditions (b), (c) and (d)
guarantee that u is evaluated again before the fragment crosses ∂I1 or ∂I2.
Proof. We fix a control-free execution fragment β = τ0update(z1)τ1update(z2) . . . τn such
that at β.fstate, next − now = ∆1. Without loss of generality we assume that at β.fstate,
z = z1, loc = l and s = x1, where z1 ∈ Z, l ∈ L and x1 ∈ Il. We have to show that at β.lstate,
s ∈ Il.
First, observe that for each k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, (τk ↓ s) is a solution of the differential
equation(s) d(s) = fl(s, g(l, x1)). Let τ be the pasted trajectory τ0 ⌢ τ1 ⌢ . . . τn.3 Let τ.ltime
be T . Since the update action does not change s, τk.lstate ⌈ s = τk+1.fstate ⌈ s for each
k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. As the differential equations are time-invariant, (τ ↓ s) is a solution of
d(s) = fl(s, g(l, x1)). We define the function γ ∶ [0, T ]→ X as ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], γ(t) ≜ (τ ↓ s)(t).
3τ1
⌢ τ2 is the trajectory obtained by concatenating τ2 at the end of τ1.
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We have to show that γ(T ) ∈ Il. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists
t∗ ∈ [0, T ], such that γ(t∗) /∈ Il. By the definition of Il, there exists i such that Fli(γ(0)) ≥ 0
and Fli(γ(t∗)) < 0. We pick one such i and fix it for the remainder of the proof. Since Fli
and γ are continuous, from intermediate value theorem, we know that there exists a time
t1 before t∗ where Fli vanishes and that there is some finite time  > 0 after t1 when Fli
is strictly negative. Formally, there exists t1 ∈ [0, t∗) and  > 0 such that for all t ∈ [0, t1],
Fli(γ(t)) ≥ 0, Fli(γ(t1)) = 0, and for all δ ∈ (0, ], Fli(γ(t1 + δ)) < 0.
Case 1: x1 ∈ Il ∖Ci. Since Fli(γ(t1)) = 0, by definition, γ(t1) ∈ ∂Ii. But from the value
of Fli(γ(t)) where t is near to t1, we get that ∂Fli∂t (t1) = ∂Fli∂s (γ(t1)) ⋅ fl(γ(t1), g(l, x1)) < 0.
This contradicts condition (a).
Case 2: x1 ∈ Ci. Since for all t ∈ [0, t1], Fli(γ(t)) ≥ 0 and Fli(γ(t1)) = 0, we get
that for all t ∈ [0, t1], γ(t) ∈ Il and γ(t1) ∈ ∂Ii. So from condition (b) and (c), we get
ci ≤ ∥γ(t1) − x1∥ = ∥∫ t10 fl(γ(t), g(l, x1))dt∥ ≤ bit1. That is, t1 ≥ cibi . But we know that
t1 < t∗ ≤ T and periodicity of control actions T ≤ ∆1 + ∆2. Combining these, we get
∆1 +∆2 > cibi , which contradicts condition (d).
For PCHAs with certain properties, the following lemma provides sufficient conditions
for the existence of the bounds bj and cj , which satisfy the bounded distance and bounded
speed conditions of Lemma 5.3.2.
Lemma 5.3.3. For a given l ∈ L, let Ul = {g(l, s) ∣ l ∈ L, s ∈ Il} ⊆ U and suppose Il is
compact and fl is continuous in Il ×Ul. The bounded distance and bounded speed conditions
(of Lemma 5.3.2) are satisfied if Cj ⊂ Il satisfies the following conditions: (a) Cj is closed,
and (b) Cj ∩ ∂Ij = ∅
Proof. From the continuity of Flj , we can assume, without loss of generality, that ∂Ij /= ∅.
This is because if ∂Ij = ∅, then for all s ∈ X , it must be either Flj(s) > 0 or Flj(s) < 0,
that is, Flj is not needed to describe Il. In addition, the case where Cj = ∅ is trivial since
conditions (b) and (c) of Lemma 5.3.2 are satisfied for any arbitrary large cj and arbitrary
small bj . So for the rest of the proof, we assume that ∂Ij /= ∅ and Cj /= ∅. Since Il is
compact and Cj and ∂Ij are closed, Cj and ∂Ij are also compact. Consider a function
Gj ∶ ∂Ij → R defined by
Gj(s) = min
s0∈Cj ∥s − s0∥,
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where ∥ ⋅ ∥ is a norm on Rn. Due to the continuity of ∥ ⋅ ∥ and the compactness and non-
emptiness of Cj , Gj is continuous and since Cj∩∂Ij = ∅, we get that for all s ∈ ∂Ij ,Gj(s) > 0.
Since ∂Ij is compact and non-empty, Gj attains its minimum in ∂Ij . So there exists cj > 0
such that mins∈∂Ij Gj(s) ≥ cj .
Next, consider a function Hj ∶ Il → R defined by
Hj(s) = max
s0∈Cj ∥fl(s, g(l, s0))∥.
Using the continuity of fl, the compactness and non-emptiness of Cj and Il and the same
argument as above, we can conclude that there exists bj ≥ 0 such that maxs∈IlHj(s) ≤ bj .
Theorem 5.3.1 combines the above lemmas and provides sufficient conditions for invari-
ance of I.
Theorem 5.3.1. Consider a PCHA A and a set I ⊆ QA. Suppose Q0A ⊆ I, A satisfies
control invariance condition of Lemma 5.3.1 and conditions (a)–(d) of Lemma 5.3.2 for
each l ∈ LA. Then ReachA ⊆ I.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 5.3.1 and Lemma 5.3.2 since if conditions
(a)–(d) of Lemma 5.3.2 are satisfied for any l ∈ L, then condition (b) of Lemma 5.3.1 is
satisfied.
Theorem 5.3.1 essentially exploits the structure of PCHAs in order to simplify their in-
variant verification. It can be applied to any PCHAs, including those with non-polynomial
vector fields such as Alice, as illustrated later in Section 5.5. Although the PCHA of Fig-
ure 5.1 has one action of each type, Theorem 5.3.1 can be extended for PCHAs with an
arbitrary number of update actions. For PCHAs with polynomial vector fields, given semi-
algebraic sets Il and Cj , checking condition (a) and finding cj and bj that satisfy conditions
(b) and (c) of Lemma 5.3.2 can be formulated as a sum of squares optimization prob-
lem (provided that Il and Cj are basic semialgebraic sets) or proving emptiness of certain
semialgebraic sets based on quantifier elimination. The sum of squares formulation is pre-
sented in the next section and allows the proof to be automated using, for example, SOS-
TOOLS [106]. The quantifier elimination problem can also be formulated and allows the
proof to be automated using, for example, QEPCAD [17]. Alternatively, in Section 5.3.4,
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we show how an invariant set can be automatically computed using the constraint-based
approach presented in [43].
5.3.3 Sum of Squares Formulation for Checking the Invariant Conditions
Suppose the candidate invariant set Il is a basic semialgebraic set, i.e., each of the boundary
functions Flk ∶ X → R is a real polynomial. This section presents a sum of squares formu-
lation for (1) checking condition (a) and finding the cj and bj that satisfy conditions (b)
and (c) of Lemma 5.3.2 for a given basic semialgebraic subset Cj , and (2) finding a subset
Cj such that conditions (a)–(c) of Lemma 5.3.2 are satisfied. For the first case, the sum of
squares problem is convex and can be solved using, for example, SOSTOOLS [106]. For the
second case, however, the problem is not convex but can still be automatically solved using
an iterative scheme as presented in [104].
Checking the Invariant Condition for a Given Subset
Suppose Cj is a basic semialgebraic set, that is, there exists a natural number p such that
Cj can be written as
Cj = {s ∈ Il ∣ ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , p},Gji(s) ≥ 0} (5.1)
where Gji ∶ X → R is a real polynomial for each i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Using the generalized S-
procedure (a special case of the Positivstellensatz) [116], we obtain the following sufficient
condition for condition (a) of Lemma 5.3.2.
Proposition 5.3.1. Suppose for each k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, there exist sums of squares κ1,k(s, s0),
µk(s), ρk,i(s) and σk,i(s) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and a polynomial νk(s) such that
∂Flj(s)
∂s ⋅ fl(s, g(l, s0)) = κ1,k(s, s0) +∑mi=1 ρk,i(s)Fli(s) + νk(s)Flj(s) +∑mi=1 σk,i(s0)Fli(s0)− µk(s0)Gjk(s0).
(5.2)
Then, For each s0 ∈ Il ∖Cj and s ∈ ∂Ij,
∂Flj(s)
∂s
⋅ fl(s, g(l, s0)) ≥ 0.
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Given arbitrary s ∈ ∂Ij and s0 ∈ Il ∖ Cj , non-negativity of κ1,k(s, s0), ρk,i(s), σk,i(s0)
and µk(s0) implies that the derivative term on the left-hand side of the equation (5.2) is
non-negative. In other words, the condition in (5.2) ensures that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , p},
{(s, s0) ∈ X ×X ∣ ∀i ∈ {1, . . .m}, Fli(s) ≥ 0, Flj(s) = 0, Fli(s0) ≥ 0,Gjk(s0) ≤ 0}⊆ {(s, s0) ∈ X ×X ∣ ∂Flj(s)∂s ⋅ fl(s, g(l, s0)) ≥ 0}.
That is, for all s ∈ ∂Ij and s0 ∈ Il ∖ Cj , we have ∂Flj(s)∂s ⋅ fl(s, g(l, s0)) ≥ 0. Similarly,
based on the generalized S-procedure, checking condition (b) and checking condition (c)
of Lemma 5.3.2 can be formulated as an optimization problem according to the following
propositions.
Proposition 5.3.2. There exists cj > 0 such that for all s0 ∈ Cj and s ∈ ∂Ij, ∥s − s0∥ ≥ cj
if the solution c∗j of the following optimization problem is positive.
Maximize cj such that there exist sums of squares κ2(s, s0), γi(s) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and λi(s)
for i ∈ {1, . . . p} and a polynomial γm+1(s) such that
∥s − s0∥2 − c2j = κ2(s, s0) + m∑
i=1γi(s)Fli(s) + γm+1(s)Flj(s) +
p∑
i=1λi(s0)Gji(s0).
Proposition 5.3.3. There exists bj > 0 such that for all s0 ∈ Cj and s ∈ Il, ∥fl(s, g(l, s0))∥ ≤
bj if the solution b∗j of the following optimization problem is positive.
Minimize bj such that there exist sums of squares κ3(s, s0), ζi(s) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and ηi(s)
for i ∈ {1, . . . p} such that
b2j − ∥fl(s, g(l, s0)∥2 = κ3(s, s0) + m∑
i=1 ζi(s)Fli(s) +
p∑
i=1ηi(s0)Gji(s0).
Finding a Subset for Checking the Invariant Conditions
Suppose Cj = {s ∈ Il ∣ Gj(s) ≥ 0}. In this case, we only have to find a polynomial Gj(s).
According to the generalized S-procedure, this problem can be formulated as follows: Find
sums of squares ρi(s), σi(s), µ(s), γi(s), λ(s), ζi(s) and η(s) for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and poly-
nomials Gj(s), ν(s) and γm+1(s) such that the following are sums of squares:
(a) ∂Flj(s)∂s ⋅ fl(s, g(l, s0)) −∑mi=1 ρi(s)Fli(s) − ν(s)Flj(s) −∑mi=1 σi(s0)Fli(s0) + µ(s0)Gj(s0),
64
(b) ∥s − s0∥2 − c2j −∑mi=1 γi(s)Fli(s) − γm+1(s)Flj(s) − λ(s0)Gj(s0), and
(c) b2j − ∥fl(s, g(l, s0)∥2 −∑mi=1 ζi(s)Fli(s) − η(s0)Gj(s0).
5.3.4 Example
In this section, we illustrate how invariant verification of a PCHA can be partially automated
on a simple example. Consider a one-dimensional system whose global state (e.g., position
or velocity) needs to be regulated such that it stays within some safe ball with respect to a
reference point, given by an external command. The reference point is given as an input to
the system and may change throughout an execution. We assume that the distance between
the reference point and the global state of the system at the time the reference point is
received is not larger than δ. The system has the following variables: (a) a continuous state
variable s of type R that represents the deviation of the system from the current reference
point; (b) a discrete state variable loc of type R that represents the current reference point;
(c) a command variable z of type R that stores the last external command, i.e., the reference
point for the next control cycle; and (d) a control variable u of type U = {a1, a2} where
a1 ∈ R− and a2 ∈ R+ are system parameters.
Figure 5.3 shows the HIOA specification of this state regulator system. The control
action occurs once every ∆ time starting from time 0 where ∆ ∈ R+. This action updates
the values of the variables s, loc and u as follows.
A. First, set the value of loc and s so that they correspond to the new reference point and
the deviation of the system from the new reference point, respectively (lines 16–17).
1signature
internal control
3input update(z′ ∶ Z)
5variables
internal s : R := s0 = 0
7internal discrete loc : R, z : R, u : {a1, a2}
internal now : R≥0 := 0, next : R≥0 := 0
9
transitions
11input update(z′)
eff z := z′
internal control
14pre now ≥ next
eff next := now + ∆;
16s ∶= s − z + loc;
loc ∶= z;
18if s > 0 then u := a1
else u := a2 fi
20
trajectories
22evolve d(now) = 1; d(s) = u
stop when now = next
Figure 5.3: The state regulator system with parameters a1 ∈ R−, a2 ∈ R+, ∆ ∈ R+, δ ∈ R≥0
and D ∈ R.
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B. Based on the updated value of s, u is computed as follows (lines 18–19): If s > 0, then
u is set to a1. Otherwise, u is set to a2.
Along a trajectory, the continuous state s evolves according to the differential equation
s˙ = u (line 22). That is, for any l ∈ L, the function fl of line 24 of Figure 5.1 is defined as
fl(s, u) = u.
Invariant For each mode l ∈ L, we let Il = [−δ + a1∆, δ + a2∆]. That is, the candidate
invariant set Il is defined by two boundary functions Fl1(s) = s + δ − a1∆ and Fl2(s) =−s + δ + a2∆. The overall candidate invariant set is then given by I ≜ {x ∈ Q∣ Fl1(x.s) ≥
0 and Fl2(x.s) ≥ 0}.
Proving Invariance We use Theorem 5.3.1 to show that I is in fact an invariant of
the system. Clearly, the initial state is contained in I. To verify the control invariance
condition of Lemma 5.3.1, we define sˆ ≜ s + loc to be the global state of the system. From
the assumption on the distance between the reference point and the global state of the
system at the time an update action occurs and periodicity control actions, it can be checked
that when a control action occurs, sˆ − z ∈ [−δ + a1∆, δ + a2∆]. Hence, from the update rule
of s (line 16), the control invariance condition of Lemma 5.3.1 is satisfied. Finally, define
C1 ≜ [0, δ+a2∆] and C2 ≜ [−δ+a1∆,0]. We get that conditions (a)–(d) of Lemma 5.3.2 are
satisfied with c1 = δ − a1∆, c2 = δ + a2∆, b1 = −a1, b2 = a2.
Automatically Finding an Invariant We consider the case where a1 = −1 and a2 = 1.
Assume that an invariant Il for any mode l ∈ R has the following form: Il = {s ∈ R ∣ Fl1(s) ≥
0 and Fl2(s) ≥ 0} where Fl1(s) = s − η1, Fl2(s) = −s + η2 and η1 ≤ −δ + a1∆ and η2 ≥ δ + a2∆
are constants that need to be computed such that all the conditions of Lemma 5.3.2 are
satisfied. (From the previous proof, these constraints on η1 and η2 ensure that the initial
state is contained in I and the control invariance condition of Lemma 5.3.1 are satisfied.)
To prove that Il is in fact an invariant, we use the sets C1 and C2 of the following forms:
C1 = {s ∈ R ∣ G1(s) ≥ 0 and Fl2(s) ≥ 0} and C2 = {s ∈ R ∣ Fl1(s) ≥ 0 and G2(s) ≥ 0} where
G1(s) = s − κ1, G2(s) = −s + κ2 and κ1 and κ2 are constants to be determined.
Clearly, for any s, s0 ∈ R and l ∈ L, ∥fl(s, g(l, s0))∥ = ∥g(l, s0)∥ = 1. Thus, condition (c)
of Lemma 5.3.2 is satisfied with bj = 1 for any sets Cj and Il. With the particular form of
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the sets C1, C2 and Il we have previously chosen, it is straightforward to check that the
problem of finding η1, η2, κ1 and κ2 such that all the conditions of Lemma 5.3.2 are satisfied
for j = 1 is equivalent to finding η1, η2, κ1 and κ2 such that for all s, s0 ∈ R, the followings
are satisfied:
(a) (Fl1(s0) < 0) ∨ (Fl2(s0) < 0) ∨ (G1(s0) ≥ 0) ∨ (Fl1(s) /= 0) ∨ (Fl2(s) < 0) ∨ (s0 ≤ 0),
(b) κ1 ≤ η2, κ1 > η1 and κ1 − η1 ≥ ∆.
Note that condition (a) is obtained from condition (a) of Lemma 5.3.2 while condition
(b) is obtained from conditions (b) and (d) of Lemma 5.3.2. Similarly, for j = 2, the following
conditions need to be satisfied for all s, s0 ∈ R:
(c) (Fl1(s0) < 0) ∨ (Fl2(s0) < 0) ∨ (G2(s0) ≥ 0) ∨ (Fl1(s) < 0) ∨ (Fl2(s) /= 0) ∨ (s0 > 0),
(d) κ2 ≥ η1, κ2 < η2 and η2 − κ2 ≥ ∆.
Applying Farkas Lemma, condition (a) can be proved by finding a constant λ1 and
non-negative constants ν1, . . . , ν3 and µ1, . . . , µ3 such that
ν1Fl1(s0) + ν2Fl2(s0) − µ1G1(s0) + λ1Fl1(s) + ν3Fl2(s) + µ2s0 + µ3 = 0 (5.3)
and at least one of the µ1, µ2, µ3 is strictly positive. Similarly, the validity of condition (c)
can be proved by finding a constant λ2 and non-negative constants ν4, . . . , ν7 and µ4, µ5
such that
ν4Fl1(s0) + ν5Fl2(s0) − µ4G2(s0) + ν6Fl1(s) + λ2Fl2(s) − ν7s0 + µ5 = 0 (5.4)
and either µ4 > 0 or µ5 > 0 (or both).
Using the tool presented in [43], the unknowns that satisfy (5.3), (5.4) and conditions
(b) and (d) are found for δ = 0.08 and ∆ = 0.02 to be: η1 = −0.2, η2 = 0.2, κ1 = −0.1, κ2 = 0.1,
ν1 = 1, ν2 = 2, µ1 = 16, λ1 = 0, ν3 = 0, µ2 = 17, µ3 = 1, ν4 = 0, ν5 = 0, µ4 = 20, ν6 = 0,
λ2 = 0, ν7 = 20 and µ5 = 2. That is, the invariant set is given by Il = [−0.2,0.2] (whereas the
invariant set we have verified manually is given by Il = [−0.1,0.1]).
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Planner
Controller
Vehicle
Brake
Controller
plan(p)
a,φ
x, y
θ, v
brake(b)
Figure 5.4: Planner-controller system.
5.4 Case Study: Alice
In this section, we describe an autonomous ground vehicle (Alice) consisting of the physical
vehicle, modeled by the Vehicle automaton, and the controller, modeled by the Controller
automaton (see Figure 5.4). Vehicle captures the position, orientation and velocity of the
vehicle in the plane. Controller receives information about the state of the Vehicle and
periodically computes the input steering (φ) and acceleration (a). It also receives an infinite4
sequence of waypoints from a Planner and its objective is to compute a and φ such that
the Vehicle (a) remains within a certain bounded distance emax of the planned path, and
(b) makes progress towards successive waypoints at a target speed. Property (a) together
with the assumption (possibly guaranteed by Planner) that all planned paths are at least
emax distance away from obstacles, imply that the Vehicle does not collide with obstacles.
While the Vehicle makes progress towards a certain waypoint, the subsequent waypoints may
change owing to the discovery of new obstacles and changes in the mission plan. Finally,
the Controller may receive an externally triggered brake input, to which it must react by
slowing the Vehicle down. The Vehicle and Controller are modeled as HIOAs, but as we shall
see shortly, the composed system has no inputs and in fact is a PCHA.
5.4.1 Vehicle
The Vehicle automaton of Figure 5.5 specifies the dynamics of the autonomous ground
vehicle with acceleration (a) and steering angle (φ) as inputs. It has two parameters:
(a) φmax ∈ (0, pi2 ) is the physical limit on the steering angle, and (b) L is the wheelbase.
The main output variables of Vehicle are (a) x and y coordinates of the vehicle with respect
4The verification technique can be extended in an obvious way to handle the case where the Vehicle has
to follow a finite sequence of waypoints and halt at the end.
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1variables
output x : R := x0; y: R := y0;
3θ: R := θ0; v: R := v0
input a, φ: R
5
trajectories
7evolve d(x) = v cos(θ)
d(y) = v sin(θ)
9if ∣u.φ∣ ≤ φmax
then d(θ) = v
L
tan(φ)
11else d(θ) = v
L
tan( φ∣φ∣φmax) fi
if v > 0 ∨a ≥ 0
13then d(v) = a
else d(v) = 0 fi
Figure 5.5: Vehicle.
to a global coordinate system, (b) orientation θ of the vehicle with respect to the positive
direction of the global x axis, and (c) vehicle’s velocity v. These variables evolve according
to the differential equations of lines 7–14. Two aspects of this Vehicle model are noteworthy:
(i) In determining the orientation of the Vehicle, if the input steering angle φ is greater than
the maximum limit φmax, then the maximum steering in the correct direction is applied.
(ii) The acceleration can be negative only if the velocity is positive, and therefore the Vehicle
cannot move backwards. This Vehicle model requires bounds on minimum and maximum
acceleration, however, the Controller ensures that the input acceleration is always within
such a bound. It is assumed that the Vehicle can execute any valid command without delay.
5.4.2 Controller
Figure 5.6 shows the HIOA specification of the Controller automaton that reads the state
of the Vehicle periodically and issues acceleration and steering outputs to achieve the afore-
mentioned goals. Controller is parameterized by: (a) the sampling period ∆ ∈ R+, (b) the
target speed vT ∈ R≥0, (c) proportional control gains k1, k2 > 0, (d) a constant δ > 0 relating
the maximum steering angle and the speed, that is, while the Vehicle is moving at speed
v, the maximum steering angle is given by δv, and (e) maximum and braking accelerations
amax > 0 and abrake < 0. Restricting the maximum steering angle instead of the maximum
steering rate is a simplifying but conservative assumption. Given a constant relating the
maximum steering rate and the speed, there exists δ as defined above that guarantees that
the maximum steering rate requirement is satisfied.
A path is an infinite sequence of points p1, p2, . . . where pi ∈ R2, for each i. The main
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signature
2input plan(p:Seq[R]); brake(b ∶ On,Off)
internal main
4
variables
6input x, y, θ, v: R
output a,φ: R := (0, 0)
8internal brake: {On, Off} := Off
path: Seq[R2] := arbitrary
10new path: Seq[R2] := path
seg: N := 1
12e1, e2, d ∶ R := [e1,0, e2,0, d0 ]
now: R := 0; next:R≥0 := 0
14
transitions
16input plan(p)
eff new path := p
18
input brake(b)
20eff brake := b
22internal main
pre now = next
24eff next := now + ∆
if path ≠ new path ∨d ≤ 0 then
26if path ≠ new path
then seg := 1; path := new path
28elseif d ≤ 0
then seg := seg + 1 fi
30let p⃗ = [ path[seg + 1].x − path[seg].x
path[seg + 1].y − path[seg].y ]
q⃗ = [ path[seg + 1].y − path[seg].y−(path[seg + 1].x − path[seg].x) ]
32r⃗ = [ path[seg + 1].x − x
path[seg + 1].y − y) ]
e1 ∶= 1∥q⃗∥ q⃗ ⋅ r⃗
34e2 ∶= θ −∠p⃗
d ∶= 1∥p⃗∥ p⃗ ⋅ r⃗
36fi
38let φd = −k1 e1 − k2 e2
φ = φd∣φd ∣ min(δ × v, ∣φd∣)
40
if brake = On then a := abrake
42elseif brake = Off ∧ v < vT
then a := amax
44else a := 0 fi
46trajectories
evolve d(now) = 1
48d(e1) = v sin(e2)
d(e2) = vL tan(φ)
50d(d) = -v cos(e2)
stop when now = next
Figure 5.6: Controller with parameters vT , k1, k2 ∈ R≥0, δ,∆ ∈ R+ and abrake < 0.
state variables of Controller are the following:
(a) brake and new path are command variables that store the information received through
the most recent brake (On or Off ) and plan (a path) actions.
(b) path is the current path being followed by Controller.
(c) seg is the index of the last waypoint visited in the current path. That is, seg + 1 is the
index of the current waypoint. The straight line joining path[seg] and path[seg + 1 ] is
called the current segment .
(d) deviation e1 is the signed perpendicular distance from the current position of the Vehicle
to the current segment (see Figure 5.7).
(e) disorientation e2 is the difference between the current orientation (θ) of the Vehicle and
the angle of the current segment.
(f) waypoint-distance d is the signed distance of the Vehicle to the current waypoint mea-
sured parallel to the current segment.
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vehicle
p[seg]
p[seg + 1]
current seg.
θ
e2
e 1
d
Figure 5.7: Deviation and disorientation.
The brake(b) action is an externally controlled input action that informs the Controller
about the application of an external brake (b = On) or the removal of the brake (b = Off ).
When brake(b) occurs, b is recorded in the command variable brake. The plan(p) action
is controlled by the external Planner and it informs the Controller about a newly planned
path p. When this action occurs, the path p is recorded in the variable new path. The main
action occurs once every ∆ time starting from time 0. This action updates the values of
the variables e1 , e2 ,d ,path, seg ,a and φ as follows:
A. If new path (obtained from the Planner) is different from path, then seg is set to 1 and
path is set to new path (line 27).
B. If new path is the same as path and the waypoint-distance d is less than or equal to 0,
then seg is set to seg + 1 (line 29).
C. For both of the above cases several temporary variables are computed that are in turn
used to update e1 , e2 ,d as specified in lines 33–35; otherwise these variables remain
unchanged.
D. The steering output to the Vehicle φ is computed using a proportional control law
saturated at δ×v (for the mechanical protection of the steering). That is, the magnitude
of the steering output φ is set to the minimum of ∣ − k1e1 − k2e2∣ and v × δ (line 39).
E. The acceleration output a is computed using a “bang-bang” control law. If brake is On,
then a is set to the braking deceleration abrake; otherwise, it executes amax until the
Vehicle reaches the target speed, at which point a is set to 0.
Along a trajectory, the evolution of the variables are specified by the differential equa-
tions on lines 48–50. These differential equations are derived from the update rules described
above and the differential equations governing the evolution of x, y, θ and v.
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5.4.3 Complete System
Let A be the composition of the Controller and the Vehicle automata. The continuous
state of A is defined by the valuations of x, y, θ, v, e1, e2 and d of Vehicle and Controller.
For convenience, we define a single derived variable s of type X = R7 encapsulating all
these variables. The discrete state of A is defined by the valuations of brake, path and seg
of Controller. A derived variable loc of type L = Tuple[{On,Off },Seq[R2],N] is defined
encapsulating all these variables. It can be checked easily that the composed automaton A
is a PCHA. Appendix 5.A describes the variables, actions, state transition functions of the
corresponding PCHA.
5.5 Analysis of the System
The informally stated goals of the system translate to the following subgoals:
A. (safety) At all reachable states of A, the deviation (e1) of the Vehicle is upperbounded
by emax, where emax is determined in terms of system parameters.
B. (waypoint progress) The Vehicle reaches successive waypoints.
First, in Section 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, we define a family {Ik}k∈N of subsets of QA and using
Lemma 5.3.2 and Lemma 5.3.3, we conclude that they are invariant with respect to the
control-free execution fragments of A. From the specification of main action, we see that
the discrete state changes only occur if path /= new path or waypoint-distance d ≤ 0 (i.e.,
the Vehicle has reached the end of the current segment). Hence, using Theorem 5.3.1, we
conclude that any execution fragment starting in Ik remains within Ik, provided that path
and current segment do not change.
In Section 5.5.3, we establish the following segment progress property: There exist cer-
tain threshold values of deviation, disorientation and waypoint-distance such that from any
state x with greater deviation, disorientation and waypoint-distance, the Vehicle reduces
its deviation and disorientation with respect to the current segment, while making progress
towards its current waypoint. This intermediate result is proved by showing that start-
ing from Ik, Ik+1 ⊆ Ik is reached in a finite amount of time and for k smaller than the
threshold value k∗, Ik+1 is strictly contained in Ik. Finally, in Section 5.5.4, we prove an
invariance of I0 and derive geometric properties of planner paths that can be followed by A
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safely. These geometric properties specify the minimum length of a path segment and the
relationship between the segment length and the maximum difference between consecutive
segment orientations and are derived from the segment progress property. An invariance
of I0 provides a proof certificate that A satisfies the safety property (A) and the waypoint
progress property (B). Since Alice’s original parameters violate the sufficient conditions for
an invariance of I0, it is not guaranteed that the behavior of Alice satisfies these subgoals.
In fact, during the NQE of the 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge, Alice violated the safety
property (A), leading to the stuttering behavior.
5.5.1 Family of Invariants
We define, for each k ∈ N, the set Ik that bounds the deviation e1 of the Vehicle to be
within [−k, k]. This bound on deviation alone, of course, does not give us an inductive
invariant. If the deviation is k and the Vehicle is highly disoriented, then it would violateIk. Thus, Ik also bounds the disorientation such that the steering angle computed based
on the proportional control law is within [−φk, φk]. To prevent the Vehicle from not being
able to turn at low speed and to guarantee that the execution speed of the Controller is fast
enough with respect to the speed of the Vehicle, Ik also bounds the speed of the Vehicle.
Formally, Ik is defined in terms of k, φk ≥ 0 as
Ik ≜ {x ∈ Q ∣ ∀i ∈ {1, . . .6}, Fk,i(x.s) ≥ 0} (5.5)
where Fk,1, . . . , Fk,6 ∶ R7 → R are defined as follows:
Fk,1(s) = k − s.e1; Fk,2(s) = k + s.e1; (5.6)
Fk,3(s) = φk + k1s.e1 + k2s.e2; Fk,4(s) = φk − k1s.e1 − k2s.e2; (5.7)
Fk,5(s) = vmax − s.v; Fk,6(s) = δs.v − φb. (5.8)
Here vmax = vT + ∆amax and φb > 0 is an arbitrary constant. As we shall see shortly,
the choice of φb affects the minimum speed of the Vehicle and also the requirements of
a brake action. We examine a state x ∈ Ik, that is, Fk,i(x.s) ≥ 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,6}.
Fk,1(s), Fk,2(s) ≥ 0 means s.e1 ∈ [−k, k]. Fk,3(s), Fk,4(s) ≥ 0 means that the steering angle
computed based on the proportional control law is within the range [−φk, φk]. Further, if
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φk ≤ φmax, then the computed steering satisfies the physical constraint of the Vehicle. If, in
addition, we have φb ≥ φk and Fk,6(s) ≥ 0, then the Vehicle actually executes the computed
steering command. Fk,5(s) ≥ 0 means that the speed of the Vehicle is at most vmax.
For each k ∈ N, we define
θk,1 = k1
k2
k − 1
k2
φk and θk,2 = k1
k2
k + 1
k2
φk. (5.9)
That is, θk,1 and θk,2 are the values of e2 at which the proportional control law yields the
steering angle of φk and −φk, respectively, given that the value of e1 is −k. From the above
definitions, we make the following observations about the boundary of the Ik sets: for any
k ∈ N and x ∈ Ik, (a) x.e2 ∈ [−θk,2, θk,2], (b) Fk,1(x.s) = 0 implies x.e2 ∈ [−θk,2,−θk,1],
(c) Fk,2(x.s) = 0 implies x.e2 ∈ [θk,1, θk,2], (d) Fk,3(x.s) = 0 implies x.e2 ∈ [−θk,2, θk,1], and
(e) Fk,4(x.s) = 0 implies x.e2 ∈ [−θk,1, θk,2].
We assume that φb and all the ′ks and φk’s satisfy the following assumptions that are
derived from physical and design constraints on the Controller. The region in the φk,k
plane that satisfies Assumption 5.5.1 is shown Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: (a) The set of (k, φk) that satisfies Assumptions 5.5.1 (c) and (d) and are
represented by the green region. (b) The relationship between the maximum bound on ∆
and φk for k = 1k1φk.
Assumption 5.5.1. (Vehicle and controller design) (a) φk ≤ φb ≤ φmax and φk < pi2 ,
(b) 0 ≤ θk,1 ≤ θk,2 < pi2 , (c) L cotφk sin θk,2 < k2k1 , (d) ∆ ≤ cb where c = 1√k21+k22 (φk − φ˜),
b = vmax√sin2 θk,2 + 1L2 tan2(φ˜) and φ˜ = cot−1 ( k2k1L sin θk,2 ),5 and (e) tanφk2L vmax∆ ≤ pi2 .
5Using Assumption 5.5.1(c), it can be shown that φ˜ < φk so cb > 0.
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If the Vehicle is forced to slow down too much at the boundary of an Ik by the brakes,
then it may not be able to turn enough to remain inside Ik. Thus, in verifying the above
properties we need to restrict our attention to executions in certain good brake controllers in
which brake inputs do not occur at low speeds and are not too persistent. This is formalized
by the next definition.
Definition 5.5.1. A brake controller is good if its composition with Controller gives rise to
an execution α = τ0a1τ1a2 . . . that satisfies: If a brake(On) action occurs at time t, then for
any i ∈ N such that t ∈ dom(τi), (a) (τi ↓ v)(t) > φbδ + ∆∣abrake∣, and (b) brake(Off ) must
occur within time t + 1∣abrake∣((τi ↓ v)(t) − φbδ −∆∣abrake∣).
We assume that the brake controller satisfies the above assumption and for the remainder
of this section, we only consider executions in good brake controllers. A state x ∈ QA is
reachable if there exists an execution α in a good brake controller with α.lstate = x.
5.5.2 Invariance Property
We fix a k ∈ N for the remainder of the section and denote Ik, Fk,i as I and Fi, respectively,
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,6}. As in Lemma 5.3.2, we define I = {s ∈ X ∣Fi(s) ≥ 0} and for each
i ∈ {1, . . . ,6}, ∂Ii = {s ∈ X ∣ Fi(s) = 0} and let the functions f1, f2, . . . , f7 ∶ R7 × R2 → R
describe the evolution of x, y, θ, v, e1, e2 and d, respectively. We prove that I satisfies the
control-free invariance condition of Lemma 5.3.1 by applying Lemma 5.3.2.
First, we check that the conditions in Lemma 5.3.2 are satisfied. This analysis appears
in Appendix 5.B. It does not involve solving differential equations but relies on algebraic
simplification of the expressions defining the vector fields and the boundaries {∂Ii}i∈{1,...6}
of the invariant set.
The next lemma shows that the subtangential, bounded distance and bounded speed
conditions (of Lemma 5.3.2) are satisfied. The proof for j = 5 is presented here as an
example. The rest of the proof is provided in Appendix 5.B.
Lemma 5.5.1. For each l ∈ L and j ∈ {1, . . . ,6}, the subtangential, bounded distance and
bounded speed conditions (of Lemma 5.3.2) are satisfied.
Proof. Define C5 ≜ {s ∈ I ∣ s.v ≤ vT }. We apply Lemma 5.3.3 to prove the bounded distance
and the bounded speed conditions. First, note that the projection of I onto the (e1, e2, v)
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space is compact and C5 is closed. Let UI = {g(l, s) ∣l ∈ L, s ∈ I}. From the definition
of I, it can be easily checked that f is continuous in I × UI . In addition, s.v = vmax for
any s ∈ ∂I5. Since amax,∆ > 0, vmax = vT + ∆amax > vT . Therefore, C5 ∩ ∂I5 = ∅. Hence,
from Lemma 5.3.3, the bounded distance and bounded speed conditions are satisfied. To
prove the subtangential condition, we pick an arbitrary s ∈ ∂I5 and s0 ∈ I ∖ C5. From the
definitions of I and C5, vT < s0.v ≤ vmax. Therefore, for any l ∈ L, either f4(s, g(l, s0)) = 0 or
f4(s, g(l, s0)) = abrake and we can conclude that ∂F5∂s ⋅ f(s, g(l, s0)) = −f4(s, g(l, s0)) ≥ 0.
From the definition of each Cj , we can derive the lower bound cj on the distance from Cj
to ∂Ij and the upper bound bj on the length of the vector field f where the control variable
u is evaluated when the continuous state s ∈ Cj . Using these bounds and Assumption
5.5.1(d), we prove the sampling rate condition.
Lemma 5.5.2. For each l ∈ L, the sampling rate condition is satisfied.
Thus, conditions (a)–(d) of Lemma 5.3.2 are satisfied. From Theorem 5.3.1, we obtain
that good execution fragments of A preserve invariance of I, provided that the path and
current segment do not change over the fragment.
Proposition 5.5.1. For any plan-free execution fragment β starting at a state x ∈ I and
ending at x′ ∈ QA, if x.path = x.new path and x.seg = x′.seg, then x′ ∈ I.
Proof. From Lemma 5.5.1 and 5.5.2, we see that all the conditions in Lemma 5.3.2 are
satisfied. Thus, we can conclude that the control-free invariance condition of Lemma 5.3.1 is
satisfied. In addition, from the specification of main action, we see that a discrete transition
in the continuous state s only occurs when path /= new path (i.e., a new path is received)
or s.d ≤ 0 (i.e., the Vehicle has reached the end of the current segment). Hence, if a
closed execution β does not contain a plan action, β.fstate ⌈ path = β.fstate ⌈ new path and
β.lstate ⌈ seg = β.fstate ⌈ seg, then a discrete transition in the continuous state s does not
occur in β. Applying Theorem 5.3.1, we get the desired result.
5.5.3 Segment Progress
In this section, we establish the segment progress property, i.e., there exist certain threshold
values of deviation, disorientation and waypoint-distance such that from any state x with
greater deviation, disorientation and waypoint-distance, the Vehicle reduces its deviation
76
and disorientation with respect to the current segment, while making progress towards its
current waypoint. First, we prove the progress property over a pasted trajectory τ between
any two main actions. That is, suppose right after an occurrence of a main action, x ∈ Ik
for some k ∈ N. Then, right before an occurrance of the next main action, x ∈ Ik+1 whereIk+1 ⊆ Ik and if k is less than some threshold k∗, then Ik+1 is strictly contained in Ik.
Next, in Lemma 5.5.4, we compute the bound d∗ on the maximum change in the value
of the waypoint-distance d over τ . Given the progress property over τ and the bound d∗, we
can then establish the segment progress property defined at the beginning of Section 5.5.
That is, starting from a state x and ending at x′, if x ∈ Ik, then x′ ∈ Ik+n where an integer
n ≥ 0 depends on x.d − x′.d and the system parameters, provided that path and current
segment do not change. Furthermore, if x.d−x′.d is large enough, then n is strictly positive.
By solving the differential equation that describes the evolution of e1 and e2 along τ
and using the periodicity of main actions, the next lemma provides the desired progress
property over τ . The complete proof appears in Appendix 5.C.
Lemma 5.5.3. Suppose τ.fstate ∈ Ik for some k ∈ N. Then τ.lstate ∈ Ik+1 whose parameters
k+1 and φk+1 are given by k+1 = k − ˆk and φk+1 = φk − φˆk for some ˆk, φˆk ≥ 0. In addition,
there exists a natural number k∗ such that for any k < k∗, ˆk and φˆk are strictly positive,
that is, Ik+1 ⊊ Ik.
The precise definitions of ˆk, φˆk and k∗ are given in Appendix 5.C. The plots showing the
progress in the deviation and disoriantation are shown in Figure 5.9(a) and Figure 5.9(b),
respectively.
The following lemma provides the value of the bound d∗ on the maximum change in the
value of d over τ .
Lemma 5.5.4. Suppose τ.fstate ∈ Ik for some k ∈ N. For any t ∈ dom(τ), ∣(τ ⌈ d)(t) −
τ.fstate ⌈ d∣ ≤ d∗ where d∗ = vmax∆.
Proof. From Proposition 5.5.1, the definitions of F5 and F6 and the definition of f7 that
describes the evolution of d, we get that maxs,s0∈I ∥f7(s, g(l, s0))∥ ≤ vmax. Since dom(τ) =[0,∆], we get ∣(τ ↓ d)(t) − τ.fstate ⌈ d∣ ≤ maxs,s0∈I ∥f7(s, g(l, s0))∥∆ ≤ vmax∆.
Using Lemma 5.5.3 and Lemma 5.5.4, we establish the relationship between the progress
of Ik’s and the decrease in the value of d. The complete proof can be found in Appendix 5.C.
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Figure 5.9: The progress in (a) deviation and (b) disorientation. (c) A sequence of shrinkingIk’s visited by A in making progress towards a waypoint.
Lemma 5.5.5. For each k ∈ N, starting from any reachable state x ∈ Ik such that x.d >
vmax∆, x.path = x.new path and x.next = x.now, any plan-free execution fragment β with
β.ltime = ∆ satisfies β.lstate ∈ Ik+1 and β.lstate ⌈ d ≥ x.d − vmax∆.
Finally, we conclude the section by establishing the segment progress property defined
at the beginning of Section 5.5.
Proposition 5.5.2. For each k ∈ N, starting from any reachable state x ∈ Ik, any reachable
state x′ is in Ik+n where n = max(⌊x.d−x′.dvmax∆ ⌋ − 1,0), provided that path and current segment
do not change.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary closed execution fragment β starting at x and ending at x′.
Since by assumption, β is a plan-free execution fragment such that β.lstate ⌈ path = β.fstate ⌈
new path and β.lstate ⌈ seg = β.fstate ⌈ seg, from Proposition 5.5.1, we know that β.lstate ∈
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Next, consider the case where ⌊x.d−x′.dvmax∆ ⌋ − 1 > 0. From the structure of a PCHA, we see
that next = now every ∆ time. So, the first state in β such that next = now occurs no later
than time ∆. Using Lemma 5.5.4, we see that at this state, d ≥ x.d − vmax∆. Applying
Lemma 5.5.5 and using an invariance of Ik for any k proved in Proposition 5.5.1, we get
that β1.lstate ∈ Ik+n where n = ⌊x.d−vmax∆−x′.dvmax∆ ⌋.
A sequence of shrinking Ik’s visited by A in making progress towards a waypoint is
shown in Figure 5.9(c).
5.5.4 Safety and Waypoint Progress: Identifying Safe Planner Paths
In this section, we derive a sufficient condition on planner paths that can be safely followed
with respect to a candidate invariant set I0 whose parameters 0 ∈ [0, emax] and φ0 ∈[0, φmax] satisfy Assumption 5.5.1 and are chosen such that I0 contains the initial state
Q0A. Then, we prove an invariance of I0 and conclude that the safety and waypoint
progress properties (A) and (B) defined at the beginning of Section 5.5 are satisfied.
The proof is structured as follows. First, we consider an execution fragment where path
does not change and starting with waypoint-distance not shorter than some threshold D∗.
Lemma 5.5.6 uses the segment progress property established in Section 5.5.3 to prove that
this execution fragment preserves an invariance of I0. Then, in Lemma 5.5.7 and Lemma
5.5.8, we show that right after the path changes, the waypoint-distance is not shorter than
D∗ and the state of A remains in I0. Using these results, Lemma 5.5.9 concludes that an
execution fragment that updates the path exactly once by the first main action preserves an
invariance of I0. Finally, we use Lemma 5.5.6 and Lemma 5.5.9 to conclude the section thatI0 is in fact an invariant of A and with this result, we conclude that the system satisfies
the safety and waypoint progress properties (A) and (B) defined at the beginning of Section
5.5.
The following assumption provides sufficient conditions for planner paths that can be
safely followed. The key idea in the condition is: Longer path segments can be succeeded by
sharper turns. Following a long segment, the Vehicle reduces its deviation and disorientation
by the time it reaches the end; thus, it is possible for the Vehicle to turn more sharply at
the end without breaking an invariance of I0.
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Assumption 5.5.2. (Planner paths) Let p0, p1, . . . be a planner path; for i ∈ N, let λi be
the length of the segment pipi+1 and σi be the difference in orientation of pipi+1 and that
of pi+1pi+2. Then, for each i ∈ {0,1, . . .},
(a) λi ≥ 2vmax∆ + 0.
(b) Let n = ⌊λi−0−2vmax∆vmax∆ ⌋. Then, λi and σi satisfy the following conditions:
n ≤ 1∣ cosσi∣ (0 − vmax∆∣ sinσi∣), (5.10)
φn ≤ φ0 − k1vmax∆ sin ∣σi∣ − k1n(1 − cosσi) − k2∣σi∣, (5.11)
where, given 0 and φ0, n and φn are defined recursively for any n > 0 by n = n−1− ˆn−1
and φn = φn−1 − φˆn−1 where for each k ∈ N, ˆk and φˆk are defined in Lemma 5.5.3.
The relationship between λ and the maximum value of σ which satisfies this assumption
is shown in Figure 5.10.
0 5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
λ (m)
|σ
| (
de
gr
ee
)
L = 3, δ = 0.1
L = 3.5, δ = 0.1
L = 4, δ = 0.1
L = 3.5, δ = 0.05
L = 3.5, δ = 0.15
Figure 5.10: Segment length vs. maximum difference between consecutive segment orien-
tations, for different values of L and δ.
Remark 5.5.1. The choice of 0’s and φ0’s affects both the requirements on a safe path
(Assumption 5.5.2) and the definition of a good brake controller (Definition 5.5.1). Larger
0’s and φ0’s allow sharper turns in planned paths but force brakes to occur only at higher
speeds. That is, relaxing the constraint on a path results in the tighter constraint on a
brake action. This tradeoff is related to the design flaw of Alice as discussed in Section 1.1.
Without having quantified the tradeoff, we inadvertently allowed a path to have sharp turns
and also brakes at low speeds—thus violating safety.
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To establish that I0 is an invariant of A, we further assume that (a) new planner paths
begin at the current position, (b) Vehicle is not too disoriented with respect to new paths,
and (c) Vehicle speed is not too high as stated in Assumption 5.5.3.
Assumption 5.5.3. (plan action and new path)
(a) Any new path p = p1p2 . . . satisfies p1 = [xp, yp] where xp and yp are the values of the
variable x and y, respectively, when the path is received (i.e., when the plan action
occurs). That is, for any new input path, the path must begin at the current position
of the Vehicle.
(b) Let vp and θp be the speed and the orientation of the Vehicle, respectively, when a plan
action occurs. Then, vp < 0
∆
√
1+sin2 θ0,2 −amax∆ where given 0 and φ0, θ0,2 is defined as
in (5.9). In addition, let p = p1p2 . . . be the received path and let p⃗ be the vector that
represents a straight line defined by p1 and p2. Then,
∣∠p⃗ − θp∣ ≤ φ0
k2
− (vp + amax∆)∆(k1
k2
√
1 + sin2 θ0,2 + tanφ0
L
) .
First, we consider an execution fragment where path does not change and starting with
a large enough waypoint-distance. Using the progress property established in Section 5.5.3,
the update rule of the variable seg and Lemma 5.5.4, we can show that before switching to
the next segment, x ∈ In where n ≥ 0 depends on the segment length. (See Appendix 5.D
for the complete proof.) Since we restrict the sharpness of the turn with respect to segment
length (Assumption 5.5.2), we can then conclude that this execution fragment preserves an
invariance of I0.
Lemma 5.5.6. Consider a plan-free execution fragment β starting at a state x ∈ I0. Suppose
x.path = x.new path and x.d ≥ D∗ where D∗ = λ1 − 0 − vmax∆ and λ1 is the length of the
segment x.seg. Then β.lstate ∈ I0.
The next two lemmas show that Assumption 5.5.3 is sufficient to guarantee that if the
path is changed, then all the assumptions in the Lemma 5.5.6 are satisfied. All the proofs
appear in Appendix 5.D.
Lemma 5.5.7. For each state x,x′ ∈ Q such that x.path /= x.new path, if x ∈ I0 and
x
main→ x′, then x′.d ≥ λ−vmax∆ > 0 where λ is the length of the first segment of x.new path.
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Lemma 5.5.8. For each state x,x′ ∈ Q such that x.path /= x.new path, if x ∈ I0 and
x
main→ x′, then x′ ∈ I0.
Using the previous three lemmas, the following lemma concludes that an execution
fragment that updates the path exactly once by the first main action preserves an invariance
of I0.
Lemma 5.5.9. Consider a plan-free execution fragment β starting at a state x ∈ I0. If
x.path /= x.new path, then β.lstate ∈ I0.
Proof. β can be written as β = β1mainβ2 where β1 = τ0brakeτ1brake . . . τn and β2 is a plan-
free execution fragment with β2.fstate ⌈ path = β2.fstate ⌈ new path. Clearly, β1.lstate ⌈
path /= β1.lstate ⌈ new path. In addition, β1.fstate ∈ I0 and thus, from Proposition 5.5.1,
β1.lstate ∈ I0. Applying Lemma 5.5.7 and Lemma 5.5.8, we see that β2.fstate ⌈ d ≥ λ1 −
vmax∆ ≥ λ1 − 0 − vmax∆ and β2.fstate ∈ I0 where λ1 is the length of the first segment of
x.new path. Therefore, from Lemma 5.5.6, β.lstate ∈ I0.
Finally, we conclude that I0 is an invariant of A.
Theorem 5.5.1. Suppose the initial state x0 ∈ I0 and x0.d ≥ λ1 − 0 − vmax∆ where λ1 is
the length of the first segment of the initial path. Then, I0 is an invariant of A.
Proof. Any execution α can be written as α = β1planβ2plan . . . where β1 is a plan-free
execution fragment with β1.fstate ⌈ path = β1.fstate ⌈ new path and for any i ≥ 2, βi is a
plan-free execution fragment with βi.fstate ⌈ path /= βi.fstate ⌈ new path. Since plan action
does not affect the variable s, if β1.lstate ∈ I0, then β2.fstate ∈ I0 and using Lemma 5.5.9, we
get that for any i ≥ 2, βi.lstate ∈ I0. Thus, we only need to show that β1.lstate ∈ I0. But this
is true from Lemma 5.5.6 since β1.fstate ⌈ d = x0.d ≥ λ1 − 0 − vmax∆ and β1.fstate ∈ I0.
Since for any state x ∈ I0, ∣x.e1∣ ≤ 0 ≤ emax, invariance of I0 guarantees the safety
property (A). For property (B), we note that for any state x ∈ I0, there exists vmin > 0 such
that x.v ≥ vmin > 0 and ∣x.e2∣ ≤ θ0,2 < pi2 , that is, d˙ = f7(x.s, u) ≤ −vmin cos θ0,2 < 0 for any
u ∈ U . Thus, it follows that the waypoint-distance decreases and the Vehicle makes progress
towards its waypoint.
The simulation results are shown in Figure 5.11, which illustrate that the Vehicle is
capable of making a sharp left turn, provided that the path satisfies Assumption 5.5.2. In
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Figure 5.11: The positions of Alice (dashed line) as it follows a path (solid line) to execute
a sharp left turn. The initial path is drawn in thick solid (black) line. When brake is
triggered, a thick dashed (red) line is drawn on the position of Alice. (a) The path satisfies
Assumption 5.5.2. (b) The path does not satisfy the assumption and the replan occurs due
to excessive deviation. The replanned paths are drawn in thin solid (grey) line.
addition, we are able to replicate the stuttering behavior described in Section 1.1 when
Assumption 5.5.2 is violated.
5.6 Conclusions
Motivated by a design bug that caused an undesirable behavior of Alice, an autonomous
vehicle built at Caltech for the 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge, this chapter introduced
Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automata (PCHA), a subclass of Hybrid I/O Automata
that is suitable for modeling embedded control systems with periodic sensing and actuation.
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New sufficient conditions for verifying invariant properties of PCHAs were presented. For
PCHAs with polynomial continuous vector fields, it is possible to check these conditions
automatically using, for example, quantifier elimination or sum of squares relaxations. The
intuition behind these conditions is that for an execution fragment to leave an invariant setI, it needs to cross the boundary ∂I of I. Hence, to verify invariance of I, it is sufficient
to identify a subset C of I such that: (a) there is enough separation between C and ∂I
to ensure that if a control law is evaluated when the state is inside C, then it is evaluated
again before an execution fragment reaches ∂I, and (b) if the control law is evaluated
when the state is outside C, then the vector field on ∂I points inwards with respect to
∂I. These conditions can be generalized to the case where a collection of subsets C’s
corresponding to different parts of ∂I is needed to prove invariance of I. An example that
illustrates automatic construction of an invariant set using the constraint-based approach
was provided.
We then applied the proposed technique to manually verify a sequence of invariant
properties of the planner-controller subsystem of Alice. Geometric properties of planner-
generated paths were derived that guarantee that such paths can be safely followed by
the controller. The analysis revealed that the software design was not inherently flawed;
the undesirable behavior was caused by an unfortunate choice of certain parameters. The
simulation results verified that with the proper choice of parameters, the observed failure
does not occur.
Appendix
5.A Vehicle∥Controller as a PCHA
Here we show that the composed automaton A = Vehicle∥Controller is a Periodically Con-
trolled Hybrid Automaton. We define an automaton A′ that is identical to A except that
its variables, actions and transition functions are renamed to match the definition of the
generic PCHA of Figure 5.1.
Variables.
A′ has the following variables.
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(a) a continuous state variable s ≜ ⟨x, y, θ, v, e1, e2, d⟩ of type X = R7.
(b) a discrete state variable loc ≜ ⟨brake, path, seg⟩ of type L = Tuple[{On,Off },Seq[R2],N].
(c) a control variable is u = ⟨a,φ⟩ of type U = R2.
(d) two command variables z1 ≜ brake of type Z1 = {On,Off } and z2 = new path of typeZ2 = Seq[R2].
Actions and transitions.
A has two input update actions, brake(b) and plan(p), and the command variables z1 and
z2 store the values b and p, respectively, when these actions occur.
An internal control action main occurs every ∆ time, starting from time 0. That is,
values of ∆1 and ∆2 as defined in a generic PCHA are ∆1 = ∆ and ∆2 = 0. The control law
function g and the state transition function h of A can be derived from the specification of
main action in Figure 5.6. Let g = ⟨ga, gφ⟩ where ga ∶ L×X → R and gφ ∶ L×X → R represent
the control law for a and φ, respectively, and are given by
ga(l, s) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
abrake if l.brake = On
amax if l.brake = Off ∧ s0.v < vT
0 otherwise
gφ(l, s) = φd∣φd∣ min(δ × s.v, ∣φd∣)
where φd = −k1s.e1 − k2s.e2. Let h = ⟨hs,1, . . . , hs,7, hl,1, hl,2, hl,3⟩ where hs,1, . . . , hs,7 ∶ L ×X ×Z1 ×Z2 → R describe the discrete transition of x, y, θ, v, e1, e2 and d components of s,
respectively, and hl,1 ∶ L × X × Z1 × Z2 → {On,Off }, hl,2 ∶ L × X × Z1 × Z2 → Seq[R2] and
hl,3 ∶ L×X ×Z1×Z2 → N describe the discrete transition of brake, path and seg, respectively.
85
Then, the function h is given by
hs,1(l, s, z1, z2) = s.x
hs,2(l, s, z1, z2) = s.y
hs,3(l, s, z1, z2) = s.v
hs,4(l, s, z1, z2) = s.θ
hs,5(l, s, z1, z2) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
s.e1 if l.path = z2 ∧ s.d > 0
1∥q⃗∥ q⃗ ⋅ r⃗ otherwise
hs,6(l, s, z1, z2) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
s.e2 if l.path = z2 ∧ s.d > 0
s.θ −∠p⃗ otherwise
hs,7(l, s, z1, z2) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
s.d if l.path = z2 ∧ s.d > 0
1∥p⃗∥ p⃗ ⋅ r⃗ otherwise
hl,1(l, s, z1, z2) = z1
hl,2(l, s, z1, z2) = z2
hl,3(l, s, z1, z2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if l.path /= z2
l.seg + 1 if l.path = z2 ∧ s.d ≤ 0
l.seg otherwise
where the temporary variable p⃗, q⃗ and r⃗ are computed as in the Controller specification
based on the updated value of path and seg.
Trajectories.
From the the state models of Vehicle and Controller automata specified on line 14 of Fig-
ure 5.5 and lines 48–50 of Figure 5.6, we see that A only has one state model. For any value
of l ∈ L, the continuous state s evolves according to the differential equation s˙ = f(s, u)
where f = ⟨f1, f2, . . . , f7⟩ and f1, . . . , f7 ∶ X ×U → R are associated with the evolution of the
x, y, θ, v, e1, e2 and d components of s, respectively. Using the definition of the control
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law function g defined above, we can derive the following components of f(s, g(l, s0)):
f1(s, g(l, s0)) = s.v cos(s.θ), f2(s, g(l, s0)) = s.v sin(s.θ)
f3(s, g(l, s0)) = f6(s, g(l, s0)) = s.v
L
tan( φd∣φd∣ min(∣φd∣, δs0.v, φmax))
f4(s, g(l, s0)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
abrake if l.brake = On ∧ s.v > 0
amax if l.brake = Off ∧ s0.v < vT
0 otherwise
f5(s, g(l, s0)) = s.v sin(s.e2)
f7(s, g(l, s0)) = −s.v cos(s.e2)
where φd = −k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2.
5.B Invariant Verification
From the definition of a good execution (Definition 5.5.1), we show that when the value of
the variable brake is On, the speed of the Vehicle is at least φbδ +∆∣abrake∣.
Lemma 5.B.1. At any reachable state x of A, if x.brake = On then x.v ≥ φbδ +∆∣abrake∣.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary execution fragment, α = τ0a1τ1a2 . . . and an arbitrary i ∈ N
such that (τi ↓ brake)(0) = On. Since the initial value of the variable brake is Off , there
must exists j ≤ i such that aj is a brake(On) action and for any natural number m ∈ [j, i],
am is not a brake(Off ) action. Let (τj−1.lstate) ⌈ v = vb. Since aj is a brake(On) action which
does not affect v, we get (τj .fstate) ⌈ v = vb. From Definition 5.5.1, vb > φbδ +∆∣abrake∣ and
there must exists k > i such that ak is a brake(Off ) action and ∑k−1m=j τm.ltime ≤ 1∣abrake∣(vb −
φb
δ −∆∣abrake∣). So for any t ∈ dom(τi), we get
(τi ↓ v)(t) ≥ vb + min
s,s0∈X ,l∈L f4(s, g(l, s0))(t + i−1∑m=j τm.ltime)
≥ vb + abrake(k−1∑
m=j τm.ltime) = φbδ +∆∣abrake∣.
The next lemma shows that the subtangential, bounded distance and bounded speed
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conditions (of Lemma 5.3.2) are satisfied. The proof utilizes Lemma 5.3.3. The knowledge
about the reachable state x of A with x.brake = On, provided in Lemma 5.B.1, is needed
to prove the subtangential condition for j = 6.
Lemma 5.5.1. For each l ∈ L and j ∈ {1, . . . ,6}, the subtangential, bounded distance and
bounded speed conditions (of Lemma 5.3.2) are satisfied.
Proof. First, we define the sets {Cj}j∈{1,...,6} as follows:
C1 ≜ C2 ≜ ∅,
C3 ≜ {s ∈ I ∣ − k1s.e1 − k2s.e2 ≤ 0 ∨L cot(−k1s.e1 − k2s.e2) sin θk,2 ≥ k2
k1
},
C4 ≜ {s ∈ I ∣ − k1s.e1 − k2s.e2 ≥ 0 ∨L cot(k1s.e1 + k2s.e2) sin θk,2 ≥ k2
k1
},
C5 ≜ {s ∈ I ∣ s.v ≤ vT },
C6 ≜ {s ∈ I ∣ s.v ≥ φb
δ
+∆∣abrake∣}.
Since C1,C2 = ∅, we see that the bounded distance and bounded speed conditions are
automatically satisfied for j = 1,2 with any arbitrary large cj and arbitrary small bj . Now,
consider an arbitrary s0 ∈ I and s ∈ ∂I1. By definition, F1(s) = 0. From the definition of θk,1
and θk,2 and Assumption 5.5.1(b), s.e2 ∈ [−θk,2,−θk,1] ⊂ (−pi2 ,0]. In addition, since s ∈ I,
F6(s) = δs.v − φb ≥ 0 and since δ > 0 and φb ≥ 0, s.v ≥ 0. Thus,
∂F1
∂s
(s) ⋅ f(s, g(l, s0)) = −de1
dt
= −s.v sin(s.e2) ≥ 0.
For j = 2, the subtangential condition can be proved in a similar way.
To prove the bounded distance and the bounded speed conditions for j = 3, . . . ,6, we
apply Lemma 5.3.3. Let UI = {g(l, s) ∣l ∈ L, s ∈ I}. From the definition of I, we get that
for any s0 ∈ I, −k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2 ∈ [−φk, φk] ⊂ (−pi2 , pi2 ). Therefore, f is continuous in I ×UI .
In addition, it can be easily checked that the projection of I onto the (e1, e2, v) space
is compact and for any j ∈ {3, . . . ,6}, Cj is closed. Since the only variables involved in
proving the control-free invariance condition of Lemma 5.3.1 are e1, e2 and v whose evolution
along a trajectory can be described without other variables, from the proof of Lemma 5.3.2
and Lemma 5.3.3, we see that the requirement that I is compact can be relaxed to the
requirement that the projection of I onto the (e1, e2, v) space is compact. Hence, from
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Lemma 5.3.3, to prove that conditions (a)–(c) of Lemma 5.3.2 hold, we only need to show
that for any l ∈ L, the following conditions are satisfied for each j ∈ {3, . . . ,6}:
1. Cj ∩ ∂Ij = ∅,
2. For any s0 ∈ I ∖Cj and s ∈ ∂Ij , ∂Fj∂s ⋅ f(s, g(l, s0)) ≥ 0.
Consider an arbitrary s ∈ ∂I3. From the definition of I3, −k1s.e1 − k2s.e2 = φk > 0. So
from Assumption 5.5.1(c), L cot(−k1s.e1 − k2s.e2) sin θk,2 < k2k1 . Therefore, C3 ∩ ∂I3 = ∅.
Pick an arbitrary s0 ∈ I ∖ C3. From the definition of I and C3, 0 < −k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2 ≤ φk
and L cot(−k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2) sin θk,2 < k2k1 . Combining this with Assumption 5.5.1(a), we
get 0 < −k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2 ≤ pi2 and ∣ − k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2∣ ≤ φmax. In addition, since s0 ∈ I,
F6(s0) ≥ 0 and so δs0.v ≥ φb ≥ φk ≥ ∣ − k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2∣, and since s ∈ I, s.v ≥ 0. Therefore,
we can conclude that
ds.e2
dt
= s.v
L
tan(−k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2) ≥ 0
and from Assumption 5.5.1(b), s.e2 ∈ [−θk,2, θk,1] ⊂ (−pi2 ,0]. So we get
ds.e1
ds.e2
= L cot(−k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2) sin(s.e2)≥ −L cot(−k1s0.e1 − k2s0.e2) sin θk,2> −k2
k1
.
Thus,
∂F3
∂s
⋅ f(s, g(l, s0)) = k2ds.e2
dt
+ k1ds.e1
dt
= ds.e2
dt
(k2 + k1ds.e1
ds.e2
) ≥ 0.
This completes the proof for j = 3.
For j = 4, we can follow the previous proof to show that C4 ∩ ∂I4 = ∅, ds.e2dt ≤ 0 and
ds.e1
ds.e2
> −k2k1 , and so ∀s0 ∈ I ∖C4, ∂F4
∂s
⋅ f(s, g(l, s0)) ≥ 0.
Next, consider an arbitrary s ∈ ∂I5. From the definition of ∂I5, s.v = vmax. Since
amax,∆ > 0, vmax = vT +∆amax > vT . Therefore, C5 ∩∂I5 = ∅. Pick an arbitrary s0 ∈ I ∖C5.
From the definition of I and C5, vT < s0.v ≤ vmax. Therefore, we can conclude that
∂F5
∂s
⋅ f(s, g(l, s0)) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
−abrake
0
≥ 0.
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This completes the proof for j = 5.
Finally, consider an arbitrary s ∈ ∂I6. From the definition of ∂I6, s.v = φbδ . Since
∆, ∣abrake∣ > 0, φbδ < φbδ +∆∣abrake∣. Therefore, C6∩∂I6 = ∅. Consider an arbitrary s0 ∈ I ∖C6.
From Lemma 5.B.1 and the definition of f4, we see that f4(s, g(l, s0)) = abrake only if
s0.v ≥ φbδ +∆∣abrake∣. But since s0 ∈ I∖C6, from the definition of I and C6, s0.v < φbδ +∆∣abrake∣.
Therefore, f4(s, g(l, s0)) is either 0 or amax and so we can conclude that
∂F6
∂s
⋅ f(s, g(l, s0)) = f4(s, g(l, s0)) ≥ 0.
Now, we prove that Assumption 5.5.1(d) provides the bound on ∆ such that the sampling
rate condition of Lemma 5.3.2 is satisfied.
Lemma 5.5.2. For each l ∈ L, the sampling rate condition is satisfied.
Proof. For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,6}, we want to find cj and bj that satisfy conditions (b) and (c)
of Lemma 5.3.2. First, we note that for j = 1,2, Cj = ∅, so cj can be arbitrary large and
bj can be arbitrary small and therefore any ∆ ∈ R+ satisfies the sampling rate condition of
Lemma 5.3.2. For j = 5,6, it can be easily shown that c5 = ∆amax, b5 = amax, c6 = ∆∣abrake∣
and b6 = ∣abrake∣; thus, cjbj = ∆. That is, ∆ can be an arbitrary large number if we only
consider j = 1,2,5,6. So we only have to consider j = 3,4. From Assumption 5.5.1(c), there
exists
φ˜ = cot−1 ( k2
k1L sin θk,2
) < φk.
Using symmetry, we get that for j = 3 and j = 4, the shortest distance between Uj and ∂Ij
is then given by
cj = min
s∈∂Ij ,s0∈Uj ∥s − s0∥ = 1√k21 + k22 (φk − φ˜).
Since ∀s ∈ I, s.e2 ∈ [−θk,2, θk,2] ⊂ (−pi2 , pi2 ), we have
bj = max
s∈I,s0∈Uj ∥f(s, g(l, s0))∥
≤ vmax√sin2 θk,2 + 1
L2
tan2(φ˜)
From Assumption 5.5.1(d), we see that ∆ ≤ minj∈{1,...,6} cjbj .
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Having proved that all the conditions of Lemma 5.3.2 are satisfied, it follows that the
control-free invariance condition of Lemma 5.3.1 holds. Applying Theorem 5.3.1, we can
conclude the following invariance property of I.
5.C Proofs for Segment Progress
First, we solve the differential equation that describes the evolution of e1 and e2 along
τ . From periodicity of main actions we see that dom(τ) = [0,∆]. Define the functions
e1, e2, v, vavg ∶ dom(τ) → R as follows: e1(t) = (τ ↓ e1)(t), e2(t) = (τ ↓ e2)(t), v(t) = (τ ↓
v)(t) and vavg(t) = 1t ∫ t0 v(t′)dt′. From the state models of the Vehicle and the Controller
specified in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6, since φ and a are constant along τ , the solution to
the differential equations can be solved analytically and are given by
e1(t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
e1(0) +L cotφ cos e2(0) −L cotφ cos e2(t) if φ /= 0
e1(0) + vavg(t)t sin e2(0) otherwise ,
e2(t) = e2(0) + tanφL vavg(t)t,
(5.12)
where φ = τ.fstate ⌈ φ and a = τ.fstate ⌈ a.
The following lemma provides a bound on the change in e1 over τ and on the change in φ
between two consecutive main actions assuming that a discrete transition in the continuous
state s does not occur.
Lemma 5.C.1. Suppose τ.fstate ∈ Ik for some k ∈ N. Then, ∣e1(0) − e1(∆)∣ ≤ ∆e and∣(k1e1(0)+k2e2(0))−(k1e1(∆)+k2e2(∆))∣ ≤ ∆φ where ∆e = vmax∆ and ∆φ = vmax∆ (k1 + k2 tanφkL ).
Proof. From (5.12), we see that ∣e1(∆) − e1(0)∣ ≤ vmax∆ and ∣e2(∆) − e1(0)∣ ≤ tanφkL vmax∆.
So
∣(k1e1(0) + k2e2(0)) − (k1e1(∆) + k2e2(∆))∣ ≤ k1∣e1(∆) − e1(0)∣ + k2∣e2(∆) − e2(0)∣≤ k1vmax∆ + k2 tanφk
L
vmax∆.
The next lemma proves the desired progress property over τ .
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Lemma 5.5.3. Suppose τ.fstate ∈ Ik for some k ∈ N. Then τ.lstate ∈ Ik+1 whose parameters
k+1 and φk+1 are given by
k+1 = k − ˆk, (5.13)
φk+1 = φk − φˆk, (5.14)
where ˆk, φˆk ≥ 0 and are given by
ˆk = k −max(′k+1, 1k1φ′k+1) , (5.15)
φˆk = φk −max(φ′k+1, ϕ), (5.16)
′k+1 = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
max (k − ξk, ∗k) if k > ∗k
k otherwise
, (5.17)
φ′k+1 = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
max (φk − ψk, φ∗k) if φk > φ∗k
φk otherwise
, (5.18)
∗k = ′k + vmax∆, (5.19)
φ∗k = φ′k + k1vmax∆ + k2 tanφkL vmax∆, (5.20)
ξk = −2L max
φ∈[−φk,φk] cotφ sin(−k1∗kk2 − φk2 + vmax∆ tanφ2L ) sin(φb∆ tanφ2Lδ ) , (5.21)
ψk = k2
L
tanφ∗k φbδ ∆ − 2k1L cotφ∗k sin θk,2 sin(tanφk2L vmax∆) , (5.22)
′k = max
φ˜∈[−φk,φk](− 1k1 φ˜ + k2k1 tan φ˜2L vmax∆) , (5.23)
φ′k = max⎛⎝tan−1
√
2k1L2δ
k2φb∆
sin θk,2 sin(tanφk2L vmax∆),∆φ⎞⎠ , (5.24)
where ϕ is the minimum value of φk+1 such that ′k+1 and φk+1 satisfy Assumption 5.5.1(c).
In addition, define k∗ to be the minimum value of k such that k ≤ ∗k or φk ≤ φ∗k. (If for any
k, k > ∗k and φk > φ∗k, just pick an arbitrary natural number k∗.) Then, for any k < k∗, ˆk
and φˆk are strictly positive, that is, Ik+1 ⊊ Ik.
Proof. Since by definition k+1 ≥ ′k+1 and φk+1 ≥ φ′k+1, we see that if ∣τ.lstate ⌈ e1∣ ≤ ′k+1 and∣k1(τ.lstate ⌈ e1) + k2(τ.lstate ⌈ e2)∣ ≤ φ′k+1, then τ.lstate ∈ Ik+1. To show that k+1 and φk+1
satisfy Assumption 5.5.1 and that ˆk, φˆk ≥ 0, we use the following observations: (a) ψk ≥ 0
and ξk ≥ 0 and thus, ′k+1 ≤ k and φ′k+1 ≤ φk, (b) given φ′k+1, 1k1φ′k+1 is the minimum value
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of k+1 such that k+1 and φ′k+1 satisfies Assumption 5.5.1, (c) given ′k+1, ϕ is the minimum
value of φk+1 such that ′k+1 and φk+1 satisfies Assumption 5.5.1, and (d) ϕ decreases as ′k+1
decreases. With these observations and the assumption that k and φk satisfy Assumption
5.5.1, it can be easily checked that (a) k+1 ≤ k and φk+1 ≤ φk, (b) if k > ∗k and φk > φ∗k,
then ′k+1 < k and φ′k+1 < φk, and (c) if k+1 /= ′k+1, then φk+1 = φ′k+1 and if φk+1 /= φ′k+1, then
k+1 = ′k+1. Thus, we can conclude that k+1 and φk+1 satisfy Assumption 5.5.1 and that if
k > ∗k and φk > φ∗k, then k+1 < k and φk+1 < φk.
So what remains to be proved are ∣τ.lstate ⌈ e1∣ ≤ ′k+1 and ∣k1(τ.lstate ⌈ e1)+k2(τ.lstate ⌈
e2)∣ ≤ φ′k+1. From Theorem 5.5.1, τ.lstate ∈ Ik. Thus, we can conclude that φ′k+1 ≤ φk and
′k+1 ≤ k. This completes the proof for the second case of (5.17) and (5.18).
Next, we prove the first case of (5.18). Let φf = −k1e1(0)− k2e2(0) and φl = −k1e1(∆)−
k2e2(∆). Suppose ∣φf ∣ ≥ ∆φ. From (5.12), we get that
φl = −k1 (e1(0) +L cotφ1 cos(e2(0)) −L cotφ1 cos(e2(∆))) − k2 (e2(0) + tanφf
L
vavg∆)
where vavg is the average speed of the Vehicle over τ . Substituting e1(0) = −k2k1 e2(0)− 1k1φf ,
we get
φl = φf − (k2
L
tanφfvavg∆ + 2k1L cotφf sin(12(e2(0) + e2(∆))) sin(tanφf2L vavg∆)) .
Since τ.fstate, τ.lstate ∈ Ik, from the definition of θk,2, we see that ∣e2(0)∣, ∣e2(∆)∣ ≤ θk,2. So
1
2 ∣e2(0)+e2(∆)∣ ≤ θk,2. In addition, from Theorem 5.5.1 and the definition of F5 and F6, we
know that φbδ ≤ vavg ≤ vmax. From Lemma 5.5.3, we get that φf and φl have the same sign.
So it is easy to show that
∣φl∣ ≤ ∣φf ∣ − (k2
L
tan ∣φf ∣φb
δ
∆ − 2k1L cot ∣φf ∣ sin θk,2 sin(tanφk2L vmax∆)) .
Define the function Ψ ∶ [0, φk]→ R by
Ψ(φ) = k2
L
tanφ
φb
δ
∆ − 2k1L cotφ sin θk,2 sin(tanφk2L vmax∆) .
That is ψk = Ψ(φ∗k). It can be easily checked that with Assumption 5.5.1(e), Ψ(φ) increases
with φ and vanishes when φ = tan−1 √2k1L2δk2φb∆ sin θk,2 sin ( tanφk2L vmax∆), which does not ex-
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ceed φ′k defined in (5.24). For φ > φ′k, Ψ(φ) > 0. From Lemma 5.C.1, we also know that for
any φf ∈ [−φk, φk],
∣φl∣ ≤ ∣φf ∣ + k1vmax∆ + k2 tanφk
L
vmax∆.
Since φ∗k > φ′k, we arrive at the following conclusion:
∣φl∣ ≤
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∣φf ∣ − ψk if ∣φf ∣ > φ∗k
φ∗k if φ′k ≤ ∣φf ∣ ≤ φ∗k∣φf ∣ + k1vmax∆ + k2 tanφkL vmax∆ if ∣φf ∣ < φ′k
.
Thus, ∣φl∣ ≤ max(φk − ψk, φ∗k).
Finally, we prove the first case of (5.17). From (5.12), we get that
e1(∆) = e1(0) + 2L cotφ1 sin(e2(0) + tanφf2L vavg∆) sin(tanφf2L vavg∆) .
Note that the case where φf = 0 is also captured by this equation as
lim
φf→0 2L cotφf sin(tanφf2L vavg∆) = vavg∆.
Define the function Ξ ∶ [0, k]→ R by
Ξ() = −2L max
φ∈[−φk,φk] cotφ sin(−k1k2 e − 1k2φ + tanφ2L vmax∆) sin(tanφ2L φbδ ∆) .
That is ξk = Ξ(∗k). It can be easily checked that with Assumption 5.5.1(e), Ξ() > 0 for any
 > ′k and that if e1(0) ≥ ′k, then e2(0) ≤ −k1k2 ′k − 1k2φf . So
2L cotφf sin(e2(0) + tanφf2L vavg∆) sin(tanφf2L vavg∆) ≤ −ξk.
Using symmetry, we can derive a similar lower bound for the case where e1(0) ≤ −′k. From
Lemma 5.C.1, we also know that
∣e1(∆)∣ ≤ ∣e1(0)∣ + vmax∆.
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So we arrive at the following conclusion:
∣e1(∆)∣ ≤
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∣e1(0)∣ − ξk if ∣e1(0)∣ > ∗k
∗k if ′k ≤ ∣e1(0)∣ ≤ ∗k∣e1(0)∣ + vmax∆ if ∣e1(0)∣ < ′k
.
Thus, ∣e1(∆)∣ ≤ max(k − ξk, ∗k).
Using Lemma 5.5.3 and Lemma 5.5.4, we establish the relationship between the progress
of Ik’s and the decrease in the value of d.
Lemma 5.5.5. For each k ∈ N, starting from any reachable state x ∈ Ik such that x.d >
vmax∆, x.path = x.new path and x.next = x.now, any plan-free execution fragment β with
β.ltime = ∆ satisfies β.lstate ∈ Ik+1 and β.lstate ⌈ d ≥ x.d − vmax∆.
Proof. Since x.next = x.now and β.ltime = ∆, we see that β can be written as β = β′ or
β = β′mainτjbrake(bj)τj+1brake(bj+1) . . . τn where β′ is an execution fragment with exactly
one main action ai that occurs at time 0 and is immediately followed by a main action
in the execution, β′.ltime = ∆ and τj , . . . τn are point trajectories. Let τ be the pasted
trajectory of all the trajectories after ai in β′. Then, τ is a pasted trajectory of all the
trajectories between two main actions and so Lemma 5.5.3 and Lemma 5.5.4 apply. Since
the main action ai occurs at time 0 in β and brake action does not affect the value of
s, we see that τi−1.lstate ⌈ s = x.s. So τi−1.lstate ⌈ d > vmax∆ > 0 and hence ai does
not change the value of s. That is, τ.fstate = x ∈ Ik. From Lemma 5.5.3, we get that
β′.lstate ∈ Ik+1. In addition, from Lemma 5.5.4, we see that β′.lstate ⌈ d ≥ x.d − vmax∆.
Since x.d > vmax∆, we get β′.lstate ⌈ d > 0. Therefore, the main action following β′ does
not change the value of s. In addition, since brake action only affects the brake variable,
we see that β.lstate ⌈ s = β′.lstate ⌈ s. Hence, we can conclude that β.lstate ∈ Ik+1 and
β.lstate ⌈ d ≥ x.d − vmax∆.
5.D Proofs for Safety and Waypoint Progress
Lemma 5.5.6. Consider a plan-free execution fragment β starting at a state x ∈ I0.
Suppose x.path = x.new path and x.d ≥D∗ where D∗ = λ1− 0−vmax∆ and λ1 is the length
of the segment x.seg. Then β.lstate ∈ I0.
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Proof. First, observe that β can be written as β = β1a1β2a2 . . . βm where for any i, ai is a
main action and βi is a plan-free execution fragment such that βi.lstate ⌈ path = βi.fstate ⌈
new path and βi.lstate ⌈ seg = βi.fstate ⌈ seg. From Theorem 5.5.1, we get that for any i,
if βi.fstate ∈ I0, then β.lstate ∈ I0. So, suppose β1.fstate ∈ I0, β1.fstate ⌈ path = β1.fstate ⌈
new path and β1.fstate ⌈ d ≥ λ1 − 0 − vmax∆. We only need to show that for any i > 1,
βi.fstate ∈ I0.
Consider the base case i = 2. If β2.fstate ⌈ seg = β1.lstate ⌈ seg, then a1 does not change
the continuous state s, and so β2.fstate ∈ I0. Otherwise, β2.fstate ⌈ seg = β1.fstate ⌈ seg + 1.
But from the update rule of the variable seg and Lemma 5.5.4, it can be easily shown
that −vmax∆ < β1.lstate ⌈ d ≤ 0. Applying Theorem 5.5.2, we get that β1.lstate ∈ In where
n = ⌊λ1−0−2vmax∆vmax∆ ⌋ because by Assumption 5.5.2(a), λ1 − 0 − 2vmax∆ > 0.
Let x1 = β1.lstate and x2 = β2.fstate and let σ1 be the difference between the orientation
of β1.fstate ⌈ seg and β1.fstate ⌈ seg + 1. From the update rule for e1 and the definition
of p⃗, q⃗ and r⃗ in Figure 5.6, it can be shown that x2.e1 = x1.d sinσ1 + x1.e1 cosσ1. But
since β1.lstate ∈ In, from the definition of In, ∣x1.e1∣ ≤ n. Therefore, using the bounds on
x1.d provided earlier in the proof, we get ∣x2.e1∣ ≤ vmax∆∣ sinσ1∣ + n∣ cosσ1∣. Hence, from
Assumption 5.5.2(b), ∣x2.e1∣ ≤ 0, that is, F1(x2.s), F2(x2.s) ≥ 0.
Next, we prove that F3(x2.s), F4(x2.s) ≥ 0. From the definition of In, we know that−k1k2x1.e1 − 1k2φn ≤ x1.e2 ≤ −k1k2x1.e1 + 1k2φn. From the update rule for e2, it can be easily
shown that x2.e2 = x1.e2 − σ1. Thus, we get that −k1k2x1.e1 − 1k2φn − σ1 ≤ x2.e2 ≤ −k1k2x1.e1 +
1
k2
φn−σ1. Using the bounds on x2.e1, x2.e2 and x1.d, we can derive that k1x2.e1+k2x2.e2 ≤
k1vmax∆ sin ∣σ1∣ + k1n(1 − cosσ1) + φn + k2∣σ1∣ and k1x2.e1 + k2x2.e2 ≥ −k1vmax∆ sin ∣σ1∣ −
k1n(1 − cosσ1) − φn − k2∣σ1∣. That is,
∣k1x2.e1 + k2x2.e2∣ ≤ k1vmax∆ sin ∣σ1∣ + k1n(1 − cosσ1) + φn + k2∣σ1∣.
Therefore, Assumption 5.5.2(b) guarantees that ∣k1x2.e1+k2x2.e2∣ ≤ φ0. That is, F3(x2.s) ≥
0 and F4(x2.s) ≥ 0. In addition, since a main action does not affect v, F5(x2.s) = F5(x1.s)
and F6(x2.s) = F6(x1.s), so F5(x2.s), F6(x1.s) ≥ 0.
Therefore, by definition of I0, we get β2.fstate ∈ I0. In addition, from the bounds on
x1.d and x1.e1, it can be easily shown that β2.fstate ⌈ d ≥ λ2 − 0 − vmax∆ where λ2 is the
length of the segment β2.fstate ⌈ seg.
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Next, consider an arbitrary i ≥ 2 and assume that βi−1.fstate ∈ I0 and if i = 2 or i > 2
and βi−1.fstate ⌈ seg /= βi−2.lstate ⌈ seg, then βi−1.fstate ⌈ d ≥ λi−1 − 0 − vmax∆ where λi−1 is
the length of the segment βi−1.fstate ⌈ seg. Simply following the previous proof for i = 2, we
get βi.fstate ∈ I0 and if βi.fstate ⌈ seg /= βi−1.lstate ⌈ seg, then βi.fstate ⌈ d ≥ λi − 0 − vmax∆
where λi is the length of the segment βi.fstate ⌈ seg.
By mathematical induction, we conclude the proof that for any i > 1, βi.fstate ∈ I0.
Lemma 5.5.7. For each state x,x′ ∈ Q such that x.path /= x.new path, if x ∈ I0 and
x
main→ x′, then x′.d ≥ λ−vmax∆ > 0 where λ is the length of the first segment of x.new path.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary execution α = τ0a1τ1a2 . . .. Pick an arbitrary natural number
i such that ai is a main action and let x = τi−1.lstate and x′ = τi.fstate. We want to show
that if x ⌈ path /= x ⌈ new path, then x′.d ≥ λ− vmax∆ > 0. Notice that x.path /= x.new path
if and only if there exists a natural number j < i such that aj is a plan action and for any
natural number k ∈ {j + 1, . . . , i − 1}, ak is not a main action. Using Assumption 5.5.3(a),
we get ⟨τj .fstate ⌈ x, τj .fstate ⌈ y⟩ = pi,1 where pi,1 is the first waypoint in x.new path. Since
main action occurs every ∆ time, the time between ai and aj is at most ∆. Therefore, from
Theorem 5.5.1, the definition of F5 and F6 and the definition of f1 and f2 which describe the
evolution of x and y, we see that ∥⟨x.x,x.y⟩−pi,1∥ ≤ vmax∆. Furthermore, from Assumption
5.5.2(a), we know that λ = ∥pi,2 − pi,1∥ > vmax∆+ 0 where pi,2 is the second waypoint in pi.
Thus, x.d ≥ ∥pi,2 − pi,1∥ − ∥⟨x.x,x.y⟩ − pi,1∥ ≥ λ − vmax∆ > 0.
Lemma 5.5.8. For each state x,x′ ∈ Q such that x.path /= x.new path, if x ∈ I0 and
x
main→ x′, then x′ ∈ I0.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary execution α = τ0a1τ1a2 . . .. Pick an arbitrary natural number
i such that ai is a main action and let x = τi−1.lstate and x′ = τi.fstate. We want to show
that if x ∈ I0 and x.path /= x.new path, then x′ ∈ I0. So suppose x ∈ I0. Notice that
x.path /= x.new path if and only if there exists a natural number j < i such that aj is a plan
action and for any natural number k ∈ {j + 1, . . . , i − 1}, ak is not a main action. Let pj1
and pj2 be the first two waypoints of the new path. Consider a closed execution fragment
β = τjaj+1 . . . τi−1. From Assumption 5.5.3(a), we get that pj1 = τj .fstate ⌈ ⟨x, y⟩. Since
main action occurs every ∆ time, we see that β.ltime ≤ ∆. From the differential equations
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describing the evolution of x and y, we get that
∣(τj .fstate ⌈ x) − (x.x)∣ ≤ ((τj .fstate ⌈ v) + amax∆)∆,∣(τj .fstate ⌈ y) − (x.y)∣ ≤ sin θ0,2((τj .fstate ⌈ v) + amax∆)∆.
So from the definition of r⃗ in Figure 5.6, we get that
∥r⃗∥ ≤ (τj .fstate ⌈ v) + amax∆)∆√1 + sin2 θ0,2.
Using Assumption 5.5.3(b), we can conclude that ∥r⃗∥ ≤ 0. So from the update rule for e1,∣x′.e1∣ ≤ ∥r⃗∥ and so
∣x′.e1∣ ≤ (τj .fstate ⌈ v) + amax∆)∆√1 + sin2 θ0,2 ≤ 0, (5.25)
that is F1(x′.s), F2(x′.s) ≥ 0.
Similarly, from the differential equation describing the evolution of θ, we get that
∣(τj .fstate ⌈ θ) − (x.θ)∣ ≤ 1
L
tanφ0((τj .fstate ⌈ v) + amax∆)∆.
Using Assumption 5.5.3(b), we can conclude that
∣∠p⃗ − (x.θ)∣ = ∣(∠p⃗ − (τj .fstate ⌈ θ)) + ((τj .fstate ⌈ θ) − (x.θ))∣≤ ∣(∠p⃗i − (τj .fstate ⌈ θ))∣ + ∣((τj .fstate ⌈ θ) − (x.θ))∣≤ φ0
k2
− k1
k2
((τj .fstate ⌈ v) + amax∆)∆√1 + sin2 θ0,2.
So we get
∣k2x′.e2∣ ≤ φ0 − k1((τj .fstate ⌈ v) + amax∆)∆√1 + sin2 θ0,2.
Combining this with (5.25), we get that
∣k1(x′.e1) + k2(x′.e2)∣ ≤ ∣k1(x′.e1)∣ + ∣k2(x′.e2)∣ ≤ φ0,
that is, F3(x′.s), F4(x′.s) ≥ 0.
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In addition, since main action does not affect v, we see that F5(x′.s) = F5(x.s) and
F6(x′.s) = F6(x.s), so F5(x′.s), F6(x′.s) ≥ 0. Therefore, by definition of I0, we get that
x′ ∈ I0.
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Chapter 6
Automatic Synthesis of Embedded
Control Software
The design flaw in Alice as described in Section 1.1 was, in fact, partially known shortly
before the second run of Test Area A. However, it was difficult to modify and verify the
design during the National Qualifying Event due to the complexity of the system and the
lack of sufficient time. Although it might be impossible to make such a system simple, part
of the complexity could have been avoided if the system had been designed in a systematic
way. As an effort towards this systematic design direction, this chapter presents an approach
that allows embedded control software such as the planner-controller subsystem of Alice to
be automatically synthesized such that the system is provably correct with respect to its
requirements expressed in linear temporal logic.
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, we investigate the problem of automatically synthesizing an embedded
control component to provide a formal guarantee that, by construction, the system satisfies
the desired properties, which we also refer to as the specification. We assume that the
desired properties are expressed in linear temporal logic.
A common approach to such a synthesis problem is to construct a finite transition system
that serves as an abstract model of the physical system (which typically has infinitely many
states) [57, 65, 25, 64, 113, 40, 122, 124]. Then based on this abstract model, synthesize
a strategy, represented by a finite state automaton, satisfying the specification. This leads
to a hierarchical, two-layer design with a discrete planner computing a discrete plan based
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on the abstract model and a continuous controller computing a sequence of control signals
based on the physical model to continuously implement the plan. Simulations/bisimulations
[6] provide the proof that the continuous execution preserves the correctness of the discrete
plan.
The correctness of this hierarchical approach relies on the abstraction of systems evolv-
ing on a continuous domain into equivalent (in the simulation sense) finite state models.
If the abstraction is done properly such that the continuous controller is capable of imple-
menting any discrete plan computed by the discrete planner, then it is guaranteed that the
correctness of the plan is preserved in the continuous execution.
Several abstraction methods have been proposed based on a fixed abstraction. For ex-
ample, a continuous-time, time-invariant model was considered in [65], [25] and [64] for
special cases of fully actuated (s˙(t) = u(t)), kinematic (s˙(t) = A(s(t))u(t)) and piecewise
affine dynamics, respectively, while a discrete-time, time-invariant model was considered
in [122] and [113] for special cases of piecewise affine and controllable linear systems, re-
spectively. Reference [40] deals with more general dynamics by relaxing the bisimulation
requirement and using the notions of approximate simulation and simulation functions [39].
More recently, a sampling-based method has been proposed for µ-calculus specifications
[57]. However, these approaches do not take into account the presence of exogenous distur-
bances and the resulting system may fail to satisfy its specification if its evolution does not
exactly match its model.
To increase the robustness of the system against the effects of direct, external distur-
bances and a mismatch between the actual system and its model, in this chapter, we extend
the existing abstraction approaches to deal with a discrete-time linear time-invariant state
space model with exogenous disturbances and provide an approach to automatically com-
pute a finite state abstraction for such a model.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we present the key
definitions and notations. A brief description of a digital design synthesis tool that we use
for automatically synthesizing a discrete planner is also provided. The planner-controller
synthesis problem is formulated in Section 6.3. The hierarchical approach is described
in detail in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 provides an approach to automatically compute a
finite state abstraction for a discrete-time linear time-invariant system, taking into account
exogenous disturbances.
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6.2 Preliminaries
We use a variable structure to specify the states of the system (as described in Defini-
tion 2.2.1) and linear temporal logic to specify properties of a system (see Section 2.2).
As previously discussed, a finite transition system is used as a mathematical object that
represents an abstraction of the physical system.
Definition 6.2.1. A finite transition system is a tuple T ∶= (V,V0,→) where V is a finite
set of states, V0 ⊆ V is a non-empty set of inital states, and → ⊆ V×V is a transition relation.
Given states νi, νj ∈ V, we write νi → νj if there is a transition from νi to νj in T.
Observe that we use ν to represent a state of a finite transition system and v to represent
a state of a general, possibly non-finite state system.
6.2.1 Synthesis of a Digital Design: A Two-Player Game Approach
In many applications, systems need to interact with their environments and whether they
satisfy the desired properties depends on the behavior of the environments. For example,
whether an autonomous car exhibits the correct behavior at an intersection depends on the
behavior of other cars at the intersection, e.g., which car gets to the intersection first, etc.
In this section, we informally describe the work of Piterman, et al. [98]. We refer the reader
to [98] and references therein for the detailed discussion of automatic synthesis of a finite
state automaton from its specification.
From Definition 2.2.4, for a system to be correct, its specification ϕ must be satisfied
in all of its executions regardless of the behavior of the environment in which it operates.
Thus, the environment can be treated as an adversary and the synthesis problem can be
viewed as a two-player game between the system and the environment: the environment
attempts to falsify ϕ while the system attempts to satisfy ϕ. We say that ϕ is realizable if
the system can satisfy ϕ no matter what the environment does.
For a specification of the form
(⋀
i∈I ◻3ϕi) Ô⇒ (⋀j∈J ◻3ψj),
known as Generalized Reactivity(1), Piterman et al. shows that checking its realizability
and synthesizing the corresponding automaton can be performed in polynomial time. In
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particular, we are interested in a specification of the form
ϕ = (ϕe Ô⇒ ϕs)
where roughly speaking, ϕe characterizes the initial states of the system and the assumptions
on the environment and ϕs describes the correct behavior of the system, including the valid
transitions the system can make. We refer the reader to [98] for precise definitions of ϕe
and ϕs. Note that since ϕe Ô⇒ ϕs is satisfied whenever ϕe is False, if the assumptions on
the environment or the initial state of the system violate ϕe, then the correct behavior ϕs
of the system is not ensured, even though the specification ϕ is satisfied.
If the specification is realizable, the digital design synthesis tool presented in [98] gener-
ates a finite state automaton that represents a set of transitions the system should follow in
order to satisfy ϕ. Assuming that the environment and the initial state of the system satisfy
ϕe, then at any instance of time, there exists a node in the automaton that represents the
current state of the system and the system can follow the transition from this node to the
next based on the current knowledge about the environment. However, if ϕe is violated, the
automaton is no longer valid, meaning that there may not exist a node in the automaton
that represents the current state of the system, or even though such a node exists and the
system follows the transitions in the automaton, the correct behavior ϕs is not guaranteed.
If the specification is not realizable, the synthesis tool provides an initial state of the
system starting from which there exists a set of moves of the environment such that the
system cannot satisfy ϕ. The knowledge of the realizability of the specification is useful
since it provides information about the conditions under which the system will fail to satisfy
its desired properties.
The main limitation of the synthesis of finite state automata is the state explosion
problem. In the worst case, the resulting automaton may contain all the possible states
of the system. For example, if the system has N variables, each can take any value in{1, . . . ,M}, then there may be as many as MN nodes in the automaton.
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6.2.2 Synthesis of a Continuous Controller: An Optimization-Based Ap-
proach
Control systems are usually described by a set of differential or difference equations. These
continuous systems typically contain an infinite number of states. Hence, the digital design
synthesis tool, which relies on the finiteness of the number of system states as described in
Section 6.2, cannot be directly applied. For certain classes of systems, however, a provably
correct controller can be automatically constructed using an optimization-based approach,
provided the desired system properties are restricted to a certain class of safety and guar-
antee properties.
Consider the discrete-time linear control system
s[t + 1] = As[t] +Bu[t], t ∈ {0,1, . . .},
where s[t] ∈ Rn represents the state of the system, u[t] ∈ Rm represents the control input
to the plant and A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rn×m.
Given a fixed horizonN ∈ {0,1, . . .} and a cost function J ∶ (s[0], . . . , s[N], u[0], . . . , u[N−
1])↦ R, the problem of finding a sequence of control signals u[0], . . . , u[N−1] that optimizes
the given cost function subject to linear inequality constraints on the states s[0], . . . , s[N]
and control signals u[0], . . . , u[N − 1] can be formulated as a convex optimization problem,
provided that the cost function is convex. An example of such convex cost function is
J(s[0], . . . , s[N], u[0], . . . , u[N − 1]) ≜ ∥Ps[N]∥2 + N−1∑
t=0 (∥Qs[t]∥2 + ∥Ru[t]∥2)
where P and Q are positive semidefinite matrices and R is a positive definite matrix. l1-
norm and l∞-norm can also be used with some extra assumptions on P , Q and R.
In particular, we are interested in the problem of controlling the state of the system
from a given initial state s[0] ∈ Rn to a given goal region G ⊆ Rn. We also require that for
all t ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1}, s[t] stays within a given safe set S ⊆ Rn and u[t] stays within the set
U ⊆ Rm of admissible control inputs. The corresponding finite horizon constrained optimal
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control problem is given by
min
u[0],...,u[N−1] ∥P sˆ[N]∥2 + N−1∑t=0 (∥Qsˆ[t]∥2 + ∥Ru[t]∥2)
such that s[N] ∈ G,
s[t + 1] = As[t] +Bu[t],
u[t] ∈ U,
s[t] ∈ S,∀t ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1},
(6.1)
where for any t ∈ {0, . . . ,N}, sˆ[t] = s[t]−sj for some chosen sj ∈ G (e.g., sj may be the center
of the goal region G). As previously discussed, for the case where P and Q are positive
semidefinite matrices, R is a positive definite matrix and G, S and U are polyhedral sets,
i.e., sets defined by affine inequalities, the explicit solution u[0], . . . , u[N − 1] of (6.1) can
be computed using convex optimization [16].
This optimization-based approach can be extended to handle a linear time-invariant
state space model with bounded exogenous disturbances
s[t + 1] = As[t] +Bu[t] +Ed[t], d[t] ∈D, t ∈ {0,1, . . .},
provided that the set D ⊆ Rp of exogenous disturbances is polyhedral. In this case, the
constraints on the states s[0], . . . , s[N] and control signals u[0], . . . , u[N − 1] need to be
ensured for any sequence of exogenous disturbances d[0], . . . , d[N − 1] ∈D.
More details on solving such constrained optimal control problems can be found in [14].
Off-the-shelf software such as MPT [67], YALMIP [75] or NTG [92] provides a computational
tool for solving such a constrained optimal control problem.
6.3 Problem Formulation
We consider a system that comprises the physical component, which we refer to as the
plant, and the (potentially dynamic and not a priori known) environment in which the plant
operates. Assuming that the system specification ϕ is expressed in LTL, we are interested
in automatically synthesizing a planner-controller subsystem that generates control signals
to the plant in order to ensure that ϕ is satisfied in the presence of exogenous disturbances
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for any initial condition and any environment in which the plant operates. Specifically, we
define the system model S and the specification ϕ as follows.
System Model : Consider a system model S with a set V = S ∪ E of variables where
S and E are disjoint sets that represent, respectively, the set of plant variables that are
regulated by the planner-controller subsystem and the set of environment variables whose
values may change arbitrarily throughout an execution. The domain of V is given by
dom(V ) = dom(S) × dom(E) and a state of the system can be written as v = (s, e) where
s ∈ dom(S) ⊆ Rn and e ∈ dom(E). In this thesis, we call s the controlled state and e the
environment state.
Assume that the controlled state evolves according to the following discrete-time linear
time-invariant state space model: for t ∈ {0,1,2, . . .},
s[t + 1] = As[t] +Bu[t] +Ed[t],
u[t] ∈ U,
d[t] ∈ D,
s[0] ∈ dom(S),
(6.2)
where U ⊆ Rm is the set of admissible control inputs, D ⊆ Rp is the set of exogenous
disturbances and s[t], u[t] and d[t] are the controlled state, the control signal and the
exogenous disturbance, respectively, at time t.
Example 6.3.1. Consider a robot motion planning problem where a robot needs to navigate
an environment populated with (potentially dynamic) obstacles and explore certain areas
of interest. S typically includes the state (e.g., position and velocity) of the robot while
E typically includes the positions of obstacles (which are generally not known a priori and
may change over time). The evolution of the controlled state (i.e., the state of the robot)
is governed by its equations of motion, which can be written in the form of (6.2) (after
linearization, if necessary).
System Specification : We assume that the specification ϕ consists of the following com-
ponents:
(a) the assumption ϕinit on the initial condition of the system,
(b) the assumption ϕe on the environment, and
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(c) the desired behavior ϕs of the system.
Specifically, we assume that ϕ can be written as
ϕ = (ϕinit ∧ ϕe) Ô⇒ ϕs. (6.3)
Let Π be a finite set of atomic propositions of variables from V . Each of the atomic
propositions in Π essentially captures the states of interest. We assume that the desired
behavior ϕs is an LTL specification built from Π and can be expressed as a conjunction of
safety, guarantee, obligation, progress, response and stability properties as follows:
ϕs = ⋀j∈J1 ◻ps1,j ∧ ⋀j∈J2 3ps2,j ∧⋀j∈J3(◻ps3,j ∨ 3qs3,j) ∧ ⋀j∈J4 ◻3ps4,j ∧⋀j∈J5 ◻(ps5,j Ô⇒ 3qs5,j) ∧ ⋀j∈J6 3 ◻ ps6,j ,
(6.4)
where J1, . . . , J6 are finite sets and for any i and j, psi,j and q
s
i,j are propositional formulas
of variables from V that are built from Π.
Furthermore, we assume that ϕinit is a propositional formula built from Π and ϕe can
be expressed as a conjunction of safety and justice requirements as follows
ϕe = ⋀
i∈I1 ◻pef,i ∧ ⋀i∈I2 ◻3pes,i, (6.5)
where pef,i and p
e
s,i are propositional formulas built from Π and only contain variables from
E.
Example 6.3.2. Consider the robot motion planning problem described in Example 6.3.1.
Suppose the workspace of the robot is partitioned into cells C1, . . . ,CM and the robot needs
to explore (i.e., visit) the cells C1 and C2 infinitely often. In addition, we assume that one
of the cells C1, . . . ,CM may be occupied by an obstacle at any given time and this obstacle-
occupied cell may change arbitrarily throughout an execution but infinitely often, C1 and
C2 are not occupied. Let s and o represent the position of the robot and the obstacle,
respectively. In this case, the desired behavior of the system can be written as
ϕs = ◻3(s ∈ C1) ∧ ◻3(s ∈ C2) ∧ ◻((o ∈ C1) Ô⇒ (s /∈ C1)) ∧◻((o ∈ C2) Ô⇒ (s /∈ C2)) ∧ . . . ∧ ◻((o ∈ CM) Ô⇒ (s /∈ CM)).
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Assuming that initially, the robot does not occupy the same cell as the obstacle, we simply
let
ϕinit = ((o ∈ C1) Ô⇒ (s /∈ C1)) ∧ ((o ∈ C2) Ô⇒ (s /∈ C2)) ∧ . . . ∧ ((o ∈ Cm) Ô⇒ (s /∈ Cm)).
Finally, the assumption on the environment can be expressed as
ϕe = ◻3(o /∈ C1) ∧ ◻3(o /∈ C2).
Planner-Controller Synthesis Problem : Given the system model S and the system
specification ϕ, synthesize a planner-controller subsystem that generates a sequence of con-
trol signals u[0], u[1], . . . ∈ U to the plant to ensure that starting from any initial condition,
ϕ is satisfied for any sequence of exogenous disturbances d[0], d[1], . . . ∈D and any sequence
of environment states.
Remark 6.3.1. We restrict ϕs and ϕe to be of the form (6.4) and (6.5), respectively, for
the clarity of presentation. Our framework only requires that the specification (6.3) can be
reduced to the form of Equation (6.7), presented later.
Remark 6.3.2. The specification ϕ has to be satisfied for any initial condition and envi-
ronment, including those that violate the assumptions ϕinit and ϕe. However, according to
(6.3), satisfying ϕ ensures that the system exhibits the desired behavior ϕs only when ϕinit
and ϕe are satisfied.
6.4 Hierarchical Approach
As described in Section 6.1, we follow a hierarchical approach to attack the Planner-
Controller Synthesis Problem defined in Section 6.3. First, we construct a finite transition
system D (e.g., a Kripke structure) that serves as an abstract model of S (which typically
has infinitely many states). With this abstraction, the problem is then decomposed into
• synthesizing a discrete planner that computes a discrete plan satisfying the specifica-
tion ϕ based on the abstract, finite-state model D, and
• designing a continuous controller that implements the discrete plan.
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The success of this abstraction-based approach thus relies on the following two critical steps:
(a) an abstraction of an infinite-state system into an equivalent (in the simulation sense)
finite state model such that any discrete plan generated by the discrete planner can be
implemented (i.e., simulated ; see, for example, [114] for the exact definition of simula-
tion) by the continuous controller, provided that the evolution of the controlled state
satisfies (6.2), and
(b) synthesis of a discrete planner (i.e., a strategy), represented by a finite state automaton,
that ensures the correctness of the discrete plan.
In Section 6.5, we present an approach to handle step (a), assuming that the physical
system is modeled as described in Section 6.3. To handle step (b) and ensure the system cor-
rectness for any initial condition and environment, we apply the two-player game approach
presented in [98] to synthesize a discrete planner as in [65, 122]. In summary, consider a
class of LTL formulas of the form
⎛⎝ψinit ∧ ◻ψe ∧ ⋀i∈If ◻3ψf,i⎞⎠ Ô⇒ ⎛⎝⋀i∈Is ◻ψs,i ∧ ⋀i∈Ig ◻3ψg,i⎞⎠ , (6.6)
known as Generalized Reactivity[1] (GR[1]) formulas. Here, ψinit, ψf,i and ψg,i are proposi-
tional formulas of variables from V ; ψe is a Boolean combination of propositional formulas
of variables from V and expressions of the form #ψte where ψte is a propositional formula of
variables from E that describes the assumptions on the transitions of environment states;
and ψs,i is a Boolean combination of propositional formulas of variables from V and ex-
pressions of the form #ψts where ψts is a propositional formula of variables from V that
describes the constraints on the transitions of controlled states. The approach presented
in [98] allows checking the realizability of this class of specifications and synthesizing the
corresponding finite state automaton to be performed in time O(∣V ∣3) where ∣V ∣ is the size
of the state space of the finite state abstraction D of the system. We refer the reader to [98]
and references therein for a detailed discussion.
Proposition 6.4.1. A specification of the form (6.3) can be reduced to a subclass of GR[1]
formula of the form
⎛⎝ψinit ∧ ◻ψee ⋀i∈If ◻3ψef,i⎞⎠ Ô⇒ ⎛⎝⋀i∈Is ◻ψs,i ∧ ⋀i∈Ig ◻3ψg,i⎞⎠ , (6.7)
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where ψinit, ψs,i and ψg,i are as defined above and ψee and ψ
e
f,i are propositional formulas
of variables from E.
In this thesis, we call the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (6.7) the “assumption”
part and the “guarantee” part, respectively.
The proof of Proposition 6.4.1 is based on the fact that all safety, guarantee, obligation
and response properties are special cases of progress formulas ◻3p, provided that p is allowed
to be a past formula [82]. Hence, these properties can be reduced to the “guarantee” part
of (6.7) by introducing auxiliary Boolean variables. For example, a guarantee property
3ps2,j can be reduced to the “guarantee” part of (6.7) by introducing an auxiliary Boolean
variable x, initialized to ps2,j . 3ps2,j can then be equivalently expressed as a conjunction of◻((x ∨ ps2,j) Ô⇒ #x), ◻(¬(x ∨ ps2,j) Ô⇒ #(¬x)) and ◻3x. Obligation and response
properties can be reduced to the “guarantee” part of (6.7) using a similar idea. In addition,
a stability property 3◻ ps6,j can be reduced to the “guarantee” part of (6.7) by introducing
an auxiliary Boolean variable y, initialized to False. 3 ◻ ps6,j can then be equivalently
expressed as a conjunction of ◻(y Ô⇒ ps6,j), ◻(y Ô⇒ #y), ◻(¬y Ô⇒ (#y ∨ #(¬y)))
and ◻3y. Note that these reductions lead to equivalent specifications. However, for the case
of stability, the reduction may lead to an unrealizable specification even though the original
specification is realizable. Roughly speaking, this is because the auxiliary Boolean variable
y needs to make clairvoyant (prophecy), non-deterministic decisions. For other properties,
the realizability remains the same after the reduction since the synthesis algorithm [98] is
capable of handling past formulas. The detail of this discussion is beyond the scope of this
thesis and we refer the reader to [98] for more detailed discussion on the synthesis of GR[1]
specification.
6.5 Computing Finite State Abstraction
To construct a finite transition system D from the physical model S, we first partition
dom(S) and dom(E) into finite sets S and E , respectively, of equivalence classes or cells
such that the partition is proposition preserving [6]. Roughly speaking, a partition is said to
be proposition preserving if for any atomic proposition pi ∈ Π and any states v1 and v2 that
belong to the same cell in the partition, v1 satisfies pi iff v2 also satisfies pi. We denote the
resulting discrete domain of the system by V = S×E . We call v ∈ dom(V ) a continuous state
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and ν ∈ V a discrete state of the system. For a discrete state ν ∈ V, we say that ν satisfies
an atomic proposition pi ∈ Π, denoted by ν ⊩d pi, if and only if there exists a continuous
state v contained in the cell labeled by ν such that v satisfies pi. Given an infinite sequence
of discrete states σd = ν0ν1ν2 . . . and LTL formula ϕ built from Π, we say that ϕ holds at
position i ≥ 0 of σd, written νi ⊧d ϕ, if and only if ϕ holds for the remainder of σd starting
at position i. With these definitions, the semantics of LTL for a sequence of discrete states
can be derived from the general semantics of LTL.
Next, we need to determine the transition relations → of D. In Section 6.5.1, we use a
variant of the notion of reachability that is sufficient to guarantee that if a discrete controlled
state ςj is reachable from ςi, the transition from ςi to ςj can be continuously implemented
or simulated by a continuous controller. A computational scheme that provides a sufficient
condition for reachability between two discrete controlled states and subsequently refines
the state space partition is also presented in Section 6.5.3 and 6.5.4.
6.5.1 Finite Time Reachability
Let S = {ς1, ς2, . . . , ςl} be a set of discrete controlled states. We define a map Ts ∶ dom(S)→ S
that sends a continuous controlled state to a discrete controlled state of its equivalence class.
That is, T−1s (ςi) ⊆ dom(S) is the set of all the continuous controlled states contained in the
cell labeled by ςi and {T−1s (ςi), . . . , T −1s (ςn)} is the partition of dom(S). We define the
reachability relation, denoted by ↝, as follows.
Definition 6.5.1. A discrete state ςj is reachable from a discrete state ςi, written ςi ↝ ςj ,
only if starting from any point s[0] ∈ T −1s (ςi), there exists a horizon length N ∈ {0,1, . . .}
and a sequence of control signals u[0], u[1], . . . , u[N − 1] ∈ U that takes the system (6.2) to
a point s[N] ∈ T −1s (ςj) satisfying the constraint s[t] ∈ T−1s (ςi) ∪ T−1s (ςj),∀t ∈ {0, . . . ,N} for
any sequence of exogenous disturbances d[0], d[1], . . . , d[N − 1] ∈ D. We write ςi ↝̸ ςj if ςj
is not reachable from ςi.
In general, for two discrete states ςi and ςj , verifying the reachability relation ςi ↝ ςj is
hard because it requires searching for a proper horizon length N . Therefore, we consider the
restricted case where the horizon length is fixed and given and U , D and T−1s (ςi), i ∈ {1, . . . , l}
are polyhedral sets. Our approach relies on solving the following problem.
Reachability Problem : Given an initial continuous controlled state s[0] ∈ Rn, discrete
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controlled states ςi, ςj ∈ S, the set of admissible control inputs U ⊆ Rm, the set of exogenous
disturbances D ⊆ Rp, the matrices A, B and E as in (6.2), a horizon length N ≥ 0, determine
a sequence of control signals u[0], u[1], . . . , u[N −1] ∈ Rm such that for all t ∈ {0, . . . ,N −1}
and d[t] ∈D,
s[t + 1] = As[t] +Bu[t] +Ed[t],
s[t] ∈ T−1s (ςi),
u[t] ∈ U,
s[N] ∈ T−1s (ςj).
(6.8)
6.5.2 Preliminaries on Polyhedral Convexity
We consider the case where U , D and T−1s (ςi), i ∈ {1, . . . , l} are polyhedral sets defined as
follows.
Definition 6.5.2. A subset P of Rn is said to be a polyhedral set if it is non-empty and has
the form P = {p ∣ Gp ≤ h} for some G ∈ Rr×n and h ∈ Rr, where the inequality ≤ is evaluated
elementwise.
Definition 6.5.3. Let P be a non-empty convex set. A point p ∈ P is an extreme point of
P if and only if it does not lie strictly between the endpoints of any line segment contained
in the set, i.e., for an extreme point p,
p = λp1 + (1 − λ)p2, p1, p2 ∈ P, λ ∈ (0,1) Ô⇒ p = p1 = p2.
To compute the set S0 of initial states for which the Reachability Problem is feasible,
we apply the following results on polyhedral convexity. The proofs for the next three
propositions can be found in [11].
Proposition 6.5.1. Let P be a polyhedral subset of Rn. If P has the form P = {p ∈
Rn ∣ g′jp ≤ hj , j = 1, . . . , r} where gj ∈ Rn, g′j is the transpose of gj and hj ∈ R, then a point
p ∈ P is an extreme point of P if and only if the set Gp ≜ {gj ∣ g′jp = hj , j ∈ {1, . . . , r}}
contains n linearly independent vectors.
Proposition 6.5.2. Let P be a non-empty convex subset of Rn. If P is closed, then P has
at least one extreme point if and only if it does not contain a line, i.e., a set of the form{p + λh ∣ λ ∈ R}, where h ∈ Rn is non-zero and p ∈ P .
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Proposition 6.5.3 (Fundamental Theorem of Linear Programming). Let P be a polyhedral
set that has at least one extreme point. A linear function that is bounded below over P attains
a mininum at some extreme point of P .
Using Proposition 6.5.1, we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 6.5.4. Let P be a polyhedral subset of Rn and let P be the set of all its extreme
points. For any natural number N , PN ≜ P × . . . × P (N times) is a polyhedral subset of
RnN and PN ≜ P × . . . × P (N times) is the set of all its extreme points.
Proof. Since P is a polyhedral set, by definition, it can be written as P = {p ∈ Rn ∣ Cp ≤D}
for some matrix C ∈ Rr×n and vector D ∈ Rr. Clearly, PN is a polyhedral subset of RnN
since it can be written as PN = {p ∈ RnN ∣ C˜p ≤ D˜} where C˜ ∈ RrN×nN is a block diagonal
matrix whose diagonal blocks are C and D˜ = [D′, . . . ,D′]′ ∈ RrN .
Let Q be the set of all the extreme points of PN . First, we will show that P
N ⊆ Q.
Consider any point q ∈ PN . Then, q = [p′1, . . . , p′N ]′ for some p1, . . . , pN ∈ P . Let c′j be
the jth row of C and let dj be the jth element of D. From Proposition 6.5.1, we get
that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, the set Cpi ≜ {cj ∣ c′jpi = dj , j ∈ {1, . . . , r}} contains n linearly
independent vectors. Let c˜′j be the jth row of C˜ and let d˜j be the jth element of D˜. Define
Cq ≜ {c˜j ∣ c˜′jq = d˜j , j ∈ {1, . . . , rN}}. From the block diagonal structure of C˜, it can be easily
verified that
Cq = N⋃
i=1 0n(i−1) ×Cpi × 0n(N−i),
where for any natural number m, 0m is a zero vector of length m. Since for each i ∈{1, . . . ,N}, Cpi contains n linearly independent vectors, it can be easily shown that Cq
contains nN linearly independent vectors. Thus, using Proposition 6.5.1, we can conclude
that q ∈ Q.
Next, we will show that Q ⊆ PN . Consider any point q ∈ Q. Then, q = [p′1, . . . , p′N ]′
for some p1, . . . , pN ∈ P . From Proposition 6.5.1, we get that the set Cq ≜ {c˜j ∣ c˜′jq = d˜j , j ∈{1, . . . , rN}} contains nN linearly independent vectors. From the block diagonal structure
of C˜, it can be easily verified that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, the set Cpi ≜ {cj ∣ c′jpi = dj , j ∈{1, . . . , r}} must contain n linearly independent vectors. Using Proposition 6.5.1, we can
conlude that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, pi ∈ P .
In addition, the following proposition can be proved using Proposition 6.5.2.
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Proposition 6.5.5. Let P be a polyhedral subset of Rn. If P is closed and bounded, then
P has at least one extreme point.
Proof. Assume, to arrive at a contradiction, that P does not have an extreme point. Then,
from Proposition 6.5.2, P contains a line L = {p + λh ∣ λ ∈ R} where h ∈ Rn is non-zero and
p ∈ P . This contradicts the assumption that P is bounded.
Finally, the next three propositions can be found in standard textbooks on topology,
e.g., [109].
Proposition 6.5.6 (Heine-Borel Theorem). A subset of Euclidean space Rn is compact if
and only if it is closed and bounded.
Proposition 6.5.7 (Tychonoff’s Theorem). The product of any collection of compact topo-
logical spaces is compact.
Proposition 6.5.8 (Extreme Value Theorem). A continuous real-valued function on a
non-empty compact space is bounded and attains its supremum.
6.5.3 Verifying the Reachability Relation
Given two discrete controlled states ςi, ςj ∈ S, to determine whether ςi ↝ ςj , we essentially
have to verify that T−1s (ςi) ⊆ S0 where S0 is the set of s[0] starting from which the Reach-
ability Problem defined in Section 6.5.1 is feasible. In this section, we describe how S0 can
be computed using an idea from constrained robust optimal control [14].
We assume that U , D and T−1s (ςi), i ∈ {1, . . . , l} are polyhedral sets, i.e., there exist
matrices L1, L2 and L3 and vectors M1, M2 and M3 such that T−1s (ςi) = {s ∈ Rn ∣ L1s ≤M1},
U = {u ∈ Rm ∣ L2u ≤M2} and T−1s (ςj) = {s ∈ Rn ∣ L3s ≤M3}. Then, by substituting
s[t] = Ats[0] + t−1∑
k=0 (AkBu[t − 1 − k] +AkEd[t − 1 − k])
and replacing s[t] ∈ T−1s (ςi), u[t] ∈ U and s[N] ∈ T−1s (ςj) with L1s[t] ≤ M1, L2u[t] ≤ M2
and L3s[N] ≤M3, respectively, in (6.8), it can be easily checked that equation (6.8) can be
rewritten in the form
L
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s[0]
uˆ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤M −Gdˆ, (6.9)
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where uˆ ≜ [u[0]′, . . . , u[N − 1]′]′ ∈ RmN , dˆ ≜ [d[0]′, . . . , d[N − 1]′]′ ∈ DN and the matrices
L ∈ Rr×n+mN and G ∈ Rr×pN and the vector M ∈ Rr can be obtained from L1, L2, L3, M1,
M2, M3, A, B and E.
Using properties of polyhedral convexity, we can prove the following result.
Theorem 6.5.1. Suppose D is a closed and bounded polyhedral subset of Rp and D is the
set of all its extreme points. Let P ≜ {y ∈ Rn+mN ∣ Ly ≤M −Gdˆ,∀dˆ ∈DN} and let S0 be the
projection of P onto its first n coordinates, i.e.,
S0 = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩s ∈ Rn ∣ ∃uˆ ∈ RmN s.t. L
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s
uˆ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤M −Gdˆ,∀dˆ ∈D
N
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ .
Then, the Reachability Problem defined in Section 6.5.1 is feasible for any s[0] ∈ S0.
Proof. From the Heine-Borel theorem and the Tychonoff’s theorem, we get that DN is
compact. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, let mj be the jth element of M and g′j be the jth row
of G and define a linear function fj ∶ DN → R by fj(dˆ) = mj − g′j dˆ. Since fj is continuous
and DN is compact, from the extreme value theorem, fj is bounded below over DN . In
addition, since DN is compact, from the Heine-Borel theorem and Proposition 6.5.5, DN
has at least one extreme point. Using the fundamental theorem of linear programming, we
can conclude that fj attains a minimum at some extreme point of DN .
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists s0 ∈ S0 and dˆ0 ∈ DN such
that for any uˆ ∈ RmN , L⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s0
uˆ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ > M − Gdˆ0. Then, there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that
l′j
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s0
uˆ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ > fj(dˆ0) where l′j is the jth row of L. But since fj attains a minimum at some
extreme point of DN , there exists dˆ ∈ DN such that l′j ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
s0
uˆ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ > fj(dˆ). This contradicts the
assumption that s0 ∈ S0.
Using Theorem 6.5.1, the problem of computing the set S0 such that the Reachability
Problem is feasible for any s[0] ∈ S0 is reduced to computing a projection of the intersection
of finite sets and can be automatically solved using off-the-shelf software, for example, the
Multi-Parametric Toolbox (MPT) [67].
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6.5.4 State Space Discretization and Correctness of the System
In general, given the previous partition of dom(S) and any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the reachability
relation between ςi and ςj may not be established through the set S0 of s[0] starting from
which the Reachability Problem defined in Section 6.5.1 is feasible since T−1s (ςi) is not
necessarily covered by S0 (due to the constraints on u and a specific choice of the finite
horizon N). To partially alleviate this limitation, we refine the partition based on the
reachability relation defined earlier to increase the number of valid discrete state transitions
of D. The underlying idea is that starting with an arbitrary pair of ςi and ςj , we determine
the set S0 of feasible s[0] for the Reachability Problem. Then, we partition T−1s (ςi) into
T−1s (ςi) ∩ S0, labeled by ςi,1, and T−1s (ςi)/S0, labeled by T−1s (ςi,2), and obtain the following
reachability relations: ςi,1 ↝ ςj and ςi,2 ↝̸ ςj . This process is continued until some pre-
specified termination criteria are met. Table 6.1 shows the pseudo-code of the algorithm
where a prescribed lower bound Volmin on the volume of each cell in the new partition is used
as a termination criterion. The algorithm terminates when no cell can be partitioned such
that the volumes of the two resulting new cells are both greater than Volmin . Larger Volmin
causes the algorithm to terminate sooner. Other termination criteria such as the maximum
number of iterations can be used as well. Note that the point at which the algorithm
terminates affects the reachability between discrete controlled states of the new partition
and as a result, affects the realizability of the specification. Generally, a coarse partition
makes the specification unrealizable but a fine partition causes state space explosion. A
way to decide when to terminate the algorithm is to start with a coarse partition and keep
refining it until the specification is realizable.
We denote the set of all the discrete controlled states corresponding to the resulting
partition of dom(S) after applying the discretization algorithm by S ′. Since the partition
obtained from the proposed algorithm is a refined partition of {T−1s (S1), . . . , T −1s (Sn)} andV = S × E is proposition preserving, it is trivial to show that V ′ = S ′ × E is also proposition
preserving. For simplicity of notation, we call S ′ as S and V ′ as V for the rest of the chapter.
We define the finite transition system D that serves as the abstract model of S as follows:V = S ×E is the set of states of D and for any two states νi = (ςi, i) and νj = (ςj , j), νi → νj
(i.e., there exists a transition from νi to νj) only if ςi ↝ ςj . Using the abstract model D, a
discrete planner that guarantees the satisfaction of ϕ while ensuring that the discrete plans
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Table 6.1: Discretization Algorithm.
Discretization Algorithm
input: The lower bound on cell volume (Volmin), the parameters A, B, E, U , D, N
of the Reachability Problem, and the original partition ({T−1s (ςi) ∣ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}})
output: The new partition sol
sol = {T−1s (ςi) ∣ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}; IJ = {(i, j) ∣ i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}};
while (size(IJ ) > 0)
Pick arbitrary ςi and ςj where (i, j) ∈ IJ ;
Compute the set S0 of s[0] starting from which the Reachability Problem is feasible
for the previously chosen ςi and ςj ;
if (volume(sol[i] ∩ S0) > Volmin and volume(sol[i]/S0 > Volmin) then
Replace sol[i] with sol[i] ∩ S0 and append sol[i]/S0 to sol ;
For each k ∈ {1, . . . , size(sol)}, add (i, k), (k, i), (size(sol), k) and (k, size(sol)) to IJ ;
else
Remove (i, j) from IJ ;
endif
endwhile
are restricted to those satisfying the reachability relations can be automatically constructed
using the digital design synthesis tool [98].
From the stutter-invariant property of ϕ [97], the formulation of the Reachability Prob-
lem and the proposition preserving property of V, it is straightforward to prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 6.5.9. Let σd = ν0ν1 . . . be an infinite sequence of discrete states of D where
for each natural number k, νk → νk+1, νk = (ςk, k), ςk ∈ S is the discrete controlled state
and k ∈ E is the discrete environment state. If σd ⊧d ϕ, then by applying a sequence of
control signals, each corresponding to a solution of the Reachability Problem with ςi = ςk and
ςj = ςk+1, the infinite sequence of continuous states σ = v0v1v2 . . . satisfies ϕ.
Proof. From the formulation of the Reachability Problem, the (continuous) execution of the
system (i.e., the infinite sequence of continuous states) can be written as
σ = v0,0v0,1 . . . v0,N−1v1,0v1,1 . . . v1,N−1 . . . ,
where N is the horizon length of the Reachability Problem and for each i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,} and
j ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1}, the continuous state vi,j belongs to the cell labeled by νi. Thus, for
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each atomic proposition pi ∈ Π, vi,j ⊩ pi if and only if νi ⊩d pi. Since σd ⊧d ϕ, from the
stutter-invariant property of ϕ, we can conclude that σ ⊧ ϕ.
As described in Section 6.2.2, a solution u[0], . . . , u[N − 1] of the Reachability Problem
can be computed by formulating a constrained optimal control problem, which can be solved
using off-the-shelf software such as MPT [67], YALMIP [75] or NTG [92].
6.5.5 Example
We consider a point-mass omnidirectional vehicle navigating a straight road while avoiding
obstacles and obeying certain traffic rules. It was shown in [56] that the non-dimensional
equations of motion of the vehicle are given by
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x¨
y¨
θ¨
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x˙
y˙
2mL2
J θ˙
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
qx
qy
qθ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (6.10)
with the following constraints on the control efforts:
∀t, q2x(t) + q2y(t) ≤ (3 − ∣qθ(t)∣2 )2 and ∣qθ(t)∣ ≤ 3. (6.11)
Conservatively, we can set ∣qx(t)∣ ≤ √0.5, ∣qy(t)∣ ≤ √0.5 and ∣qθ(t)∣ ≤ 1 so that the constraints
(6.11) are decoupled.
In this section, we are only interested in the translational (x and y) components of the
vehicle state. Discretizing the dynamics (6.10) with time step 0.1, we obtain the following
discrete-time linear time-invariant state space model
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
z[t + 1]
vz[t + 1]
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0.0952
0 0.9048
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
z[t]
vz[t]
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ +
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0.0048
0.0952
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ qz (6.12)
where z represents either x or y and vz represents the rate of change in z. Let Cz be
the domain of the vehicle state projected onto the (z, vz) coordinates. We restrict the
domain Cz to [zmin, zmax]× [−1,1] and partition Cz as Cz = ⋃i∈{zmin+1,...,zmax}Cz,i where
Cz,i = [i−1, i]×[−1,1] as shown in Figure 6.1. Throughout the section, we call this partition
the original partition of the domain Cz.
118
0!
1!
-1!
zmin! zmin+1! zmin+2! zmax!zmax-1!….!
z!
vz!
Figure 6.1: The original partition of the domain Cz.
We consider a road with two lanes, each of width 1, so we set ymin = 0 and ymax = 2.
Since the vehicle dynamics are translationally invariant, without loss of generality we set
xmin = 0 and xmax = L where L is the length of the road.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and j ∈ {1,2}, we define a Boolean variable Oi,j that is assigned
the value True if and only if an obstacle is detected at some position (xo, yo) ∈ [i − 1, i] ×[j − 1, j]. The state of the system is therefore a tuple (x, vx, y, vy,O1,1,O1,2, . . . ,OL,1,OL,2)
where (x, vx, y, vy) ∈ [0, L]×[−1,1]×[0,2]×[−1,1] is the vehicle state or the controlled state
and (O1,1,O1,2, . . . ,OL,2) ∈ {0,1}2L is the environment state.
State Space Discretization
Since the dynamics and the constraints on the control efforts for the x and y components
of the vehicle state are decoupled, we apply the discretization algorithm presented in Sec-
tion 6.5.4 for the x and y components separately for the sake of computational efficiency.1
Since the vehicle dynamics (6.10) are translationally invariant, we can use similar partitions
for all Cz,i. The discretization algorithm with horizon length N = 10 and Volmin = 0.1 yields
a partition with 11 cells {C1z,i,C2z,i, . . . ,C11z,i} for each Cz,i as shown in Figure 6.2. For each
i ∈ {zmin + 1, . . . , zmax} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,11}, we let Cjz,i be the state label of cell Cjz,i and
let Cz,i = {C1z,i, . . . ,C11z,i}. A discrete state is therefore a tuple (νx, νy,O1,1, . . . ,OL,2) where(νx, νy) ∈ Cx,i × Cy,i is the discrete controlled state. The reachability between discrete con-
trolled states can be determined by checking set inclusion and applying Thereom 6.5.1 as
described in Section 6.5.3. By solving the associated constrained optimal control problem
using off-the-shelf software such as MPT, a controller associated with each reachable pair of
them can be generated such that the resulting continuous execution implements the discrete
1Before performing the discretization, we partition each Cz,i into (C+z,i ∪C−z,i) where C+z,i = [i−1, i]×[0,1]
and C−z,i = [i− 1, i]× [−1,0] to allow the possibility of enforcing other traffic laws such as disallowing reverse
motion of the vehicle.
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Figure 6.2: The partition of each cell Cz,i in the original partition of the domain Cz.
transition between them.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter proposed an approach to automatically compute a finite state abstraction of a
discrete-time linear time-invariant system, taking into account the presence of exogenous dis-
turbances. This, together with the digital design synthesis tool, allows us to automatically
synthesize embedded control software for the system that is guaranteed, by construction,
to satisfy its specification regardless of the environment in which it operates (subject to
certain assumptions on the environment that need to be stated in the specification). The
resulting system is provably robust with respect to bounded exogenous disturbances.
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Chapter 7
Receding Horizon Framework for
Temporal Logic Specifications
This chapter describes a receding horizon framework that satisfies a class of linear temporal
logic specifications sufficient to describe a wide range of properties including safety, stability,
progress, obligation, response and guarantee. The resulting embedded control software
consists of a goal generator, a trajectory planner and a continuous controller. The goal
generator reduces the trajectory generation problem to a sequence of smaller problems of
short horizon while preserving the desired system-level temporal properties. Subsequently,
in each iteration, the trajectory planner solves the corresponding short-horizon problem
with the currently observed state as the initial state and generates a feasible trajectory to
be implemented by the continuous controller. Based on the simulation property, we show
that the composition of the goal generator, trajectory planner and continuous controller and
the corresponding receding horizon framework guarantee the correctness of the system. To
handle failures that may occur due to a mismatch between the actual system and its model,
we propose a response mechanism and illustrate, through an example, how the system is
capable of responding to certain failures and continues to exhibit a correct behavior.
7.1 Overview
Synthesis of correct-by-construction embedded control software based on temporal logic
specifications has attracted considerable attention in the recent years due to the increasing
frequency of systems with tight integration between computational and physical elements
and the complexity in designing and verifying such systems. The hierarchical approach
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presented in Chapter 6 is a commonly used to attack this synthesis problem. One of the
main challenges of this approach, which is the focus of Chapter 6, is in the abstraction of
systems evolving on a continuous domain into equivalent (in the simulation sense) finite
state models.
Another challenge of this hierarchical approach that remains an open problem and has
received less attention in the literature is the computational complexity in the synthesis
of finite state automata. In particular, the synthesis problem becomes significantly harder
when the interaction with the (potentially dynamic and not a priori known) environment
has to be taken into account. Piterman et al. [98] treated this problem as a two-player
game between the system and the environment and proposed an algorithm for the synthesis
of a finite state automaton that satisfies its specification regardless of the environment
in which it operates (subject to certain assumptions on the environment that need to be
stated in the specification). Although for a certain class of properties, known as Generalized
Reactivity[1] , such an automaton can be computed in polynomial time, the applications of
the synthesis tool are limited to small problems due to the state explosion issue.
Similar computational complexity is also encountered in the area of constrained optimal
control. In the control domain, an effective and well-established technique to address this
problem is to design and implement control strategies in a receding horizon manner, i.e.,
optimize over a shorter horizon, starting from the currently observed state, implement the
initial control action, move the horizon one step ahead, and reoptimize. This approach
reduces the computational complexity by essentially solving a sequence of smaller opti-
mization problems, each with a specific initial condition (as opposed to optimizing with any
initial condition in traditional optimal control). Under certain conditions, receding horizon
control strategies are known to lead to closed-loop stability [83, 92, 53]. See, e.g., [91, 42]
for a detailed discussion on constrained optimal control, including finite horizon optimal
control and receding horizon control.
This chapter describe an extension of traditional receding horizon control to incorporate
linear temporal logic specification of the form (6.7) in order to reduce the computational
complexity of the synthesis problem. Specifically, we develop the receding horizon frame-
work for executing finite state automata while ensuring system correctness with respect to
a given temporal logic specification. This essentially allows the synthesis problem to be
reduced to a set of smaller problems of short horizon.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 provides a brief descrip-
tion of traditional receding horizon control. Section 7.3 formulates the planner synthesis
problem. To reduce the complexity of the synthesis problem, in Section 7.4, we propose
the receding horizon framework for executing finite state automata while ensuring system
correctness with respect to a given linear temporal logic specification. The proposed frame-
work allows the synthesis problem to be reduced to a set of smaller problems of short
horizon. Its implementation, presented in Section 7.5, leads to the decomposition of the
discrete planner into a goal generator and a trajectory planner. The goal generator reduces
the synthesis problem to a sequence of short horizon problems while preserving the desired
system-level temporal properties. Subsequently, in each iteration, the trajectory planner
solves the corresponding short-horizon problem with the currently observed state as the
initial state and generates a feasible trajectory to be implemented by the continuous con-
troller. This design corresponds to Alice’s planner-controller subsystem (Figure 2.1) with
the goal generator having similar functionality as Mission Planner, the trajectory planner
having similar functionality as the composition of Traffic Planner and Path Planner, and
the continuous controller having similar functionality as Path Follower. Also presented in
Section 7.5 is a response mechanism that potentially increases the robustness of the system
with respect to a mismatch between the actual system and its model and violation of the
environment assumptions. Finally, in Section 7.6, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed technique through an example of an autonomous vehicle navigating an urban en-
vironment. This example also illustrates that the system is not only robust with respect
to exogenous disturbances but is also capable of handling violation of the environment
assumptions.
7.2 Preliminaries on Receding Horizon Control
Computational complexity is an inherent problem in the area of constrained optimal con-
trol. Consider, for example, the two degree of freedom controller design [7] of Figure 7.1
commonly used in motion control systems to handle non-linear designs, including global
non-linearities, input saturation and state space constraints, taking into account noise and
unmodeled dynamics. This control architecture separates the control component into the
trajectory generation (feedforward compensator) and the local control (feedback compen-
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“Receding Horizon Control”
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Figure 7.1: A typical control system with trajectory generation implemented in a receding
horizon manner. ∆ models uncertainties in the plant model.
sator) components. Given a reference trajectory, the trajectory generation component com-
putes a feasible state space trajectory sd and the nominal control signals u that enable the
system to track sd based on the differential equations that govern the evolution of the plant
state. The local control is implemented to account for the effect of the noise and unmodeled
dynamics captured by ∆.
In traditional constrained optimal control [91, 42], the trajectory generation component
solves a constrained optimization problem to generate an optimal state space trajectory
sd. This component is typically run in an open-loop manner, i.e., there is no dashed
arrow labeled “Receding Horizon Control” and sd is computed offline, taking into account
all the possible initial conditions. An effective and well-established approach to deal with
computational complexity pertaining to this problem is to “close the loop” at the trajectory
generation level as shown in Figure 7.1 and allow control strategies to be designed and
implemented in a receding horizon manner. In summary, at each sampling instant, the
current state of the plant is sampled and a finite horizon optimal control problem (see
Section 6.2.2) is solved using the current plant state as the initial state. Only an initial
part of the resulting control strategy is then implemented. The plant state is sampled
again and the computation is repeated starting from the new current plant state. Hence,
this strategy essentially reduces the original constrained optimal control problem into a
sequence of smaller problems, each with a specific initial condition.
To ensure closed-loop stability, certain terminal state constraints need to be imposed [60,
85, 83]. A more sophisticated approach is to use an appropriate control Lyapunov function
(CLF) as a terminal cost [53, 92]. The absence of terminal constraints in this CLF approach
results in a significant speedup in computation time and even allows a trajectory generation
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problem to be solved in real-time [86].
Receding horizon control is known to not only reduce computational complexity but also
increase the robustness of the system with respect to exogenous disturbances and modeling
uncertainties [92]. With disturbances and modeling uncertainties, an actual execution of
the system usually deviates from a state space trajectory sd. Receding horizon control
allows the current state of the system to be continually reevaluated so sd can be adjusted
accordingly based on the externally received reference if the actual execution of the system
does not match it. Receding horizon control has been successfully demonstrated in many
applications [96, 29, 92, 61].
7.3 Problem Formulation
We consider the Planner-Controller Synthesis Problem formulated in Section 6.3. The
hierarchical approach described in Section 6.4 is commonly used to attack this problem.
In this chapter, we focus on the computational complexity issue of the discrete planner
synthesis problem (step (b) as described in Section 6.4). We assume that a finite state
abstraction D of the physical model S of the system has been constructed using, for example,
the discretization algorithm presented in Section 6.5.4. We denote the (finite) set of states
of D by V.
We consider a specification of the form (6.7) since, from Proposition 6.4.1, the specifi-
cation (6.3) can be reduced to this form. The following aspects of specification (6.7) are
noteworthy:
(i) The desired properties include the safety properties, ⋀
i∈Is ◻ψs,i, and the progress prop-
erties, ⋀
i∈Ig ◻3ψg,i.
(ii) Each progress property, ◻3ψg,i, i ∈ Ig, specifies the set of states that the system needs
to visit infinitely often. In other words, it represents a system goal. The conjunction
of these progress properties allows multiple goals to be specified. Each of these goals
has to be achieved infinitely often. However, the order in which they are achieved is
irrelevant.
Discrete Planner Synthesis Problem : Given a finite state abstraction D of the physical
system and the system specification ϕ of the form (6.7), synthesize a discrete planner that
125
computes a discrete plan to ensure that starting from any initial condition, ϕ is satisfied
for any sequence of environment states.
7.4 Receding Horizon Framework
The digital design synthesis tool presented in Section 6.2.1 was designed to solve the Discrete
Planner Synthesis Problem. However, in many cases, this tool fails because of the state
explosion problem. In the worst case, the resulting automaton may contain all the possible
states of the system. For example, if the system has N variables, each can take any value
in {1, . . . ,M}, then there may be as many as MN nodes in the automaton. This type of
computational complexity limits the application of the systhesis to relatively small problems.
To reduce computational complexity in the synthesis of finite state automata, we apply
an idea similar to the traditional receding horizon control described in Section 7.2. First, we
observe that in many applications, it is not necessary to plan for the whole execution, taking
into account all the possible behaviors of the environment since a state that is very far from
the current state of the system typically does not affect the near future plan. Consider, for
example, the robot motion planning problem described in Example 6.3.2. Suppose C1 or
C2 is very far away from the initial position of the robot. Under certain conditions, it may
be sufficient to only plan out an execution for only a short segment ahead and implement
it in a receding horizon fashion, i.e., recompute the plan as the robot moves, starting from
the currently observed state (rather than from all initial conditions satisfying ϕinit as the
original specification (6.3) suggests). In this section, we present a sufficient condition and
a receding horizon strategy that allows the synthesis to be performed on a smaller domain;
thus, substantially reduces the number of states (or nodes) of the automaton while still
ensuring the system correctness with respect to the LTL specification (6.3).
We use the notion of partial order to provide a measure of closeness to the goal states.
Definition 7.4.1. A partially ordered set (V,⪯) consists of a set V and a binary relation⪯ over the set V satisfying the following properties: for any v1, v2, v3 ∈ V , (a) v1 ⪯ v1; (b) if
v1 ⪯ v2 and v2 ⪯ v1, then v1 = v2; and (c) if v1 ⪯ v2 and v2 ⪯ v3, then v1 ⪯ v3.
First, for each progress property ◻3ψg,i, i ∈ Ig, we construct a collection of subsetsW i0, . . . ,W ip of V such that
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Figure 7.2: Illustration of the receding horizon framework showing the relationships between
the states of V and between the subsets W i0, . . . ,W ip.
(a) W i0 ∪W i1 ∪ . . . ∪W ip = V,
(b) ψg,i is satisfied for any ν ∈ W i0, i.e., W i0 is the set of goal states associated with the
progress property ◻3ψg,i, and
(c) P i ≜ ({W i0, . . . ,W ip},⪯ψg,i) is a partially ordered set defined such that W i0 ≺ψg,i W ij ,∀j /=
0.
Define a function F i ∶ {W i0, . . . ,W ip} → {W i0, . . . ,W ip} such that F i(W ij) ≺ψg,i W ij ,∀j ≠ 0.
As we shall see shortly, the function F i(W ij) defines an intermediate goal for starting from
a state in W ij .
Consider a simple case where {ν1, . . . , ν10} is the set V of states, ν10 satisfies ψg,i, and the
states in V are organized into five subsets W i0, . . . ,W i4. The relationships between the states
in V and the subsets W i0, . . . ,W i4 are illustrated in Figure 7.2. The partial order may be
defined as W i0 ≺W i1 ≺ . . . ≺W i4 and the mapping F i may be defined as F i(W ij) =W ij−2,∀j ≥
2, F i(W i1) =W i0 and F i(W i0) =W i0. Suppose ν1 is the initial state of the system. The key
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idea of the receding horizon framework, as described later, is to plan from the initial state
ν1 ∈W i4 to any state in F i(W i4) =W i2, rather than planning from the initial state ν1 to the
goal state ν10 in one shot, taking into account all the possible behaviors of the environment.
Once a state in W i3, i.e., ν5 or ν6 is reached, we then replan from that state to a state
in F i(W i3) = W i1. We repeat this process until ν10 is reached. Under certain sufficient
conditions presented later, this strategy ensures the correctness of the overall execution of
the system.
Formally, with the above definitions of W i0, . . . ,W ip and F i, we define a short-horizon
specification Ψij associated with W ij for each i ∈ Ig and j ∈ {0, . . . , p} as
Ψij ≜ ((ν ∈W ij) ∧ Φ ∧ ◻ψee ∧ ⋀k∈If ◻3ψef,k)Ô⇒ (⋀k∈Is ◻ψs,k ∧ ◻3(ν ∈ F i(W ij)) ∧ ◻Φ) . (7.1)
Here, ν is the state of the system and ψee, ψ
e
f,k and ψs,k are defined as in (6.7). Φ is a
propositional formula of variables from V such that ψinit Ô⇒ Φ is a tautology, i.e., any
state ν ∈ V that satisfies ψinit also satisfies Φ. The role of Φ is to add assumptions on
the initial states that need to be considered when synthesizing an automaton satisfying Ψij .
These assumptions may need to be added in order to make Ψij realizable. For example,
Φ may be used to exclude an unsafe state from the set of initial states. A more detailed
discussion on the role of Φ can be found in Remark 7.4.2.
An automaton Aij satisfying Ψij defines a strategy for going from a state ν1 ∈ W ij to a
state ν2 ∈ F i(W ij) while satisfying the safety requirements ⋀i∈Is ◻ψs,i and maintaining the
invariant Φ (see Remark 7.4.2 for the role of Φ in this framework). Roughly speaking, the
partial order P i provides a measure of “closeness” to the states satisfying ψg,i. Since each
specification Ψij asserts that the system eventually reaches a state that is smaller in the
partial order, it ensures that each automaton Aij brings the system “closer” to the states
satisfying ψg,i. The function F i thus defines the horizon length for these short-horizon
problems. In general, the size of Aij increases with the horizon length. However, with too
short a horizon, the specification Ψij is typically not realizable. A good practice is to choose
the shortest horizon, subject to the realizability of Ψij , so that the automaton Aij contains
as small a number of states as possible.
Receding Horizon Strategy : For each i ∈ Ig and j ∈ {0, . . . , p}, construct an automa-
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ton Aij satisfying Ψij , defined in (7.1). Let Ig = {i1, . . . , in} and define a corresponding
ordered set (i1, . . . , in). Note that this order only affects the sequence of progress properties
ψg,i1 , . . . , ψg,in that the system tries to satisfy. Hence, it can be picked arbitrarily without
affecting the correctness of the receding horizon strategy.
(1) Determine the index j1 such that the current state ν0 ∈W i1j1 . If j1 /= 0, then execute the
automaton Ai1j1 until the system reaches a state ν1 ∈ W i1k where W i1k ≺ψg,i1 W i1j1 . Note
that since the union of W i11 , . . . ,W i1p is the set V of all the states, given any ν0, ν1 ∈ V,
there exist j1, k ∈ {0, . . . , p} such that ν0 ∈W i1j1 and ν1 ∈W i1k . This step corresponds to
going from W i1j1 to W i1j1−1 in Figure 7.3.
(2) If the current state ν1 /∈W i10 , switch to the automaton Ai1k where the index k is chosen
such that the current state ν1 ∈W i1k . Execute Ai1k until the system reaches a state that
is smaller in the partial order P i1 . Repeat this step until a state ν2 ∈ W i10 is reached.
Note that it is guaranteed that a state ν2 ∈ W i10 is eventually reached because of the
finiteness of the set {W i10 , . . . ,W i1p } and its partial order. See the proof of Theorem 7.4.1
for more details. This step corresponds to going all the way down the leftmost column
in Figure 7.3.
(3) Switch to the automaton Ai2j2 where the index j2 is chosen such that the current state
ν2 ∈W i2j2 . Repeat step (2) with i1 replaced by i2 for the partial order P i2 until a state
ν3 ∈W i20 is reached. Repeat this step with i2 replaced by i3, i4, . . . , in, respectively, until
a state νn ∈W in0 is reached. In Figure 7.3, this step corresponds to moving to the next
column, going all the way down this column and repeating this process until we reach
the bottom of the rightmost column.
(4) Repeat steps (1)–(3).
Theorem 7.4.1. Suppose Ψij is realizable for each i ∈ Ig, j ∈ {0, . . . , p}. Then the proposed
receding horizon strategy ensures that the system is correct with respect to the specification
(6.7), i.e., any execution of the system satisfies (6.7).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary execution σ of the system that satisfies the “assumption”
part of (6.7). We want to show that the safety properties ψs,i, i ∈ Is, hold throughout the
execution and for each i ∈ Ig, a state satisfying ψg,i is reached infinitely often.
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Figure 7.3: A graphical description of the receding horizon strategy for a special case where
for each i ∈ Ig, W ij ≺ψg,i W ik,∀j < k, F i(W ij) = W ij−1,∀j > 0 and F i(W i0) = W i0. Starting
from a state ν0, the system executes the automaton Ai1j1 where the index j1 is chosen such
that ν0 ∈ Ai1j1 . Repetition of step (2) ensures that a state ν2 ∈ W i10 (i.e., a state satisfying
ψg,i1) is eventually reached. This state ν2 belongs to some set, say, W i2j2 in the partial
order P i2 . The system then works through this partial order until a state ν3 ∈W i20 (i.e., a
state satisfying ψg,i2) is reached. This process is repeated until a state νn satisfying ψg,in is
reached. At this point, for each i ∈ Ig, a state satisfying ψg,i has been visited at least once
in the execution. In addition, the state νn belongs to some set in the partial order P i1 and
the whole process is repeated, ensuring that for each i ∈ Ig, a state satisfying ψg,i is visited
infinitely often in the execution.
Let ν0 ∈ V be the initial state of the system and let the index j1 be such that ν0 ∈W i1j1 .
From the tautology of ψinitÔ⇒ Φ, it is easy to show that σ satisfies the “assumption” part
of Ψi1j1 as defined in (7.1). Thus, if j1 = 0, then Ai10 ensures that a state ν2 satisfying ψg,i1 is
eventually reached and the safety properties ψs,i, i ∈ Is hold at every position of σ up to and
including the point where ν2 is reached. Otherwise, j1 /= 0 and Ai1j1 ensures that eventually,
a state ν1 ∈ W i1k where W i1k ≺ψg W i1j1 is reached, i.e., ν1 is the state of the system at some
position l1 of σ. In addition, the invariant Φ and all the safety properties ψs,i, i ∈ Is, are
guaranteed to hold at all the positions of σ up to and including the position l1. According
to the receding horizon strategy, the planner switches to the automaton Ai1k at position l1
of σ. Since ν1 ∈W i1k and ν1 satisfies Φ, the “assumption” part of Ψi1k as defined in (7.1) is
satisfied. Using the previous argument, we get that Ψi1k ensures that all the safety properties
ψs,i, i ∈ Is, hold at every position of σ starting from position l1 up to and including position
l2 at which the planner switches the automaton (from Ai1k ) and Φ holds at position l2. By
repeating this procedure and using the finiteness of the set {W i10 , . . . ,W i1p } and its partial
order condition, eventually the automaton Ai10 is executed which ensures that σ contains a
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state ν2 satisfying ψg,i1 and step (2) terminates.
Applying the previous argument to step (3), we get that step (3) terminates and before
this step terminates, the safety properties ψs,i, i ∈ Is, and the invariant Φ hold throughout
the execution and for each i ∈ Ig, a state satisfying ψg,i has been reached at least once. By
continually repeating steps (1)–(3), the receding horizon strategy ensures that ψs,i, i ∈ Is,
hold throughout the execution and for each i ∈ Ig, a state satisfying ψg,i is reached infinitely
often.
Remark 7.4.1. As discussed in Section 7.2, by continually evaluating the current plant
state and adjusting the state space trajectory sd based on the actual execution of the
system, traditional receding horizon control is known to increase the robustness of the
system with respect to exogenous disturbances and modeling uncertainties. Such an effect
may be expected in our extension of the traditional receding horizon control. Verifying this
property is subject to current study.
Remark 7.4.2. The propositional formula Φ can be viewed as an invariant of the system.
It adds an assumption on the initial state of each automaton Aij and is introduced in order
to make Ψij realizable. Without Φ, the set of initial states of Aij includes all states ν ∈W ij .
However, starting from some “bad” state (e.g., unsafe state) in W ij , there may not exist a
strategy for the system to satisfy Ψij . Φ is essentially used to eliminate the possibility of
starting from these “bad” states. Given a partially ordered set P i and a function F i, one
way to determine Φ is to start with Φ ≡ True and check the realizability of the resulting
Ψij . If there exist i ∈ Ig and j ∈ {0, . . . , p} such that Ψij is not realizable, the synthesis
process provides the initial state ν∗ of the system starting from which there exists a set
of moves of the environment such that the system cannot satisfy Ψij . This information
provides guidelines for constructing Φ, i.e., we can add a propositional formula to Φ that
prevents the system from reaching the state ν∗. This procedure can be repeated until Ψij
is realizable for any i ∈ Ig and j ∈ {0, . . . , p} or until Φ excludes all the possible states, in
which case either the original specification is unrealizable or the proposed receding horizon
strategy cannot be applied with the given partially ordered set P i and function F i.
Remark 7.4.3. For each i ∈ Ig and j ∈ {0, . . . , p}, checking the realizability of Ψij requires
considering all the initial conditions in W ij satisfying Φ. However, as will be further dis-
cussed in Section 7.5, when a strategy (i.e., a finite state automaton satisfying Ψij) is to be
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extracted, only the currently observed state needs to be considered as the initial condition.
Typically, the realizability can be checked symbolically and enumeration of states is only
required when a strategy needs to be extracted [98]. Symbolic methods are known to handle
large number of states, in practice, significantly better than enumeration-based methods.
Hence, state explosion usually occurs in the synthesis (i.e., strategy extraction) stage rather
than the realizability checking stage. By considering only the currently observed state as
the initial state in the synthesis stage, the receding horizon strategy delays state explosion
both by considering a short-horizon problem and a specific initial state.
Remark 7.4.4. The proposed receding horizon approach is not complete. Even if there
exists a control strategy that satisfies the original specification in (6.7), there may not
exist an invariant Φ or a collection of subsets W i0, . . . ,W ip that allow the receding horizon
strategy to be applied since the corresponding Ψij may not be realizable for all i ∈ Ig and
j ∈ {0, . . . , p}.
Example
We consider the point-mass omnidirectional vehicle as in Section 6.5.5. The embedded
control software has to be designed such that the vehicle is capable of navigating a straight
road while avoiding obstacles and obeying certain traffic rules. In this section, we precisely
describe these desired properties using linear temporal logic and illustrate the application
of the receding horizon framework.
System Specification
We assume that at the initial configuration, the vehicle is at least dobs away from any
obstacle and that the vehicle starts in the right lane. That is, ψinit in (6.7) is defined as:
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , L},
⎛⎝x ∈ i+dobs⋃k=i−dobsCx,k Ô⇒ (¬Oi,1 ∧ ¬Oi,2)⎞⎠ ∧ y ∈ Cy,1. (7.2)
The following properties are assumed for the environment.
1. An obstacle is detected before the vehicle gets too close to it. That is, there is a lower
bound dpopup ≥ 0 on the distance from the vehicle for which obstacle is allowed to
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instantly pop up. An LTL formula corresponding to this assumption is a conjunction
of the following formula: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and k ∈ {1,2},
◻ ⎛⎝⎛⎝x ∈ i+dpopup⋃j=i−dpopupCx,j ∧ ¬Oi,k⎞⎠ Ô⇒ ◻(¬Oi,k)⎞⎠ . (7.3)
2. Sensing range is limited. That is, the vehicle cannot detect an obstacle that is farther
away from it than dsr > dpopup ≥ 0. An LTL formula corresponding to this assumption
is a conjunction of the following formula: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , L},
◻ ⎛⎝x ∈ Cx,i Ô⇒ ⋀j>i+dsr(¬Oj,1 ∧ ¬Oj,2)⎞⎠ . (7.4)
3. The road is not blocked. That is, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , L},
◻ (¬Oi,1 ∨ ¬Oi,2) . (7.5)
4. To make sure that the stay-in-lane requirement (see below) is achievable, we assume
that an obstacle in the right lane does not disappear while the vehicle is in its vicinity.
That is, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , L},
◻ ⎛⎝⎛⎝x ∈ i+1⋃j=i−1Cx,j ∧ Oi,1⎞⎠ Ô⇒ ◻(Oi,1)⎞⎠ . (7.6)
These assumptions can be relaxed so that they have the form of the “assumption” part
of (6.6) by replacing the inner ◻ in (7.3) and (7.6) with #. Note that the resulting formula
is still not in the form of ◻ψee in (6.7). However, it can be shown that the resulting system
specification ϕ is stutter-invariant; thus, Proposition 6.5.9 can be applied to ensure the
correctness of the hierarchical approach. In addition, it can be shown that the proof of
Theorem 7.4.1 is valid for this specification; hence, the receding horizon framework can be
utilized to reduce the computational complexity of the synthesis problem while ensuring
the correctness of the system.
Next, we define the desired safety property, ⋀
i∈Is◻ψs,i, as the conjunction of the following
properties:
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1. No collision, i.e., for any i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and j ∈ {1,2},
◻ (Oi,j Ô⇒ ¬(x ∈ Cx,i ∧ y ∈ Cy,j)). (7.7)
2. The vehicle stays in the right lane unless there is an obstacle blocking the lane. That
is, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , L},
◻ ((¬Oi,1 ∧ x ∈ Cx,i) Ô⇒ (y ∈ Cy,1)). (7.8)
Finally, we define the desired progress property ◻3(x ∈ Cx,L), i.e., we want to ensure
that the vehicle reaches the end of the road.
Receding Horizon Formulation
Based on the new partition of the vehicle state space, there are the total of 242×L discrete
vehicle states and 22×L discrete environment states. Thus, in the worst case, the resulting
automaton may have as many as 242 ×L × 22×L nodes. To avoid state explosion, we apply
the receding horizon strategy presented earlier. The partially ordered set is defined by P =({W0, . . . ,WL−1},⪯ψg) where for each j ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, Wj = {(νx, νy,O1,1, . . . ,OL,2) ∣ νx ∈Cx,L−j} and Wj ≺ψg Wk for any j < k.
Next, we follow the scheme in Remark 7.4.2 to find an invariant Φ. Starting with
Φ = True, we iteratively add, until Ψj as defined in (7.1) is realizable, a propositional
formula to exclude the initial states starting from which there exists a set of moves of the
environment such that the system cannot satisfy Ψj . A close examination of the resulting
Φ reveals that Φ is essentially the conjunction of the following logics:
1. To ensure the progress property ◻3(x ∈ Cx,L), we need to assume that νx ∉ Xnotrans
and νy ∉ Ynotrans where Znotrans is defined as: for any νz ∈ Znotrans , i ∈ {zmin +
1, . . . , zmax} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,11}, νz ↝̸ Cjz,i and Z represent either X or Y.
2. To ensure no collision, the vehicle cannot collide with an obstacle at the initial state.
3. Suppose νx ∈ Cx,i. To ensure no collision, if νy can only transition to ν′y ∈ Cy,1, then
either Oi,1 or Oi+1,1 is False. Similarly, if νy can only transition to ν′y ∈ Cy,2, then
either Oi,2 or Oi+1,2 is False. Similar reasoning can be derived for the case where
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νx ∈ Cx,i such that it can only transition to ν′x ∈ Cx,i+1 and for the case where it can
only transition to ν′x ∈ Cx,i.
4. To ensure the stay-in-lane property, the vehicle cannot be in the left lane unless there
is an obstacle blocking the right lane at the initial state. In addition, the vehicle is
never in the state (νx, νy) ∈ Cx,i × Cy,1 that can only transition to (ν′x, ν′y) ∈ Cx,i × Cy,2.
5. Suppose νx ∈ Cx,i and Oi+1,1 is False. To ensure that the vehicle does not go to the
left lane when the right lane is not blocked, it is not the case that νy ∈ Cy,1 that can
only transition to ν′y ∈ Cy,2. In addition, it is not the case that νx can only transition
to ν′x ∈ Cx,i+1 and νy ∈ Cy,2 that can only transition to ν′y ∈ Cy,2.
With dpopup = 1 and the horizon length 2 (i.e., F(Wj) =Wj−2,∀j ≥ 2), the specification
(7.1) is realizable. In addition, if we let dobs be greater than 1 and restrict the initial state of
the system such that νx ∉ Xnotrans and νy ∉ Ynotrans, we get that ψinit Ô⇒ Φ is a tautology.
Results
The synthesis was performed on a MacBook with a 2 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor. Using
JTLV [98], the computation time was approximately 20 seconds. The resulting automaton
contains 2845 nodes.
A simulation result with the road length of 30 is shown in Figure 7.4. The polygons
drawn in red are obstacles, which are not known a priori. Notice that when there is no
obstacle blocking the lane, the vehicle tries to stay as close to the lane boundary (y = 1) as
possible. This is expected since to be able to avoid a pop up obstacle, due to the constraint
on the admissible control inputs, the vehicle needs to stay close to the lane boundary to be
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Figure 7.4: Simulation result. The solid line is the trajectory of the vehicle. The polygons
are obstacles discovered during the execution when the vehicle gets close enough to them.
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able to change lane. To force the vehicle to stay close to the center of the lane, we need a
finer partition of the road and extra LTL formula to ensure this property needs to be added
to the system specification.
7.5 Implementation of the Receding Horizon Framework
In order to implement the receding horizon strategy described in Section 7.4, a partial orderP i and the corresponding function F i need to be defined for each i ∈ Ig. In the previous
example, we show how these elements can be manually defined for a simple case. For a more
complex case, the problem of determining P i and F i may not be as straightforward. In this
section, we present an implementation of the receding horizon strategy, allowing P i andF i to be automatically determined for each i ∈ Ig while ensuring that all the short-horizon
specifications Ψij , i ∈ Ig, j ∈ {0, . . . , p}, as defined in (7.1) are realizable.
Given an invariant Φ and subsets W i0, . . . ,W ip of V for each i ∈ Ig, we first construct a
finite transition system Ti with the set of states {W i0, . . . ,W ip}. For each j, k ∈ {0, . . . , p},
there is a transition W ij →W ik in Ti only if j /= k and the specification in (7.1) is realizable
with F i(W ij) = W ik. The finite transition system Ti can be regarded as an abstraction of
the finite state model D of the physical system S, i.e., a higher-level abstraction of S.
Suppose Φ is defined such that there exists a path in Ti from W ij to W i0 for all i ∈ Ig,
j ∈ {1, . . . , p}. (Verifying this property is basically a graph search problem. If a path does
not exist, Φ can be recomputed using a procedure described in Remark 7.4.2.) We propose
a planner-controller subsystem with three components (see Figure 7.5): goal generator,
trajectory planner, and continuous controller.
Goal generator: Pick an order1 (i1, . . . , in) for the elements of the unordered set Ig ={i1, . . . , in} and maintain an index k ∈ {1, . . . , n} throughout the execution. Starting with
k = 1, in each iteration, the goal generator performs the following tasks.
(a1) Receive the currently observed state of the plant (i.e., the controlled state) and envi-
ronment.
1As discussed in the description of the receding horizon strategy in Section 7.4, this order can be picked
arbitrarily. In general, its definition affects a strategy the system chooses to satisfy the specification (6.7)
as it corresponds to the sequence of progress properties ψg,i1 , . . . , ψg,in the system tries to satisfy.
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Figure 7.5: A system with the planner-controller subsystem implemented in a receding hori-
zon manner. In addition to the components discussed in this section, ∆, which captures
uncertainties in the plant model, may be added to make the model more realistic. In addi-
tion, the local control may be implemented to account for the effect of noise, disturbances
and unmodeled dynamics. The inputs and outputs of these two components are drawn
dashed since they are not considered in this thesis.
(a2) If the abstract state corresponding to the currently observed state belongs to W ik0 ,
update k to (k mod n) + 1.
(a3) If k was updated in step (a2) or this is the first iteration, then based on the higher-
level abstraction Tik of the physical system S, compute a path from W ikj to W ik0 where
the index j ∈ {0, . . . , p} is chosen such that the abstract state corresponding to the
currently observed state belongs to W ikj .
(a4) If a new path is computed in step (a3), then issue this path (i.e., a sequence G =W ikl0 , . . . ,W iklm for some m ∈ {0, . . . , p} where l0, . . . lm ∈ {0, . . . , p}, l0 = j, lm = 0, lα /= lα′
for any α /= α′, and there exists a transition W iklα →W iklα+1 in Tik for any α <m) to the
trajectory planner.
Note that the problem of finding a path in Tik from W ikj to W ik0 can be efficiently solved
using any graph search or shortest-path algorithm [110], such as Dijkstra’s, A*, etc. To
reduce the original synthesis problem to a set of problems with short horizon, the cost
on each edge (W iklα ,W iklα′ ) of the graph built from Tik may be defined, for example, as an
exponential function of the “distance” between the sets W iklα and W iklα′ so that a path with
smaller cost contains segments of shorter “distance.”
Trajectory planner: The trajectory planner maintains the latest sequence G =W ikl0 , . . . ,W iklm
of goal states received from the goal generator, an index q ∈ {1, . . . ,m} of the current goal
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state in G, a strategy F represented by a finite state automaton, and the next abstract state
ν∗ throughout the execution. Starting with q = 1, F being an empty finite state automaton
and ν∗ being a null state, in each iteration, the trajectory planner performs the following
tasks.
(b1) Receive the currently observed state of the plant and environment.
(b2) If a new sequence of goal states is received from the goal generator, update G to this
latest sequence of goal states, update q to 1, and update ν∗ to null. Otherwise, if the
abstract state corresponding to the currently observed state belongs to W iklq , update
q to q + 1 and ν∗ to null.
(b3) If ν∗ is null, then based on the abstraction D of the physical system S, synthesize
a strategy that satisfies the specification in (7.1) with F i(W ij) = W iklq , starting from
the abstract state ν0 corresponding to the currently observed state, i.e., replace the
assumption ν ∈W ij with ν = ν0. Assign this strategy to F and update ν∗ to the state
following the initial state in F based on the current environment state.
(b4) If the controlled state ς∗ component of ν∗ corresponds to the currently observed state
of the plant, update ν∗ to the state following the current ν∗ in F based on the current
environment state.
(b5) If ν∗ was updated in step (b3) or (b4), then issue the controlled state ς∗ to the
continuous controller.
Continuous controller: The continuous controller maintains the most recent (abstract)
final controlled state ς∗ from the trajectory planner. In each iteration, it receives the
currently observed state s of the plant. Then, it computes a control signal u such that the
continuous execution of the system eventually reaches the cell of D corresponding to the
abstract controlled state ς∗ while always staying in the cell corresponding to the abstract
controlled state ς∗ and the cell containing s. Essentially, the continuous execution has
to simulate the abstract plan computed by the trajectory planner. As discussed at the
end of Section 6.5.4, such a control signal can be computed by formulating a constrained
optimal control problem, which can be solved using off-the-shelf software such as MPT [67],
YALMIP [75] or NTG [92].
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From the construction of Ti, i ∈ Ig, it can be verified that the composition of the goal
generator and the trajectory planner correctly implements the receding horizon strategy
described in Section 7.4. Roughly speaking, the path G from W ij to W i0 computed by the
goal generator essentially defines the partial order P i and the corresponding function F i.
For a set W ilα /=W i0 contained in G, we simply let W ilα+1 ≺W ilα and F i(W ilα) =W ilα+1 whereW ilα+1 immediately follows W ilα in G. In addition, since, by assumption, for any i ∈ Ig and
l ∈ {0, . . . , p}, there exists a path in Ti from W il to W i0, it can be easily verified that the
specification Ψil is realizable with F(W il ) =W i0. Thus, to be consistent with the previously
described receding horizon framework, we assign W il ≻W i0 and F(W il ) =W i0 for a set W il not
contained in G. Note that anyW il that is not in the path G does not affect the computational
complexity of the synthesis algorithm. With this definition of the partial order P i and the
corresponding function F i, we can apply Theorem 7.4.1 to conclude that the abstract plan
generated by the trajectory planner ensures the correctness of the system with respect to
the specification in (6.7). In addition, since the continuous controller simulates this abstract
plan, the continuous execution is guaranteed to preserve the correctness of the system.
The resulting system is depicted in Figure 7.5. Note that since it is guaranteed to
satisfy the specification in (6.7), the desired behavior (i.e., the “guarantee” part of (6.7))
is ensured only when the environment and the initial condition respect their assumptions.
To moderate the sensitivity to violation of these assumptions, the trajectory planner may
send a response to the goal generator, indicating the failure of executing the last received
sequence of goals as a consequence of assumption violation. The goal generator can then
remove the problematic transition from the corresponding finite transition system Ti and
recompute a new sequence G of goals. This procedure will be illustrated in the example
presented in Section 7.6. Similarly, a response may be sent from the continuous controller
to the trajectory planner to account for the mismatch between the actual system and its
model. In addition, a local control may be added in order to account for the effect of the
noise and unmodeled dynamics captured by ∆.
7.6 Case Study: Autonomous Urban Driving
Motivated by the challenges faced in the design and verification of a DARPA Urban Chal-
lenge vehicle such as Alice, we consider an autonomous vehicle navigating an urban envi-
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Figure 7.6: The road network and its partition for the autonomous vehicle example. The
solid (black) lines define the states in the set V of the finite state model D used by the
trajectory planner. Examples of subsets W ij are drawn in dotted (red) rectangles. The
stars indicate the positions that need to be visited infinitely often.
ronment while avoiding obstacles and obeying certain traffic rules. The state of the vehicle
is the position (x, y) whose evolution is governed by
x˙(t) = ux(t) + dx(t) and y˙(t) = uy(t) + dy(t)
where ux(t) and uy(t) are control signals and dx(t) and dy(t) are external disturbances at
time t. The control effort is subject the constraints ux(t), uy(t) ∈ [−1,1],∀t ≥ 0. We assume
that the disturbances are bounded by dx(t), dy(t) ∈ [−0.1,0.1],∀t ≥ 0.
We consider the road network shown in Figure 7.6 with three intersections, I1, I2 and
I3, and six roads, R1, R2 (joining I1 and I3), R3, R4 (joining I2 and I3), R5 (joining I1
and I3) and R6 (joining I1 and I2). Each of these roads has two lanes going in opposite
directions. The positive and negative directions for each road are shown in Figure 7.6. We
partition the roads and intersections into N = 282 cells (see Figure 7.6), each of which may
be occupied by an obstacle.
As described in Section 2.1, a planner-controller subsystem of Alice is implemented in a
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hierarchical fashion with Mission Planner computing a route (i.e., a sequence of roads to be
navigated) to achieve the given tasks, the composition of Traffic Planner and Path Planner
computing a path (i.e., a sequence of desired positions) that describes how the vehicle should
navigate the route generated by Mission Planner while satisfying the traffic rules, and Path
Follower computing a control signal such that the vehicle closely follows the path generated
by Traffic Planner. This hierarchical approach follows our general framework for designing
a planner-controller subsystem (see Figure 7.5) with Mission Planner being an instance of
a goal generator and each of the sets W i1, . . . ,W ip being an entire road. However, these
components are typically designed by hand and validated through extensive simulations
and field tests. Although a correct-by-construction approach has been applied in [66],
it is based on building a finite state abstraction of the physical system and synthesizing
a planner that computes a strategy for the whole execution, taking into account all the
possible behaviors of the environment. As discussed in Section 6.4, this approach fails to
handle even modest size problems due to the state explosion issue. In this section, we
apply the receding horizon scheme to substantially reduce computational complexity of the
correct-by-construction approach.
Given this system model, we want to design a planner-controller subsystem for the
vehicle based on the following desired behavior and assumptions.
Desired Behavior : Following the terminology and notations used in Section 6.3, the
desired behavior ϕs in (6.3) includes the following properties.
(P1) Each of the two cells marked by star needs to be visited infinitely often.
(P2) No collision, i.e., the vehicle cannot occupy the same cell as an obstacle.
(P3) The vehicle stays in the travel lane (i.e., right lane) unless there is an obstacle blocking
the lane.
(P4) The vehicle can only proceed through an intersection when the intersection is clear.
Assumptions: We assume that the vehicle starts from an obstacle-free cell on R1 with
at least one obstacle-free cell adjacent to it. This constitutes the assumption ϕinit on the
initial condition of the system. The environment assumption ϕe encapsulates the following
statements, which are assumed to hold throughout each execution.
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(A1) Obstacles may not block a road.
(A2) An obstacle is detected before the vehicle gets too close to it, i.e., an obstacle may
not instantly pop up right in front of the vehicle.
(A3) Sensing range is limited, i.e., the vehicle cannot detect an obstacle that is farther away
from it than a certain distance. In this example, we let this sensing range be two cells
ahead in the driving direction.
(A4) To make sure that the stay-in-lane property is achievable, we assume that an obstacle
does not disappear while the vehicle is in its vicinity.
(A5) Obstacles may not span more than a certain number of consecutive cells in the middle
of the road.
(A6) Each of the intersections is clear infinitely often.
(A7) Each of the cells marked by star and its adjacent cells are not occupied by an obstacle
infinitely often.
The LTL formulas for expressing properties (P2) and (P3) and assumptions (A1)–(A4)
can be found in Section 6.5.5. Property (P4) can be expressed as a safety formula and
property (P1) is a progress property. Finally, assumption (A5) can be expressed as a safety
assumption on the environment while assumptions (A6) and (A7) can be expressed as justice
requirements on the environment.
We follow the hierarchical approach described in Section 6.4. First, we compute a finite
state abstraction D of the system. Following the scheme in Section 6.5, a state ν of D can
be written as ν = (ς, ρ, o1, o2, . . . , oM) where ς ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and ρ ∈ {+,−} are the controlled
state components of ν, specifying the cell occupied by the vehicle and the direction of
travel, respectively, and for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, oi ∈ {0,1} indicates whether the ith cell is
occupied by an obstacle. This leads to the total of 2M2M possible states of D. With the
horizon length N = 12, it can be shown that based on the Reachability Problem defined in
Section 6.5.1, there is a transition ν1 → ν2 in D if the controlled state components of ν1 and
ν2 correspond to adjacent cells (i.e., they share an edge in the road network of Figure 7.6).
Since the only progress property is to visit the two cells marked by star infinitely often,
the set Ig in (6.7) has two elements, say, Ig = {1,2}. We let W10 be the set of abstract states
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whose ς component corresponds to one of these two cells and define W20 similarly for the
other cell as shown in Figure 7.6. Other W ij is defined such that it includes all the abstract
states whose ς component corresponds to cells across the width of the road (see Figure 7.6).
Next, we define Φ such that it excludes states where the vehicle is not in the travel lane
while there is no obstacle blocking the lane and states where the vehicle is in the same cell
as an obstacle or none of the cells adjacent to the vehicle are obstacle-free. Using this Φ,
we can show that for each i ∈ Ig, the specification in (7.1) is realizable with F i(W ij) =W ik
for any j, k, provided that W ij and W ik correspond to adjacent dotted (red) rectangles in
Figure 7.6. The finite transition system Ti used by the goal planner can then be constructed
such that there is a transition W ij →W ik for any adjacent W ij and W ik. With this transition
relation, for any i ∈ Ig and j ∈ {0, . . . , p}, there exists a path in Ti from W ij to W i0 and
the trajectory planner essentially only has to plan one step ahead. Thus, the size of finite
state automata synthesized by the trajectory planner to satisfy the specification in (7.1)
is completely independent of M . Using JTLV [98], each of these automata has less than
900 states and only takes approximately 1.5 seconds to compute on a MacBook with a 2
GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor. In addition, with an efficient graph search algorithm, the
computation time required by the goal generator is on the order of milliseconds. Hence,
with a real-time implementation of optimization-based control such as NTG [86] at the
continuous controller level, our approach can be potentially implemented in real-time.
A simulation result is shown in Figure 7.7(a), illustrating a correct execution of the
vehicle even in the presence of exogenous disturbances when all the assumptions on the
environment and initial condition are satisfied. Note that without the receding horizon
strategy, there can be as many as 1087 states in the automaton, making this problem
practically impossible to solve.
To illustrate the benefit of the response mechanism, we add a road blockage on R2
to violate the assumption (A1). The result is shown in Figure 7.7(b). Once the vehicle
discovers the road blockage, the trajectory planner cannot find the current state of the
system in the finite state automaton synthesized from the specification in (7.1) since the
assumption on the environment is violated. The trajectory planner then informs the goal
generator of the failure to satisfy the corresponding specification with the associated pair
of W ij and F(W ij). Subsequently, the goal generator removes the transition from W ij toF(W ij) in Ti and recomputes a path to W i0. As a result, the vehicle continues to exhibit a
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Figure 7.7: Simulation results with (a) no road blockage, (b) a road blockage on R2.
correct behavior by making a U-turn and completing the task using a different path.
The result with exactly the same setup is also shown in Figure 7.8 where the presence of
exogenous disturbances is not incorporated in the planner-controller subsystem synthesis.
Once the vehicle overtakes the obstacles on R1, the continuous controller computes the
sequence of control inputs that is expected to bring the vehicle back to its travel lane as
commanded by the trajectory planner. However, due to the disturbance, the vehicle remains
in the opposite lane. As a consequence, the trajectory planner keeps sending commands to
the continuous controller to bring the vehicle back to its travel lane but even though the
control inputs computed by the continuous controller are supposed to bring the vehicle back
to its travel lane, the vehicle remains in the opposite lane due to the disturbance. In the
meantime, the disturbance also causes the vehicle to drift slowly to the right. This cycle
continues, leading to violation of the desired property that the vehicle has to stay in the
travel lane unless there is an obstacle blocking the lane.
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Figure 7.8: Simulation result with the presence of disturbances not incorporated in the
planner-controller subsystem synthesis.
7.7 Conclusions
This chapter described a receding-horizon-based framework that allows a computationally
complex synthesis problem to be reduced to a set of significantly smaller problems. The
implementation of the proposed framework led to a hierarchical, modular design with a
goal generator, a trajectory planner and a continuous controller. A response mechanism
that increases the robustness of the system with respect to a mismatch between the system
and its model and between the actual behavior of the environment and its assumptions
was discussed. The example illustrated that the system is capable of exhibiting a correct
behavior even if some of the assumptions on the environment do not hold in the actual
execution.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Summary
Design and analysis of embedded control systems are complicated by the tight interactions
among their computing, communication and control components. Simulations and tests
are not sufficient to guarantee correctness of these systems. Motivated by a subtle design
bug that caused an unsafe behavior of the autonomous vehicle, Alice, built at Caltech for
the 2007 DARPA Urban Challenge, this thesis develops methods and tools for systematic
design and analysis of embedded control software that regulates the overall behavior of such
system. The control component of Alice and the autonomous urban driving problem were
considered throughout the thesis as motivating, real-world examples.
Existing verification methods were applied to prove correctness of various components
of Alice. Periodically Controlled Hybrid Automaton (PCHA), a class of hybrid automata
for modular specication of embedded control systems was introduced. Sufficient conditions
that simplify invariant verification of PCHAs by exploiting their structure were presented.
For PCHAs with polynomial continuous vector fields, it is possible to check these conditions
automatically using, for example, quantifier elimination or sum of squares relaxations. The
proposed technique is then applied to provide a detailed analysis of the design bug that
caused the failure of Alice.
Despite several efforts in simplifying the verification process, verification of embedded
control systems such as Alice remains time consuming and requires some level of expertise.
Existing verification techniques have their limitations. Algorithmic verification based on
model checking is limited to finite state systems. It also faces a combinatorial blow up
of the state space, commonly known as the state explosion problem. On the other hand,
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deductive verification based on theorem proving is applicable to a more general class of
systems. However, it requires a skilled human interaction so the theorem proving process is
slow and often error prone. Most of the control oriented verification techniques are limited
to linear or polynomial vector fields with relatively small dimension. As a consequence,
automatic verification is not applicable to the majority of embedded control systems.
Motivated by these limitations, the second part of the thesis focused on a correct-by-
construction approach to system design to complement the verification efforts. We illus-
trated how off-the-shelf tools from computer science and control can be integrated to allow
automatic synthesis of embedded control software that, by construction, ensures the cor-
rectness of the system with respect to its desired properties even in the presence of an
adversary (typically arising from changes in the environments). This avenue of research is
appealing and promising. Once it is brought to practicality, this type of automatic design
can potentially reduce the time and cost of the system development cycle as it helps reduce
the number of iterations between redesigning the system and verifying the new design.
As an effort towards making correct-by-construction design more practical, a receding
horizon framework was presented. This approach reduces computational complexity of
the synthesis problem by effectively reducing the original synthesis problem into a set of
smaller ones. An implementation of the proposed framework leads to a hierarchical, modular
design similar to the one that was manually designed for Alice. A response mechanism that
increases the robustness of the system with respect to a mismatch between the system
and its model and between the actual behavior of the environment and its assumptions
was discussed. This mechanism was motivated by the Canonical Software Architecture
implemented on Alice. By taking into account the presence of exogenous disturbances
in the synthesis process, the resulting system is provably robust with respect to bounded
exogenous disturbances. We conjecture that this architecture also increases the robustness
of the system with respect to modeling uncertainties.
The proposed receding-horizon-based approach is not complete in the sense that even if
there exists a control strategy that satisfies the system requirements, certain conditions that
allow the receding horizon method to be applied may not be satisfied. It also requires some
human involvement in defining proper elements necessary to apply this approach. Although
the receding horizon framework substantially reduces the size of the automatically generated
finite state automaton, this automaton still contains many more states than the manually
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generated one (Figure 2.2). However, the correctness of the automatically generated one is
guaranteed by construction, while the manually generated one needs to be formally verified
for correctness.
8.2 Future Work
On the verification side, an interesting direction for future research is towards automatic
invariant proofs of PCHAs combining the proofs for invariance of control steps and for
invariance of control-free fragments based on the results of Lemma 5.3.1. Invariance of
control steps can be partially automated using a theorem prover (e.g., PVS [93]) while
invariance of control-free fragments can be automated using software tools for solving sum
of squares problems (e.g., SOSTOOLS [106]) or software tools for quantifier elimination
(e.g., QEPCAD [17], the constraint-based approach [43]). We are currently examining a
collection of PCHAs with polynomial dynamics for which this direction is promising.
Another direction of future research is related to the progress property. Although the
basic principle is straightforward, the details of the progress proof in Section 5.5.3 and 5.5.4
are quite involved. This is partly owing to the difficulty of finding the appropriate Lyapunov
functions. In the future, we plan on investigating this further and using ideas from [21] for
the progress proof. A longer term goal is to integrate all these proof techniques within the
TEMPO [115] environment.
The correct-by-construction approach to system design provides a promising comple-
mentary approach to system verification. One of the main limitations of the correct-by-
construction approach lies in the computational complexity associated with LTL synthesis,
similar to that faced by LTL model checking. The proposed receding horizon framework
alleviates this state explosion problem and allows more complex embedded control software
synthesis problems to be solved. The key steps in this framework include organizing the
discrete states obtained from the state space discretization process into a partially ordered
set and defining the receding horizon invariant Φ. A systematic approach for defining these
elements needs to be further investigated.
Further investigation of the robustness of the receding horizon framework is also of in-
terest. Specifically, we want to formally identify the types of properties and faults/failures
that can be correctly handled using the proposed response mechanism. This type of mech-
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anism has been implemented on Alice for distributed mission and contingency management
[121]. Based on extensive simulations and field tests, it has been shown to handle many
types of failures and faults at different levels of the system, including inconsistency of the
states of different software modules and hardware and software failures. A similar response
mechanism also appears in the multi-layered synergistic approach presented in [12].
Online computation of the discrete plan generated by the trajectory planner is also
promising. As presented in the thesis, the trajectory planner synthesizes an automaton
satisfying each short-horizon specification Ψij offline, stores all the resulting automata and
executes the one associated with the current intermediate goal. Since the computation time
for synthesizing each of these automata is only 1.5 seconds for the case studies presented
in Section 7.6, online synthesis is promising, provided that enough onboard computational
power is available. Online synthesis also potentially reduces the computation time and the
number of states in the resulting automaton since the synthesis can be performed based
on the current state of the system and the environment, as opposed to having to take into
account all the possible states of the environment as in offline synthesis.
Another direction of research is to study an asynchronous execution of the goal generator,
the trajectory planner and the continuous controller. As described in Chapter 7, these
components are to be executed sequentially. However, with certain assumptions on the
communication channels, a distributed, asynchronous implementation of these components
may still guarantee the correctness of the system.
Introducing optimization in LTL synthesis is also of interest since it allows the trajectory
planner to compute an optimal correct plan, instead of any correct plan. Optimal LTL
synthesis allows the possibility of considering soft constraints such as the maximum amount
of time or energy needed to achieve the goal. Considering multiple goals in this case may
lead to exponential computational complexity since all the permutations of the goals need
to be consider. Hence, we may have to limit its application to the case where only a small
number of goals are specified and consider, for example, the worst case scenario for the
evolution of the environment.
We believe that system verification needs to be integrated in the correct-by-construction
approach in order to handle large scale systems. For instance, finite state abstraction based
on state space discretization often leads to a large number of states. Together with the
use of the receding horizon framework, a higher level abstraction such as one based on
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the set of allowable maneuvers as implemented on Alice may be needed in order to deal
with large scale systems. This type of higher level abstraction requires incorporating a
certain degree of system verification in proving properties that each maneuver satisfies.
Longer term research directions following this work include incorporating such proofs in
the receding horizon framework and illustrating its application in larger scale systems such
as smart grids and transportation systems. The challenges in applying the methodology
presented in this thesis to these different application domains include identifying the right
level of abstraction and the desired properties of these systems. In addition, the notion of
“closeness” to the goal states captured by the partially ordered set P i, which is one of the
key elements in applying the receding horizon framework, may not be as obvious as in the
examples presented in the thesis.
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